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Abstract 
The nature of the Internet has changed dramatically. From a modest research network, it has 
evolved into one of the most important fabrics of our modern society, affecting the lives of 
billions each day. We rely on it for everything from performing our daily chores to accessing 
rich media and keeping in touch with our friends. 
Despite this change, service provisioning has largely remained intact. Services are provided 
in a centralized manner, resulting in bottlenecks and vulnerable collections of, often 
unwittingly, submitted sensitive information. Peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies have the 
potential to provide a better alternative for future networking. P2P services distribute the load 
from a single node to a network of peers, relying on the resources of the end-users themselves. 
Not only does it remove the bottlenecks, it has the potential to provide a more personal and safe 
networking environment. 
In this dissertation, we inspect the feasibility and implications of a generic, cross-application, 
P2P framework. We present the design and implementation of a framework that uses 
existing infrastructure and advanced networking protocols to create a secure environment. 
Using this framework, applications are able to beneﬁt from P2P networking without having to 
deploy new infrastructure or implement complex connection- and identity management. Users 
beneﬁt from using a single, strong, cross-application identity management and having better 
control over their data. This improves the trust within the system and enables new ways of 
dealing with security threats. 
We demonstrate the feasibility of the framework by evaluating the performance and usability 
of the prototype implementation. This provides a model for future networking applications and 
insight into the security and usability issues these will face. 
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Author’s Contribution
The work for this dissertation started at the TrustInet 1 project with the
intent of studying how trust-based solutions can be used to enhance secu-
rity in distributed environments. The project begun with simple experi-
ments on call ﬁltering using a P2P SIP prototype. It quickly grew into a
generic platform for evaluating security mechanisms in distributed appli-
cations. As of today, the platform has been used for experimenting with a
number of security mechanisms and different applications.
The main contributions of this dissertation are:
• The design and evaluation of a cost-effective secure P2P application frame-
work. Using a prototype for mobile devices, we evaluate our P2P appli-
cation framework that enables applications to securely communicate in
distributed environments. The feasibility of our framework is demon-
strated using performance measurements, protocol analysis and usabil-
ity evaluation. Using infrastructure based on redundancy of indepen-
dent unreliable resources, we show that networks can be built cost-
effectively, and quantify their limitations. Through these evaluations,
we show that our framework provides a less expensive, but secure, al-
ternative for building generic overlay networks.
• A secure model for P2P web. We design and evaluate P2P web inte-
gration using a novel security scheme and a distributed caching model.
Combined with the security mechanisms of our framework, it provides
protection both from eavesdropping and malicious content. Unlike tra-
ditional approaches to distributed caching, we do not assume all nodes
to be trustworthy, but include the security needed to provide authen-
ticity and protect the privacy of users. The model is evaluated using a
1Trustworthy Internet (TrustInet) http://trustinet.hiit.ﬁ
7
Author’s Contribution
prototype implementation.
• A privacy-enhancement scheme for identity-based P2P networks. We an-
alyze the privacy issues of strong identity-based P2P networks and de-
velop a generic scheme that allows users to hide their actions frommem-
bers of the overlay, while still leveraging resources shared by those. The
scheme is implemented and evaluated, with special focus on the per-
formance and usability of the solution. To our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst complete attempt at solving privacy issues in P2P networks based
on persistent identities, as traditional approaches concentrate only on
hiding the current owner of a dynamic identity.
• A privacy-conscious mechanism for trafﬁc ﬁltering in P2P environments
based on relationships. We developed a Bloom ﬁlter- based solution for
virally sharing relationship information, suited for trafﬁc ﬁltering. We
analyze the security issues of viral relationship sharing, and present a
novel protocol for the safe, and privacy-preserving, distribution of these.
The scheme is evaluated with metrics recorded from from real-life so-
cial networks, and compared to current solutions with regards to the
security of the solution and overhead. We show that it efﬁciently pro-
tects both sides of an exchange, and provides, with a high degree of
certainty, a relationship path between the two while keeping the inter-
mediate links anonymous.
This dissertation does not address the speciﬁcs of any particular P2P
overlay protocol. Topics such as churn, routing overhead and network-
level scalability are not discussed as far as they concern the overlay struc-
ture. We concentrate on the structure and security of applications using
these overlays, and leave the networking details to the designers of those
protocols.
The design of the framework was done jointly with Juho Heikkilä and
Andrei Gurtov, although the author acted as the main architect and was
responsible for implementing, and evaluating, the prototype. The de-
sign was published in [64] and [98]. In [64], the author contributed to
the architecture description and was responsible for developing a method
for efﬁciently distributing the service discovery process. The identity
model, and use of mobile cross-application identities, is a topic the author
brought to the framework from his related research [104]. The author
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was responsible for designing a generic interface which allowed the inte-
gration of external identity management systems, as well as to integrate
the system used in [104].
Application support, web integration and cooperative caching, as de-
scribed in [98][99], was designed and implemented by the author. The
author was also responsible for designing and executing the feasibility
evaluations, as well as developing the optimizations.
The P2P web security enhancements are based on work done jointly
with Nicholas Weaver, Mark Allman and Andrei Gurtov on adding attri-
bution and integrity to web pages using cross-application identities [104].
The author was responsible for developing the concept, and conceiving
a way of integrating it into web pages and servers, as well as the de-
velopment of the prototype system. The author was also responsible for
adapting the concept to P2P environments, and integrating it with the
P2P framework.
The privacy enhancements were conceived and designed by the author.
The prototype implementation and functional evaluation was completed
jointly by the author and Cheevarat Jampathom. The results were pub-
lished in a conference paper [103] written jointly with Professor Sasu
Tarkoma of the University of Helsinki.
The study of the usability aspects of the security solutions, and VoIP in
general, was done by Theofanis Kilinkaridis and Kristiina Karvonen. The
author was responsible for providing technical details, and for deﬁning the
bounds for the paper mock-ups. The initial user interface for the security
enhancements was designed by the author, although inﬂuenced by dis-
cussions with Theofanis Kilinkaridis and Kristiina Karvonen. The work
of evaluating the interface, and subsequent improvements, were done by
Kristiina Karvonen, Sanna Shibasaki and the author. Parts of this work
has been published in [102] and [101].
Filtering trafﬁc based on social networks (relationships) is a topic con-
ceived by the TrustInet project group and developed by Juho Heikkilä.
The author’s role was to design an alternative mechanism suitable for
fully P2P networks. The author was responsible for studying how Bloom
ﬁlters could be used in a secure, and privacy preserving manner, and con-
ceiving and implementing the solutions presented in this thesis. This
work was has been published in [100].
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1. Introduction
Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems have been a popular research topic during the
past years, as they have the potential to offer more reliable, fault-tolerant
and cost-efﬁcient networking. As these systems are built on the resources
of the participating client nodes themselves, they are not dwarfed by
the reliability, trustworthiness and performance of dedicated ’bottleneck’
servers. The advantages are well known, and over the past decade, we
have seen a surge of applications which to some degree rely on P2P tech-
nologies.
Although the concept is as old as computer networking, service provi-
sioning has long followed a centralized model. A widespread, serious,
interest in P2P service provisioning did not begin before the end of the
last century when ﬁle-sharing systems such as Napster 1, the Gnutella
network, and more recently BitTorrent and the Skype2 messaging appli-
cation, managed to demonstrate the enormous potential of P2P technolo-
gies in providing scalable solutions to otherwise infeasible services.
Meanwhile, the nature of the Internet has evolved from an encyclopedic-
like directory of information to a social medium, where people interact
and express themselves. Much of the content we see on the Internet today,
such as photographs, blog posts and product reviews, is produced by the
users themselves. Even sites without user generated content often embed
elements that enable social interaction, such as like and share- buttons
that allow users to recommend content to others. However, the end-user
has no real control over how this information is used. The billions of bits
of data produced each day are stored in the service providers’ databases,
creating vast collections of sensitive information.
In addition to being more scalable, P2P technologies have the potential
1http://www.napster.com
2http://www.skype.com
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to provide a safer networking environment for this modern, social, Inter-
net. As the users themselves take part in the provisioning, they have
better control over how information is managed. However, P2P- based
services are still few in today’s Internet, and considered special, tech-
nically complex. Each one has required carefully designed solutions for
connectivity issues and security threats, that ﬁt the characteristics and
environment of that particular application.
This has lead to highly specialized solutions optimized for a single cause,
and to the deployment of speciﬁcally tailored infrastructure. The service
model is decided early on, and the application is built very aware of the
network topology, whether P2P or centralized, it operates in. Chang-
ing the underlying service model is costly, requiring a fundamental re-
evaluation of how the application works, and many known, and unknown,
issues to be solved. Furthermore, as P2P implies that a provider relin-
quishes some of the control over the service, investing in P2P is commit-
ment that is hard to justify unless there are immediate beneﬁts, such as
when the application is exceptionally resource intensive.
The topic of this dissertation is to address the application-level issues
that raise the threshold for utilizing distributed service provisioning. By
designing a generic P2P application framework, we have created an envi-
ronment that allows us to study the requirements of these applications,
and to quantify and develop solutions to the problems encountered. How-
ever, our focus is not on solely P2P-speciﬁc issues, but rather on how ap-
plications should be designed, and what it would mean for them, to be
oblivious to the underlying network structure. This would enable services
that can be hosted either way, thus easing the transition for both existing,
as well as completely new, types of applications to special environments.
Compared to existing research on P2P networking, our focus is not on
the structure and protocols of the overlay network, but rather on how
applications, even existing ones, adapt to environments without a ﬁxed
structure or trusted authority. We sketch an overall architecture within
which different, current or future, network protocols can be used. Sec-
ondly, we do not assume a speciﬁc type of networking application, but
examine the issues common to all, independent of their data transfer pat-
terns or other characteristics. We do not assume that the applications are
even aware of the underlying framework, but create a system which can
be combined even with unmodiﬁed legacy applications.
Much of our work revolves around the synergy and security of applica-
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tions, i.e., how a dispersed set of users can bootstrap new applications and
communicate safely without a centralized authority. But we also examine
more practical issues, such as ensuring availability and fairness. Creat-
ing a P2P framework that could explore these issues has conventionally
been a daunting task, requiring commitment and investment to both the
framework and the applications meant to use it. Fueled by the recent ex-
plosion of consumer-oriented cloud services, our insight is that not only
can we utilize existing, readily available infrastructure and protocols to
provide such a framework, but we can adapt existing applications to it.
As the work presented in this dissertation is based on experiments us-
ing our generic P2P framework for mobile devices, we begin by reviewing
the design, placing special emphasis on the strong identity scheme which
is the cornerstone of the system’s security. Through evaluations and mea-
surements, we show that P2P overlays can be deployed at low cost using
readily available generic cloud resources, while remaining secure and re-
sponsive.
We continue by describing the application-level issues we have stud-
ied in this environment, and presenting our solutions. First we study
the privacy issues related to using the unreliable peer resources in P2P
networks. We develop a simple scheme, and discuss the usability impli-
cations of it. Secondly we address relationships and trust in distributed
systems using a novel privacy- conscious introduction mechanism. We
continue by examining data availability and fairness in these networks by
studying a distributed web caching scheme and presenting the improve-
ments to a novel incentives mechanism for data distribution. We ﬁnish
with our ﬁndings from a study of the usability of distributed communica-
tion systems, presenting our solutions to making security usable in these
environments.
1.1 Problem statement
The goal of the research of this dissertation is to develop and explore dif-
ferent aspects of a secure P2P framework. We believe that P2P provides
a more natural ﬁt for future networking applications, as the focus is in-
creasingly shifting towards mobile access and user- centric interaction.
However, creating new applications for these environments is difﬁcult.
There are a number of issues to consider, including deployment, security
and usability, to which no obvious solutions exist. These are the problems
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we are addressing. Speciﬁcally, the main research problems are stated as
follows.
i How do we design a P2P framework that is easily deployable in both
present and future networking environments?
ii How do we manage identities and security without a centralized au-
thority?
iii How do we design a generic framework that supports a wide range of
applications and networking models?
As for the ﬁrst question, deployability is a key issue when designing
new software. Our goal is not to design the most efﬁcient network proto-
col, but rather to create a framework that is practical and can actually be
deployed in the current, and future, Internet. An efﬁcient way of achiev-
ing good deployability is to re-use existing technologies and resources in
an innovative manner, which is the approach we have taken. To better
adapt to future networks, we set out with few requirements or assump-
tions regarding the intended network environments. By abstracting the
resource management based on the least common denominator of what is
available today, our goal is to develop a robust framework which not only
is deployable in various networks, but also migrates easily between those.
Aiming at producing a truly P2P framework, suitable even for mobile
and ad-hoc networks, we need a design that replaces the traditional cen-
tralized approach to identity management with a distributed solution.
The integrity of identities is a crucial prerequisite for any type of secu-
rity, however, it is not the only issue related to identity management in
distributed environments. Privacy and how peers relate to each other, the
trust between users, must also be carefully considered.
As P2P systems form a network between the participating nodes, used
to collectively perform tasks and manage resources, the network itself be-
comes the service provider. Where there once was a trusted, centralized
component, we now have a collection of possibly non-trusted nodes. Most
P2P systems have few mechanisms in place for controlling how informa-
tion is propagated within the network. Considering a P2P telephony ap-
plication, signaling exchange made through the network (such as media
content, call set-up, messaging or presence information) can potentially
be intercepted and abused, or forged, by any one of the peers. This raises
concerns about privacy and how to protect information, as well as places
the dependability of the nodes in the spotlight.
Without a trusted provider to govern users and protect us from mali-
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cious peers, we have to rethink how we establish and use trust in these
environments. We can only rely on what we know ourselves, our experi-
ences, as well as what we have heard from others we trust. Furthermore,
as computer networks spread across borders and cultures, even the no-
tion of what is correct, or trustworthy, will differ. We should explore how
we can design a model that uses our own knowledge and assumptions to
judge what is safe, while providing a sufﬁcient level of security.
Also, as we are designing a P2P framework, we should consider iden-
tity and content management broadly, including how different applica-
tions could beneﬁt from having uniﬁed framework-managed identities.
We should consider what it means to have users represented in a uniﬁed
manner across different applications. It may create new opportunities
and ways of communicating, but can also carry unwanted side effects. We
should rethink what content and information sharing in such an environ-
ment means. By using strong identities and different types of networking,
we transform on-line sharing from being tied to a speciﬁc service provider
to an activity where the service providers and networks we choose act
merely as a medium for communication.
Finally, as the purpose of the framework is to serve a range of applica-
tions instead of only a few (as most existing P2P systems), one of the re-
search problems is to examine and design ways in which applications can
interact with it. In addition to new application programming interfaces
(APIs), this includes support for existing legacy applications such as voice
and video-call applications. We want to create a framework which can
transform these from a centralized model into P2P applications suitable
for private, mobile or ad-hoc networks. This requires careful planning of
the application interfaces the framework provides, and other integration
details.
1.2 Methodology and tools
Large parts of the research is based on experiments conducted using an
implementation of a P2P application framework prototype. The approach
has therefore been a combination of background research, empirical eval-
uation, experimental analysis and engineering effort.
The process for researching the topics of this dissertation is best de-
scribed as an iterative process. After a research problem arose, the topic
was analyzed, identifying possible sub-components and the areas of the
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application framework it affected. Literature surveys were conducted
throughout the process, to identify possible solutions and gain a deeper
understanding of the issues. The ﬁrst steps towards a solution to the
problems were taken using qualitative analysis. The factors affecting the
problem, and possible solution models were sketched. This was followed
by initial empirical analysis of the proposed solutions, where prototypes
and simulations were implemented and experimented with using either
real-world, or constructed, data sets. Following the initial validation, a
prototype for the framework was implemented and evaluated, usually us-
ing the Python plug-in interface of the framework. The solution was fur-
ther optimized and improved based on the results, or discarded if it was
found faulty or infeasible. Finally the implementation was ﬁnalized, and
deployed.
Much of the experimental results were obtained from a test-bed set up at
the Helsinki Institute for Information Technology (HIIT) ofﬁce in Espoo,
Finland. For certain experiments that required data sets not feasible to
collect as part of this dissertation, models from well-known sources (such
as real-world social networks) were used.
The primary platform for the research was the Nokia Internet tablet
N810. Although these are not considered to be a high-end mobile devices
today, feature-wise they represent what we expect from a modern, hand-
held, computing environment. The N810 was selected due to its good
availability at the start of the research, as well as for its excellent de-
velopment environment. The framework was developed using the Meamo
SDK3, which relies on the Scratchbox4 cross-compilation toolkit. The soft-
ware engineering was done using desktop- and laptop computers, using
the Vim5 (Vi iMproved) and GNU Emacs6 editors and the GNU toolchain
and compiler collection7.
The early prototypes, as well as most server-side software, were built
using the Python8 interpreter. Measurements were conducted using a
range of tools, including iperf, ping, wget and curl on Debian-based desk-
top computers. Hip for Linux (HIPL) version 1.0.4 was used to provide
HIP support, and Miredo 1.1.5 for Teredo networking. A set of bash shell
3http://maemo.org/development/
4http://www.scratchbox.org
5http://www.vim.org
6http://www.gnu.org/emacs/
7http://gcc.gnu.org
8http://www.python.org
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scripts, as well as LibreOfﬁce9 was used to summarize the data and con-
struct charts.
1.3 Structure of Dissertation
The dissertation is organized as follows. Background on the relevant tech-
nologies and existing systems which have inﬂuenced our work, or show
similarities, is given in Chapter 2. Following the background, we present
the rational behind, the design and ﬁnally the implementation of our so-
lution in Chapter 3. We explain the different assumptions and require-
ments that affected the design, and how these were met. We continue by
describing the key design principles and how these are applied to current
and future networking environments, complete with an overview of the
prototype implementation. In Chapter 4 we review the implementation,
providing results from our evaluation of it. Through network performance
measurements, observations from use on mobile devices and static analy-
sis of the protocols we assess the feasibility of our approach.
This is followed by chapters discussing in detail different security en-
hancements and other features we have studied using the framework.
Chapter 5 explores privacy issues in distributed environments, and de-
scribes the design and implementation of a privacy-enhancing mode for
our framework.
Chapter 6 addresses two fundamental challenges of P2P Web: security
and accessibility. We present a novel method for adding accountability
to the web, which combined with a cooperative caching scheme enables
a secure and usable Web experience in distributed environments. Chap-
ter 7 describes our work with relationship-based trafﬁc ﬁltering, where
we present a novel Bloom ﬁlter- based scheme for distributing relation-
ship information in a privacy- conscious and secure manner.
Finally, we directed our attention to the usability of our solution, and
P2P communication in general. In Chapter 8 we study attitudes and as-
sumptions towards mobile P2P communication, and describe the user in-
terface design process. We analyzed the usability of the current prototype
and identiﬁed how the issues discovered could be improved. This disser-
tation ends with a discussion on the current status, together with future
work in Chapter 9, and conclusions in Chapter 10.
9http://www.libreofﬁce.org
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2. Background
This chapter presents an overview of the technologies and existing work
relevant to our framework. We start by reviewing P2P concepts and tech-
nologies. We continue by introducing public-key cryptography and the
concept of strong identities. We conclude by presenting relevant network
communication protocols and reviewing security and connectivity issues
seen in the Internet today.
2.1 Peer-to-peer technologies
The modern understanding of a P2P system is a distributed communica-
tion system where the end-users themselves contribute resources to sus-
tain the system. By contrast, the current model for providing most of the
network-based services is through a centralized approach. In these sys-
tems, the service provider operates all the resources (such as servers and
networking capabilities) needed to maintain the service, while the users
only connect to access those. Even though the service itself provides inter-
action and cooperation between users, on the networking-level users only
interact with the service provider. The content shared (such as images or
chat messages) is actually only shared with the service provider, who can
then decide how it is used, or to whom it is made visible.
P2P systems allow users to network without service providers, by hav-
ing the resources needed to maintain the system provided by the par-
ticipating users themselves. Although P2P-like networking in different
forms has been utilized since the dawn of the Internet, it has rarely been
between the end-users themselves, but rather between different types of
nodes within the network (distributed services). The modern type of P2P
networking, where the end-users’ devices actively participate to provide
the service, was popularized in late 1990 by ﬁle-sharing systems. Fig-
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ure 2.1 illustrates these different ways of providing networking services.
Figure 2.1. Different types of network services. Centralized services are provided by
a (logically) single node, while distributed use a network of interconnected
nodes. Peer-to-peer services utilize the resources of the end-users.
P2P networking is an active area of research, and over time we have
seen numerous contributions helping the technology to evolve into being
more reliable and robust. The ﬁrst modern P2P systems were quite sim-
ple, often relying on a centralized resource lookup service, and using P2P
connections only for data trafﬁc. Modern systems incorporate efﬁcient
information lookup without a single point of failure, advanced network
traversal techniques and anonymization of both content and users. In
the following we review different classiﬁcations of P2P systems, includ-
ing real-life examples of them. Furthermore, we summarize the different
advantages and issues with using P2P technologies.
2.1.1 Peer-to-peer network structures
P2P systems can be divided into structured and unstructured based on
the algorithm used to organize the network and propagate information
within it. Structured P2P systems are based on organizing the network so
that information is sought in a deterministic manner using a speciﬁc algo-
rithm, such as a Distribute Hash Table (DHT). These systems are based
on assigning identiﬁers to nodes and organizing the nodes so that data
destined for a speciﬁc node identiﬁer can be routed in an efﬁcient manner.
Data lookup is commonly based on assigning identiﬁers to the resources
from the same name space as the node identiﬁers, and distributing the
responsibility of these based on the proximity to the node identiﬁers.
Unstructured P2P systems are constructed in a more ad-hoc manner,
where nodes join the network at random locations. Information propaga-
tion is usually relatively inefﬁcient, often relying on ﬂooding and time-
to-live values. In many ways these mimic the natural patterns of infor-
mation propagation; knowledge is shared with those that happen to be in
the vicinity. Unstructured P2P networks are therefore better suited for
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casual information sharing, for systems where simplicity and proximity
is appreciated. Structured P2P systems are designed for systems where
performance and completeness is of key importance.
Unstructured P2P systems can further be divided into three subgroups
based on the architecture of the network: Centralized, Pure and Hybrid
P2P systems.
2.1.2 Network topologies
Centralized P2P systems are systems where a single centralized node is
used for various tasks such as resource lookup (indexing) or for bootstrap-
ping the system. The centralized node acts as a rendezvous for the peers,
allowing them to locate each other, while the actual application data (e.g.,
a ﬁle transfer) is exchanged directly between the peers. Although the ap-
plication data is exchanged without interference of the centralized node,
these systems share many of the problems of centralized client-server sys-
tems such as single-point of failure and performance bottlenecks. How-
ever, these are also the easiest to create, manage and use. With central-
ized access control and authentication, the peers are relieved from much
of the responsibility of keeping the system secure. This is also reﬂected
in the usability of the applications, as they differ hardly at all from those
based on centralized networking. In many ways, these can be seen as
merely a variation of centralized systems where only a single task is del-
egated to P2P networking.
Pure P2P systems are systems where all peers contribute equally to the
system. These systems do not suffer from having a single point of failure,
but can be inefﬁcient as queries may have to traverse a large number of
peers as each single one has a very limited view of the network. These are
also the most complex to set up and manage. System designers have to
consider issues such as routing, security and usability carefully. Without
a central authority, it is hard to identify and exclude malicious or mis-
behaving peers. Verifying that the data exchanged through the network
is correct and remain unaltered while in transit requires a good secu-
rity framework. Routing within the network also becomes complex as the
peers responsible for forwarding packets may enter and leave at will.
Hybrid P2P systems try to combine the best features of both pure and
centralized P2P systems. In hybrid networks, a subset of the peers (often
referred to as super peers) is given more responsibility based on their
resources or strategic position within the network. These do not suffer
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from having a single point of failure as centralized systems, while offering
better performance than pure P2P systems. The super peers are used
for rendezvous and indexing of resources, reducing the amount of peers
requests need to traverse. Figure 2.2 depicts the different types of P2P
network topologies.
Figure 2.2. Illustration of the different types of P2P network topologies.
2.1.3 Peer-to-peer network examples
In the following, we review the details of two P2P protocols, one using a
structured architecture and one using an unstructured one to illustrate
the difference.
Gnutella
The Gnutella network is considered to be the ﬁrst completely decentral-
ized P2P network to gain a wide popularity. The Gnutella network was
created for sharing ﬁles using keyword searches. Its primary task is to
route user-made content queries and the corresponding responses, as well
as to assist in creating the connections for the actual ﬁle transfer. The
original Gnutella network consisted entirely of nodes of equal value that
all participated in the maintenance of the network. When joining the net-
work, a node established a pre-deﬁned number of connections (originally
ﬁve) to peers already within the network. The location of these nodes
were found using, for instance, dynamic lists stored on well-known web
locations.
When submitting a query, it was forwarded to each of the connected
peers, who further forwarded it to their connections. Queries contained a
hop-counter (time to live, TTL, counter), which was increased each time.
This counter thus kept track of the spread of the query, and queries were
dropped after traversing a speciﬁc distance (originally seven hops) to pre-
vent the network from being ﬁlled with inﬁnite queries.
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The Gnutella network was in this manner fully distributed and put
an equal amount of load on each peer. However, due to the ﬂooding
mechanism, the trafﬁc within the network grows exponentially relative
to the network size. This leads to the system easily being overloaded,
and is therefore not considered scalable. To overcome these problems,
and also enable lighter, resource-constrained clients, the Gnutella proto-
col has since evolved. Currently it features a hybrid architecture where
super nodes, nodes with greater network and processing capacity, connect
to a large number of hosts and serve as a proxy for regular clients. Fur-
thermore, due to this new architecture, the maximum hop count of queries
has been limited and experiments have been made for routing the query
responses directly to the query initiator’s super node instead of through
the Gnutella network.
Chord
The Chord [167] protocol is one of the ﬁrst structured P2P protocols
developed. It provides an m-bit key-based lookup with an O(logN) node
traversal guarantee (where N is the number of nodes in the system) for
ﬁnding a piece of content in a P2P network. The size of the key space
(value of m) is chosen according to the intended use of the system to pro-
vide a space sufﬁciently large to minimize the probability of overlapping
key values. Applications of chord use these keys, in a hash table- manner,
to retrieve pieces of data from the network, hence the term distributed
hash table (DHT).
The Chord network is often illustrated as a ring where the participating
nodes and content are distributed. Each node is assigned a position on
the ring numbered 0 to 2m (where m is the key space size). Chord relies
on consistent hashing (such as SHA-1[43]) to assign the position (e.g., the
hash value of the node’s IP address) as well as for generating the content
keys. The statistically unique and uniformly distributed properties of the
hash function in use are integral for the Chord network to create a well-
balanced network.
When joining a Chord network, the node is assigned its position (peer
identiﬁer) from the key space. With this assignment, it is given respon-
sibility for maintaining all content which have a key value in the range
between itself and the previous node on the Chord ring. Due to the prop-
erties of the key- and position-assigning algorithms, in a network with K
keys and N nodes, each node is responsible for roughly K/N keys.
Each node maintains an up to m-entry table of the successor nodes (the
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Figure 2.3. A 6-bit Chord ring illustrating the ﬁnger nodes of node 0.
closest node clockwise on the ring) for the values n + 2i, where i ranges
from 0 to m. When receiving a query for a key, unless the node itself
is responsible for it, the query is forwarded using this table to the closest
preceding node on the ring (which may forward it further). As these ﬁnger
tables are logarithmic, each forward will bring the query closer to the
responsible node by at least half of the remaining distance.
Figure 2.4. Illustration of the message propagation in Chord when fetching key 43.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate the ﬁnger table and lookup process respec-
tively in a six-bit Chord ring. Other structured P2P protocols include the
Content-Addressable Network (CAN) [139], Tapestry [182], Pastry [147]
and Kademlia [116] These represent the early work on structured P2P
systems and DHTs, and are often the basis for current research. The key
differences between these are found in how they manage the exchange
of nodes in the network, routing logic and the amount of redundancy in
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connections and data placement. The exchange (joining and leaving) of
nodes often result in a ﬂood of maintenance trafﬁc, which is important to
optimize as it can overload the network in real-life scenarios. Redundancy
and routing logic on the other hand affects the performance and stability
of the networks.
2.1.4 Applications of peer-to-peer networking
As previously noted, P2P networking is not a novel concept, in fact, much
of the Internet is built on the same concepts. Even among the ﬁrst In-
ternet applications to gain a wide popularity we ﬁnd examples, such as
email and Usenet news (Network News Transfer Protocol, NNTP), that
are based on a decentralized model. Even though these were truly P2P
systems, as the hosts participating in the network were also used by the
end-users (even if through remote terminals), with the introduction of
personal computing the participating nodes took on the role of service
providers for the end-users’ clients. It was not until it became common
for end-users to handle multimedia and other large data that the need for
P2P networking re-emerged.
With the surge of home Internet connectivity, the amount and ease of
sharing data on a wider scale grew exponentially. However, sharing was
very limited compared to current standards, often in private circles inac-
cessible to the public. Using P2P data transfers enabled public sharing
systems to emerge, as it signiﬁcantly decreased the load on the sharing
sites. Today, ﬁle sharing remains the most popular use of P2P network-
ing, with one application in particular, BitTorrent1, responsible for a large
share of all Internet trafﬁc.
Another popular use for P2P is within personal communication applica-
tions. The best known example of these is Skype 2, a free communication
system allowing voice and video telephony, as well as instant messaging
and ﬁle sharing. Although the system is closed and uses proprietary tech-
nology, analysis has shown that it operates using a hybrid P2P network
model [17]. This can be seen as a key enabler in its success, as a cen-
tralized model would have required large investments in infrastructure
which might have made it impossible to offer the service for free. Other
P2P communication systems and initiatives have since emerged, includ-
ing Peer-to-Peer SIP (P2PSIP), presented in more detail in Chapter 2.5.
1http://www.bittorrent.com
2http://www.skype.com
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Structured P2P networks are often used in systems where the perfor-
mance and completeness can be guaranteed. Due to these characteristics,
they can be used also for storing and retrieving data, rather than just as
a fabric for pairing peers. Examples include distributed data storage and
ﬁle systems [148] [36], caching [76] [175] and content search (such as the
FAROO3 and YaCy4). These systems have been shown to be robust and
reliable even though a large portion of the overlay’s nodes would fail [36].
Furthermore, structured P2P networks can also be used in conjunction
with unstructured P2P systems. Especially centralized P2P systems can
beneﬁt from replacing the centralized components with a structured P2P
network for increased robustness, as demonstrated by the Bittorrent DHT
tracker.
2.1.5 Tradeoffs of peer-to-peer networking
P2P systems have several beneﬁts over traditional client-server systems.
As the peers contribute resources (network bandwidth, storage or compu-
tation power), the total capacity of the network increases as peers join,
which makes it more scalable in theory. Except for centralized P2P sys-
tems, the network may also become more reliable and robust as there is
no single point of failure. However, as P2P networks use the resources
of the clients, weak clients can negatively impact the performance of the
whole network. Furthermore, the additional load put on the clients may
be problematic for some (such as mobile devices), where power consump-
tion is critical and the storage capacity is limited.
However, the performance and efﬁciency of even the tinyest computing
devices evolve over time, giving us more capacity and networking capa-
bility per Watt of energy. In recent studies, it has been shown that even
for small hand-held mobile devices (such as PDAs and smartphones), P2P
networking is by no means infeasible [125] [129] [126]. Furthermore, it
has been shown that it is possible to modify, or tune, P2P systems into be-
ing better suited for mobile devices [91] [89] [90]. For instance, by paying
attention to communication patterns and implementing smart idle sens-
ing [60] and grouping of messages [14], or using probabilistic message
dropping [92] substantial energy savings can be made while maintain-
ing acceptable network performance. Another approach is to leverage the
mobility of nodes, which has resulted in systems such as PReCinCt which
3http://www.faroo.com/
4http://yacy.net/
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leverage proximity of the nodes for optimal performance [153].
Minimizing the negative impact weakly performing clients have on the
network has been an important topic for P2P research. Unless the net-
work is designed to consider the performance of the nodes in its structure,
the network may easily become unresponsive. There are a number of
reasons for clients to perform poorly in P2P networks. Resource-limited
clients, such as mobile phones, simply do not have the computing power
or storage capabilities of desktop computers. Furthermore, the network
connection may be slow, congested or unreliable. Furthermore, the client
may also cheat by showing poor performance even though having sufﬁ-
cient resources. For instance, network connectivity might be billed by the
amount of data transferred. This, of course, forms a very strong incentive
for the user to minimize his involvement in the P2P network. This prob-
lem of free-riding [8] can be mitigated in different ways; by minimizing the
amount of these peers in the network, or their impact on the performance.
By providing the right incentives for users to share their resources,
users are discouraged from free-riding, increasing the overall network
performance and preventing even a total collapse [87]. These incentives
can either be positive (rewarding the user when following the rules), or
negative (punishing the user for performing poorly). The success of the
Bittorrent protocol is, to a large extent, due to its incentive system. The
Bittorrent protocol uses a so-called tit-for-tat mechanism for deciding how
resources are distributed. This mechanism forces users to simultaneously
share data of the ﬁles they are downloading in order to maintain a good
download speed, leading to fairer sharing [34]. The Bittorrent network
itself uses a centralized- or distributed P2P model, where trackers (either
single nodes or DHTs) keep track of the ﬁles shared, and the users sharing
them.
The success of Bittorrent has since led to extensive analysis of it [77]
[135], resulting in mathematical modules for how different conditions and
behavior affect its performance [136], as well as being seen as a standard
to which new protocols are compared [155]. Furthermore, the tit-for-tat
incentive mechanism used in Bittorrent has been questioned, leading to
numerous improvements [20] [133] [109] [154]. Of course, Bittorrent is a
relatively simple P2P application where the incentive mechanism is de-
signed for rather short-sighted goals (maximum momentary throughput
from immediately connected peers). For complex and long-lived systems,
a more ﬁne-tuned and widespread reputation system needs to be deployed
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[47]. These need to be closely integrated with the identity management of
the network to be efﬁcient [48].
However, as there will always be peers that cannot affect their poor per-
formance (due to resource constrictions), introducing incentives only to
weed out the free-riders does not address the issue completely. By design-
ing the P2P network in an intelligent manner which acknowledges the
different restrictions of the individual nodes, we can avoid potential bot-
tlenecks. By using different types of hybrid P2P network architectures,
the trafﬁc ﬂow can be optimized. With smarter routing methods, the im-
pact of congested and poorly performing peers can be minimized [172]
[97]. And by using replication and redundancy in data storage, availabil-
ity is increased [112].
Security is, however, harder to manage in P2P systems. As users rely
on each other, there are usually ample opportunities for malicious activ-
ities. Impersonation, denial of service and distribution of bogus or ma-
licious content are some of the problems seen today. Intermediate peers
can easily modify or misroute trafﬁc. Sybil attacks [42] are one of the most
well-known threats to P2P systems. Named after the pseudonym used in
a well-known study on multiple personality disorder, it involves creating
multiple personas within the P2P network to be in a stronger position to
perform malicious activities. By having a stronger presence in the net-
work, attacks can misroute trafﬁc, efﬁciently cutting off selected targets
completely (also known as an eclipse [160]), amongst others. This has led
to research of reputation-based prevention techniques, using either the
overlay as storage (for votes, feedback and complaints) [37] [180] [85] [5],
or by distributing the information as part of the network signaling [183]
[140]. Although these techniques improve the security and reliability of
the P2P networking, trust remains an issue.
Privacy in P2P systems is also often an issue. By contributing to the
network, end-users run a higher risk of exposing, either accidentally or in-
advertently, sensitive information [54]. Without an anonymization mech-
anism, the identities of the participants are also more exposed, as there
is no third party through which data is exchanged. P2P networks lacking
the proper encryption also allows intermediate peers to follow (eavesdrop
on) or even disrupt the communication. Furthermore, as services and
data can be provided by anyone, it can lead to irresponsible behavior on
the part of the providers. Today we see viruses and other malware being
distributed with the help of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems.
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Operations over collections of content, such as searches, are also prob-
lematic. Per deﬁnition, each node in a P2P system has only a partial view
of the network, and for a complete query, the request must be processed
by multiple nodes. This is problematic in structured P2P networks in
particular, where the precise routing algorithms are not well suited for
the inexactness of common content queries. Although innovations such
as range queries [12] [158] [58] and efﬁcient multi-attribute searches [51]
[156] [62] [21] [114] have been developed, P2P systems are still seen to
excel best with rather simple bandwidth-intensive applications.
2.2 Public-key cryptography
Traditional computer cryptography is based on using a cryptography func-
tion f() that transforms a piece of data, plaintext, into encrypted data us-
ing a secret key S. The same key is used to transform the encrypted data
back to its original format, hence often referred to as symmetric cryptog-
raphy. The process seems intuitive as it is similar to real-world message
concealment methods used since ancient times. Although symmetric cryp-
tography does well in protecting the data from eavesdropping, it requires
that the secret key is known by the parties exchanging data. It essen-
tially requires that there is a pre-established relationship between each
of the communicating actors, and that each one is trusted not to expose
the secret to third parties as it would invalidate the whole system.
To solve this problem, a public key, or asymmetric, cryptography was
proposed by Ralph Merkle in 1974, although ﬁrst published by Whitﬁeld
Difﬁe and Martin Hellman in 1976 [40]. By leveraging the characteristics
of exponentiation, these systems allow two previously unknown parties to
establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. This key-negotiation
scheme introduced the notion of using a key pair with a mathematical
relation, of which one part is kept secret while the other can be exchanged
over an open channel. The latter part is used for encrypting while the
former, secret, part for decrypting.
The ﬁrst practical public key cryptography scheme was published in
1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, today known as RSA [142]. The
secret, private, and public key pair in RSA is chosen based on mathemat-
ical relationships to two randomly chosen prime numbers p and q. The
public key consists of the two numbers e and n, where n is the product of
the chosen prime numbers and e a co prime with (p−1)(q−1). The private
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key d is calculated to satisfy an inverse relationship with these, as shown
in Figure 2.5. The public key can now be openly distributed and used to
encrypt information, which can only be encrypted using the private key.
But the reverse is also true; the private key can be used to encrypt in-
formation that can be decrypted with the public key. Although the two
keys do share a mathematical tie and can be deduced from each other,
the security of RSA is based on the computational difﬁculty of factoring
large primes. Choosing sufﬁciently large values for the two prime num-
bers makes it practically impossible to determine the private key from the
public.
Choose two random large primes, p and q. Compute
n = pq
ϕ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1)
Choose the public key e as
1 < e < ϕ(n) and gcd(e, ϕ(n)) = 1
The private key d is now
d = e−1 modϕ(n)
Encrypting a message m to cipher c
c = me mod n
Decrypting a cipher c
m = cd mod n
Figure 2.5. The relationship between the public and private keys in RSA, and how en-
cryption and decryption is performed.
RSA solves the problem of a pre-shared secret as the public key used to
encrypt information can now be openly distributed. But due to the inverse
relationship of the two keys, it also offers another important feature; the
ability of verifying the source of data. As content encrypted with the pri-
vate key can be decrypted using the public key, messages can be digitally
signed using RSA. The message (or a digest of it) is encrypted by the au-
thor using the private key and added to the message. The recipient uses
the public key to decrypt this attachment, compare it to the message con-
tent and thus verify that the sender is the owner of the private key. The
recipient can therefore not only verify the source of the data, but also its
integrity.
Asymmetric encryption schemes offer many advantages over symmetric
ones, but also some drawbacks. As the keys share a mathematical rela-
tionship, they can be produced from each other. As stated, the security is
based on choosing large enough prime numbers which makes it practically
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impossible. The process is also computationally much more demanding,
although in practice most implementations take a hybrid approach, where
the content itself is encrypted using a symmetric key which is appended,
encrypted using the public key.
2.3 Key-based identity schemes
As public key encryption offers the possibility of verifying the source of
messages, these have been widely adapted for different identity schemes.
Public key identity schemes are based on binding a real-life identity to a
public key pair, assuming that only the rightful owner of the identity is
in possession of the private key. As the key pair essentially becomes the
identity, we can securely verify the source of any information published
and authenticate peers without the involvement of a third-party trusted
service.
As the public key (essentially a large number) is unintuitive for peo-
ple to manage, most applications use a mechanism for mapping human-
readable identiﬁers (names) to the actual keys. This can be done through
third-party certiﬁcation or by a leap-of-faith procedure on ﬁrst contact.
Third-party certiﬁcation is achieved by having a trusted third party sign-
ing a piece of data (certiﬁcate) which provides the mapping of an identiﬁer
to a public key. The security is based on having the trusted third party’s
identity (public key) distributed beforehand (often pre-installed in appli-
cations). Leap-of-faith is the process of storing the public key locally on
ﬁrst contact.
2.3.1 Transport Layer Security and HTTPS
One of the most well-known public key identity schemes in use is the site
certiﬁcation used in the secure version of the Hypertext Transport Proto-
col (HTTP). HTTP Secure, HTTPS [141], is the technology for wrapping
HTTP connections within Transport Layer Security (TLS [39]) connec-
tions. The TLS protocol supports both client and server authentication us-
ing electronic certiﬁcates. Modern web browsers come pre-packaged with
a number of public keys of trusted certiﬁcation authorities. These issue
certiﬁcates for different web sites, which are presented to the user when
visiting their sites. Certiﬁcates may also be chained, signed by multiple
keys. The resulting system follows the X.509 public key infrastructure
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(PKI) standard deﬁned by the ITU-T.
Although HTTPS has been a key enabler for the modern web ecosys-
tem and proven over time to be resilient to a number of attacks, it has
received its share of critique. Aside of a few exceptions, the critique has,
however, concentrated on the use of the protocol, rather than the protocol
itself. Without clear implementation guidelines, implementations have
often trivialized the authentication of the protocol, using it primarily as a
solution for securing only the data transfer. Warnings of invalid or irre-
solvable server certiﬁcates have often been minimal, causing all but the
most scrupulous users to ignore them [151]. This has enabled man-in-
the-middle attacks and impersonation, allowing attackers to gain access
to valuable credentials. Furthermore, as the protocol can be used in con-
junction with normal HTTP, web service providers often utilize it for the
most sensitive parts (such as login forms), while other data access (such
as image loading) is done through unsecured connections. This creates
opportunities for session theft for anyone that is able to listen in on the
trafﬁc (as is possible, for instance, in open wireless LAN networks).
Furthermore, the HTTPS model can be seen as outdated with regards
to the economics of the modern web. We have long since passed the time
when a single web site contained content from a single producer. Today,
web sites may include content from a myriad of sources such as advertise-
ments and user-generated media. The HTTPS model, however, only au-
thenticates the hosting server, not the actual source of the content, mak-
ing it impossible to independently judge the trustworthiness of it [104].
The lesson to be learned from HTTPS is thus that when creating a secu-
rity solution, we should be careful not only when designing the protocol,
but also pay attention to how it is implemented and used.
2.3.2 PGP
Another notable public key identity scheme is Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
best known for its use for securing e-mail [24]. Although current versions
support certiﬁcate authorities, the ﬁrst versions were based on utilizing a
web-of-trust (WOT) for binding identities to keys. As a public key identity
scheme, PGP is based on each user having a key pair of which the public
part is made publicly available. However, without a trusted certiﬁcate
authority anyone is able to publish keys which they claim belong to a
speciﬁc person. The WOT scheme is based on other users verifying (or
attesting to) a key belonging to the person it claims to.
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When entering the system users ask others, already using PGP, to elec-
tronically sign an identity certiﬁcate containing the public part of their
key and information about the person (name and validity). This signed
certiﬁcate veriﬁes that the key actually belongs to the real-life person
with the given name. These peer signatures are commonly agreed upon
in person, tying the scheme to actual human relationships. As the signing
peers also have had their identities veriﬁed similarly, it creates a network
between the users of PGP which can be traversed to ﬁnd a link, path, be-
tween ourselves and a previously not encountered identity. This creates
an identity veriﬁcation scheme based on social connections and trust.
2.3.3 Opportunistic personas
The Opportunistic Personas [10] concept provides an interesting alterna-
tive to traditional identity management. Based on a model similar to
PGP, where users use self-signed identities, it does not emphasize on es-
tablishing certain knowledge of the real-life owner (persona) of an iden-
tity. Instead, it is based on forming an opinion using our history with
that actor. Traditional identity schemes try to tie an electronic identity
to a real-world actor, either through third party certiﬁcates, WOTs or out
of band communication. How we interact with that identity is based on
our attitude towards the presumed owner. The Opportunistic Personas
scheme differs as it tries to remove the dependency on both that, some-
what fragile, link between the presumed owner and the identity, as well
as what we think we know or assume about the owner. Instead it proposes
that applications use only knowledge from previous encounters to adjust
their attitude towards an identity.
The full potential of the scheme is seen when it is used across appli-
cations to automatically record our history, or track record, with other
actors. For instance, placing voice calls to a persona could automatically
whitelist and prioritize emails received from the same actor, as we are
likely to have a relationship with it. Although the scheme has obvious
security issues and is not suited for all applications, it can provide a prac-
tical and more deployable model for others.
2.3.4 Identity revocation
A problem common for all public-key identity schemes surfaces when an
identity is compromised, i.e., when the private key is exposed to an unau-
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thorized party. As the secrecy of the private key is the cornerstone of the
security in public key cryptography, a compromised identity becomes es-
sentially worthless. Furthermore, in case the compromised identity is of
a trusted authority, everything veriﬁed by it becomes questionable. Al-
though there does not exist a method for regaining an identity after it has
been compromised, modern system include mechanisms to minimize the
risk and mitigate the damage. Electronic certiﬁcates issued by trusted
authorities are given a speciﬁc life time, which results in compromised
identities to be invalidated after they expire. This period (start and end
dates) are embedded within the issued certiﬁcate to prevent tampering.
Most systems also have a revocation mechanism for explicitly blacklist-
ing known compromised keys. However, these require each entity in the
system to actively update its database, which can be problematic in dis-
tributed systems. Web-of-trust schemes can also be used in combination
with out-of-band communication and real-world relationships to invali-
date identities in decentralized systems. As these are based on informa-
tion from only partly trusted sources (the opinions of others), these should
be used carefully. To minimize the risk of an identity becoming compro-
mised, systems can be built with using a layered approach. The real, or
root, identity is stored in a highly trusted location (for instance a tamper-
proof smart card), and used only to sign self-generated secondary identi-
ties. These secondary identities, often with short life times, are used for
day-to-day activities, and can be handled more freely.
2.4 The Session Initiation Protocol
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [146] is an Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) standardized text-based protocol for establishing and
controlling multimedia sessions. SIP is used to negotiate session parame-
ters, such as media encoding and transport addresses, and to update these
as needed. SIP has proven to be functionally diverse and has gained wide
acceptance, with several open source and proprietary voice over IP (VoIP)
and instant messaging (IM) clients available. SIP end-points, called User
Agents (UAs), can exchange data directly, but in most cases a network of
SIP servers are used. These help in locating other users, routingmessages
and setting up direct connections.
SIP users are referred to by an email-address- like identiﬁer, the SIP
Address of Record (SIP AOR). The SIP architecture deﬁnes a component
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called the Location service and Registrar for keeping track of the location
of users. As the SIP identity is based on domain names, it is common for
each domain that provides SIP services to host its own registrar server.
As the location of users change over time, users register with this server
(located by a DNS service record), announcing their current location. To
establish sessions, the SIP clients use the Location services to reach the
other user. The registrar servers are thus responsible for an important
part of the system security, as they manage the identities and authenti-
cate UAs, preventing identity spooﬁng and theft.
The SIP architecture also speciﬁes another type of server, the SIP proxy
server, which can be used as a gateway for users either for administrative
reasons (network security policies might block certain types of trafﬁc) or
to ease the burden on the clients. These proxies commonly handle all
signaling from and to the client, and are thus able to modify the session
parameters. This can be used, for instance, to set up media channels for
clients within closed networks, but allows also easy access to manipulate
the behavior of SIP applications. By creating custom SIP proxies, it is
easy to add new functionality (such as message ﬁltering or statistics) or
create gateways to other communication networks (such as to the public
switched telephone network, PSTN). Figure 2.6 illustrates the architec-
ture of SIP.
Figure 2.6. Illustration of the SIP architecture. Users uses proxies and registrars to
forward signaling.
The standard SIP session begins with both parties of the session regis-
tering, using the REGISTER message, with the Location service of their
domains. As SIP can be used both over reliable (TCP) and unreliable
(UDP) transport protocols, the REGISTERmessage is acknowledged with
43
Background
a response containing an HTTP-like response code. This code indicates
whether the registration was successful (code 200), or whether password
authentication is required or an error occurred. Following a successful
registration, the initiating user sends an INVITE message addressed to
the other party through its proxy. The proxy will locate the SIP proxy
of the recipient’s domain and forward the message, possibly adding pa-
rameters, such as Via: entries used for routing responses. The message
is further forwarded to the intended recipient, who answers with a re-
sponse indicating whether the session (such as a VoIP call) is accepted or
not. This is routed back to the initiator who, in turn, responds with a ﬁ-
nal ACK message acknowledging the response. The responding user (and
proxies in between) may also return intermediate responses used to track
the progress of the session establishment. These (such as the code 180,
Ringing, response) can be used by the SIP UA to simulate the dial-tone
behavior of PSTN.
INVITE sip:bob@p2psip.hiit.fi SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 127.0.0.1:6060;rport;branch=z9hG4bKdtbjuppq
Max-Forwards: 70
To: <sip:bob@p2psip.hiit.fi>
From: "Eve" <sip:eve@p2psip.hiit.fi>;tag=psjgk
Call-ID: odbydyiaylbjmdx@hafnium.pc.hiit.fi
CSeq: 907 INVITE
Contact: <sip:eve@127.0.0.1:6060>
Content-Type: application/sdp
Allow: INVITE,ACK,BYE,CANCEL,OPTIONS,PRACK,REFER,NOTIFY,SUBSCRIBE,INFO,MESSAGE
Subject: Meeting
Supported: replaces,norefersub,100rel
User-Agent: Twinkle/1.4.2
Content-Length: 303
v=0
o=twinkle 1934341310 1078326224 IN IP4 127.0.0.1
s=-
c=IN IP4 127.0.0.1
t=0 0
m=audio 8000 RTP/AVP 98 97 8 0 3 101
a=rtpmap:98 speex/16000
a=rtpmap:97 speex/8000
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
a=rtpmap:3 GSM/8000
a=rtpmap:101 telephone-event/8000
a=fmtp:101 0-15
a=ptime:20
Figure 2.7. An example of a SIP INVITE message for initiating a VoIP session. The
initiator and recipient are highlighted. Session media formats and transport
addresses are contained in the body of the message.
The session parameters are conveyed within the INVITE message and
its response. The initiating user populates the INVITE message with in-
formation on which transport-level address it is expecting the media traf-
ﬁc as well as the codecs or formats it supports. The responding user in-
spects these to ﬁnd suitable ones that are supported by both, and sends
these, along with its transport-level addresses, in the response. Figure 2.7
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displays a sample INVITEmessage containing parameters for a voice call.
Figure 2.8 shows the messages exchanged in a complete call set-up in SIP.
In addition to basic session management, SIP has a long list of extensions
to support features such as presence [143], instant messaging [29] and ﬁle
transfers [28].
BobEve Eve’s proxy Bob’s proxy
Internet
REGISTER
200 OK
REGISTER
200 OK
INVITE
100 TRYING INVITE
180 RINGING
200 OK
200 OK
180 RINGING
ACK
ACK
Eve places
the call
The call
is connected
Bob’s phone
rings
Bob answers
the phone
The call
is connected
Figure 2.8. Sequence diagram of the messaging involved in establishing a SIP session.
2.4.1 SIP security
The SIP protocol was designed as a simple, easy to use, open protocol for
multimedia sessions. The emphasis was on creating a protocol that is easy
to understand, versatile and extendable, rather than a strict, secure, com-
munication platform. The base speciﬁcation of the SIP protocol contains a
number of security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by different par-
ties [53]. These touch on almost all areas of communication, including
authentication, privacy and integrity. Although security extensions have
since been proposed (and standardized), all systems do not implement
these, or can be tricked into degrading the security to a lower level.
SIP uses for data transport protocols such as UDP and TCP. This means
that it naturally inherits all the security threats associated with these,
including service denial through TCP syn ﬂooding. However, the base
speciﬁcation does not require the use of any additional transport security,
leaving the signaling and media trafﬁc susceptible to eavesdropping, in-
terception and modiﬁcation by common networking tools. Furthermore,
common SIP deployments rely heavily on the DNS system, leaving them
vulnerable also to DNS-based threats. This can be clearly seen in the SIP
authentication procedure.
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SIP authentication is usually based on a pre-shared password. Users
connect to the registrar server of their domain and prove themselves us-
ing an HTTP digest authentication [50] exchange. This application-level
authentication covers only speciﬁc ﬁelds of the signaling messages, and
only certain messages. Moreover, it only authenticates the SIP client to
the server, providing ample opportunities for different man-in-the-middle
attacks. The registration, and thus identity, of the client can be captured
using message replays, legitimate calls can be disconnected or redirected
and unauthorized calls can be made. This can be used to launch DOS
attacks against a user or monetary loss through billing attacks [181]. As
the clients (as well as intermediate SIP proxies) rely on the DNS system,
the attacker need not even physically be in the same network, but may
utilize a DNS vulnerability such as cache poisoning to capture the trafﬁc.
SIP security is, however, evolving. The use of both end-to-end as well
as hop-to-hop security has been standardized, although not mandated.
These rely on technologies such as TLS [39] and S/MIME [138] to protect
the conﬁdentiality and integrity of the signaling. Many SIP UA clients
also support encrypted media formats such as Secure RTP (SRTP) [18],
which prevents eavesdropping on the sessions.
2.4.2 SIP and VoIP SPAM prevention
As SIP has emerged as the prevailing open standard for Internet-based
communication, many have feared that it will shortly be overwhelmed by
the same problems as traditional email. SIP (and VoIP in general) SPAM
prevention has subsequently been vividly discussed, resulting in a num-
ber of proposals as well as commercial products. The issue was noted also
by the people responsible for the SIP base protocol, resulting in an Inter-
net RFC discussing the issue [145]. It addresses the issue quite holisti-
cally, identifying different types of SPAM (Table 2.1) and listing a number
of high-level conceptual solutions. The key observation in this analysis is
that a strong identity scheme is needed to enable most approaches. With-
out identities that have value, spammers can easily generate new ones or
impersonate others. Temporary, so-called throw-away, domains can also
be registered at low cost to provide an abundant supply of SIP identities
for spammers.
The importance of veriﬁable identities has been addressed in the IETF
through various proposals. In [81] the authors describe a simple scheme
where SIP proxies add information to the signaling indicating whether
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Table 2.1. The possible types of SPAM in SIP systems [145].
Type Description
Call Unwanted VoIP calls. Includes marketing calls both by
humans and pre-recorded messages, scams and identity
theft through social engineering.
IM Unwanted instant messaging. Marketing and scams, im-
personation, link baits.
Presence Requests for permission to follow ones presence may in-
clude marketing messages.
they have veriﬁed the sender (for instance through password authentica-
tion). However, this scheme only applies to speciﬁc trusted environments
as these headers can easily be forged by malicious proxies. A more se-
cure and scalable scheme for verifying the authenticity of messages is pre-
sented in [132]. This scheme builds on public-key cryptography, requiring
domains to electronically sign the messages originating from their users.
A hash value is calculated over certain immutable values in the messages
by the domain’s internal proxy. Before forwarding the message, the proxy
signs this hash with a domain-speciﬁc key, and adds the signature as well
as instructions on how to retrieve the domain’s public key. The receiving
domain is expected to fetch this domain key and check that the message
has not been tampered with during transit. Furthermore, by signing the
messages, the source domain proxy is assumed to have authenticated the
user, which guarantees that a message was actually sent by the user it in-
dicates. However, these schemes address only the veriﬁcation of an iden-
tity within the context of that identity’s domain, and can be circumvented
by using rogue domains or domains that easily provide new identities.
A secure identity scheme is only the start of SPAM prevention in SIP
and other communication systems. A number of techniques for dealing
with SPAM have subsequently been proposed. These can be divided into
one of three general categories: i Non-intrusive methods that operate ei-
ther in the network or at the end-user’s client. These work without in-
teracting with either the initiator or the responder, halting SPAM before
it reaches its target. ii Caller interactive methods that interact, or chal-
lenge, the caller in some way to prevent (or make it costly) to distribute
SPAM. iii Intrusive methods that require the responder to interact with
the system. Table 2.2 presents an overview of these.
Some of the proposed VoIP SPAM prevention techniques are quite gen-
47
Background
Table 2.2. Schemes for SPAM prevention in Internet communication systems.
Type Description
N
on
-i
n
tr
u
si
ve Content ﬁltering Filter instant messages and ﬁles based on static
analysis of the content.
Black / Whitelists Prevent or allow only speciﬁc users.
Call patterns Detect suspicious communication patterns in
VoIP or IM indicating non-human or unwanted
communication.
C
al
le
r
in
te
ra
ct
iv
e
Turing tests Present different sorts of challenges to the
caller to verify that it is a human.
Resource dedication Provide the caller with computational puzzles
or other resource-demanding tasks before con-
necting the call.
Query intent Query the intent of the communication prior to
connecting a call to repel (honest) telemarke-
teers.
In
tr
u
si
ve
Feedback The responder provides feedback after the call
on whether it was SPAM. Used in conjunction
with black lists or reputation systems.
Payment at risk Before establishing a connection, the caller
commits to pay in case the communication is
SPAM. Requires feedback from the responder.
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eral, adopted from email systems, such as black- and whitelisting. The
crucial difference between VoIP and email SPAM prevention is naturally
the real-time nature of VoIP. Static content analysis (which traditional
email SPAM prevention largely relies on) cannot be used as such. But
on the other hand, the real-timeliness of VoIP allows us to analyze the
source of the call more thoroughly, even interact with it before passing
the call through. Call signaling analysis could be seen as the nearest
VoIP equivalent of email content analysis. For instance, the authors in
[113] propose a system which uses different call characteristics to iden-
tify spammers based on assumptions such as that spammers usually do
not receive calls, do not place more than one call per recipients and that
the call-terminating partner is usually the same. The scheme presented
in [178] builds on some of the same principles, but adds user feedback
combined with machine learning algorithms to produce more accurate re-
sults.
Following the development of the email ecosystem, where SPAM is cer-
tainly not hand written for each recipient separately, VoIP SPAM is feared
to become mostly based on playback of pre-recorded messages. However,
as the VoIP calls are real-time, different types of Turing [171] tests (able
to detect automated calls) present an interesting way to combat SPAM.
These can either present the caller with a question, or puzzle, which is
easily solved by a human, but hard to automate. These can be deliv-
ered within the call (e.g., a voice synthesizer asking to repeat a text or
press certain dial buttons), or as an instant message or image ﬁle (e.g., a
CAPTCHA [174]). Alternatively, the voice pattern can be analyzed to de-
tect speaking patterns abnormal for normal humans. The authors of [137]
present a system where the caller’s reactions to a pre-recorded greeting
message is analyzed to detect abnormal speaking patterns, such as dou-
ble talk. These Turing tests can be made to initiate automatically before
the user is notiﬁed of the call, transferring the call to the user only after
they have been passed.
2.5 Peer-to-peer SIP
Although SIP is not bound to a server-based architecture, for any sizable
system a network of trusted servers needs to be deployed. This creates
administrative burdens, introduces single points of failure, as well as lu-
crative targets for attacks. Furthermore, the traditional model does not
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allow for ad-hoc sessions in isolated networks as we need to be able to con-
nect to the different components of the SIP architecture. These, amongst
others, are arguments that have ignited the development of fully decen-
tralized, peer-to-peer (P2P), SIP systems. These are referred to as P2PSIP
systems. There has been a number of proposals, mainly from the research
community concerning experimental and proof-of-concept systems. In the
following we review a number of these systems, as well as provide an
overview of the standardization efforts of P2PSIP in the IETF.
2.5.1 Decentralized SIP
The SESSI (Seamless Service Interworking in Heterogeneous Mobile and
Ad-Hoc Networks) project at Helsinki University of Technology developed
as part of their research a prototype [159] [108] of a SIP proxy suitable
for ad-hoc and P2P scenarios. The proxy used the service location pro-
tocol (SLP) [61] to establish sessions in ad-hoc networks, and the design
allowed interworking with global networks [84] as well. The security was
based on public key cryptography, with strong authentication and a rela-
tively complex service-oriented permission model. The SESSI framework
provided an early model for decentralizing SIP (and other services) in ad-
hoc scenarios, but was not focused on creating one that could seamlessly
move between these and global networks.
The SIPPeer adaptor [161] [83], developed at Columbia University, re-
placed the SIP Locator functionality with a Chord-based DHT which was
established between the participating nodes. Furthermore, SIPPeer of-
fered advanced features such as ofﬂine messaging, directory services and
Network Address Translation (NAT) traversal. However, security had
not been a key research goal and authentication used an email-based
validation scheme, and the session security was not addressed. In re-
lated research at Columbia University, the use of an external DHT as SIP
proxy replacement was examined [162], with some ideas integrated into
SIPPeer. Speciﬁcally, support for the OpenDHT [127] public service, run
on PlanetLab [134], was developed. The integrity of the data was pro-
tected using public key signatures.
SoSIMPLE is a SIP-based P2P communication model developed at the
College of William and Mary [23]. SoSIMPLE is based on using a DHT
as a distributed SIP proxy, similar to the work at Columbia University.
It also touched on advanced topics such as NAT traversal and presence
management, but did not provide a clear solution for security. Similar
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research was done at the Nokia Research Center [115], however, concen-
trating on the feasibility of such systems for mobile devices. Although the
architecture was similar, focus was on experimenting with prototypes on
mobile phones, examining the feasibility through call set-up time mea-
surements.
The research within the DECICOM project at the University of Oulu
has continued on the same track, contributing much to the current under-
standing of the feasibility of P2P communication systems in mobile envi-
ronments. Although the research started with P2P SIP, using an imple-
mentation based on a (now expired) IETF protocol proposal, it has since
evolved into other application domains, including P2P web services [106]
[105]. The focus has not only been on the architecture, but also the overall
feasibility of P2P applications in mobile environments in terms of usabil-
ity, energy consumption and cost. This has resulted in extensive analysis
on energy consumption as well as the effect different types of overlay al-
gorithms and conditions have on mobile systems [88] [130] [128].
Part of the work in the DECICOM project was done in conjunction with
Hautakorpi et. al. at Ericsson Research Nomadiclab. Based on the same
protocol as the prototypes constructed in Oulu, the research was extended
towards a broader view of distributed networking. The application sup-
port was extended from simply P2PSIP to a generic framework for appli-
cations such as HTTP, email and DNS [63]. Furthermore, integration of
P2PSIP systems with commercial networks (IP Multimedia Subsystem,
IMS) was analyzed [65].
The P2PNS system presented in [19] provides an interesting model for
P2P computing. It describes a generic name-lookup service which uses a
two-part process where the identity is ﬁrst resolved to an overlay NodeId,
which is further mapped to an actual IP address. It is also one of the
ﬁrst to explicitly plan for application other than SIP from the beginning,
as well as presenting a security scheme for fully distributed networks
without a centralized CA (based on cryptographic puzzles).
2.5.2 RELOAD
Recently the IETF has recognized the need for a standard for a P2P SIP
protocol, and is currently working on standardizing the data protocol and
architecture in the P2PSIP working group [74]. The current version of the
P2PSIP protocol draft deﬁnes a highlymodular framework supporting dif-
ferent applications (called Usages) as well as overlay network types [79].
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This framework, called REsource LOcation And Discovery (RELOAD),
has an architecture which consists of the modules Message Transport,
Storage, Topology plug-in, Forward and Link Management, depicted in
Figure 2.9. This architecture provides a very general model for overlay
networking, in which the implementer can choose between different types
of routing algorithms (the Forwarding and Link Management module)
without affecting the other parts of the system. This creates an inter-
operable and reusable framework that can be adopted for a wide range of
distributed applications. As stated in [79], SIP is only one possible usage,
and there have been proposals for usages such as conferencing [95] [69]
and Simple Network Management Protocol (SMNP) [131].
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Figure 2.9. The RELOAD architecture, adapted from [79]. RELOAD creates a virtual
network stack by separating the Topology plug-in and LinkManagement into
their own modules.
Hosts in a RELOAD instance are assigned a unique NodeId, which is
used for addressing within the network as well as by the Topology plug-
ins to construct the overlay. The Topology plug-in uses the Forwarding
and Link Management module to establish and maintain peer connec-
tions according to the overlay algorithm in use. The Message Transport
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module provides end-to-end communication for the applications, Usages,
by querying the Topology plug-in for routing information and using the
Link Management module to transmit packets. The Storage module is
responsible for storing overlay data.
The applications, Usages, are provided a generic API for storing and re-
trieving overlay data, discovering services and establishing direct connec-
tions to remote users. This API is independent of the underlying network
structure, making it possible to upgrade routing algorithms and transport
protocols without affecting the application itself. The security of RELOAD
is based on strong identities. Each node maintains a cryptographic iden-
tity, which is used to sign all messages. Furthermore, the data stored in
the overlay is also signed, and secure protocols (such as TLS and DTLS)
are used for transport. The identities can be issued (signed) by a trusted
third party or, especially in closed networks, be self-signed.
SIP-based applications use this framework for three primary operations
(the SIP Usage): registration, lookup and connection establishment [80].
Registering a SIP identity (SIP Address of Record, SIP AOR) with the
overlay is done by creating a data packet containing the SIP AOR and
a NodeId (the identiﬁers used for nodes in the overlay) or another SIP
AOR, through which the user can be reached. This packet is stored in the
network under a key made from the hash of the SIP AOR. The session sig-
naling is exchanged directly between peers. To establish this connection,
the calling party fetches the data packet and sends an AppAttachmessage
to the NodeId of the target. This initiates an Interactive Connectivity Es-
tablishment (ICE) [144] procedure, during which address candidates are
gathered, and sent to the target through the overlay network. These ad-
dress candidates are transport-level addresses (Internet protocol, IP, ad-
dress and a UDP or TCP port) through which the peer is reachable. As
a host can have multiple addresses due to multihoming and network ad-
dress translation, of which not all can be used by a remote peer (in case
of closed local networks or ﬁrewalls), the different address candidates are
tried until a working connection is made.
2.6 The Host Identity Protocol
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) provides a communication architecture
that separates the network location from the identity. End-points are
bound to cryptographically generated identities, which are dynamically
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mapped to network locations, providing transparent node mobility and
multihoming. The HIP architecture is described in the IETF Request For
Comments (RFC) document 4423 [121], with the protocol details and ex-
tensions currently being standardized by the HIP working group [72].
The identity in HIP, the Host Identiﬁer (HI), is the public part of a pub-
lic key pair, making the binding secure and self-authenticating. However,
applications more commonly use a 100-bit hash of the HI, the Host Iden-
tity Tag (HIT), as an IPv6 address with an ORCHID class preﬁx [123] for
referring to the end-point. This way applications usingHIP do not address
hosts as legacy applications do when networking. Instead, the communi-
cation is between the actual identity of the remote party, not the host on
which it is assumed to reside. This creates a more secure and identity-
focused networking environment. Furthermore, although most of the cur-
rent implementations do operate on a host-level, the HIP protocol itself
allows almost any network resource to be assigned identities. We could
assign users, hosts, applications, services or even individual network ses-
sions their own identity, which are all accessed in the same manner using
HIP. This identity-based networking paradigm is highly relevant as the
penetration of Internet connectivity increases, and becoming embedded
in different types of devices (as in the Internet of things) [59].
HIP is architecturally located between the transport and network layer
in the network stack, creating a new thin waist as illustrated Figure 2.10.
The HIP stack translates application-used network addresses, the HITs
or their IPv4 representations (Local Scope Identiﬁers, LSIs), into routable
IP addresses with which it initiates a four-way handshake where the iden-
tities are veriﬁed and connection details negotiated. Data transfer with
the end-point is done using any transport protocol (e.g., TCP or UDP),
which is encapsulated for transit using a security protocol such as IPSec
[82]. This can further be encapsulated for NAT or proxy traversal, which
can be further assisted by third party relays (HIP Relays) and Rendezvous
Servers (RVS). The NAT traversal of HIP is based on the use of UDP en-
capsulation, and the use of the Interactive Connectivity Establishment
(ICE) methodology [144].
The translation from HI to network location is done using different
types of lookup services. Although the traditional lookup service of the
Internet, the DNS, can be used, due to the self-certifying properties of
the identities used in HIP, more scalable and dynamic systems are possi-
ble. The lookup service can therefore even be based on different types of
54
Background
HIP
HIT
Network
IP IPv6
Transport layer
UDPTCP SCTP
Application layer
SIPHTTP SMTP FTP DNS
Physical layer
Ethernet DSL USBWLAN
Link layer
PPPMAC ATM ARP
Application
IP addr : port
IP addr
Application
Host ID : port
IP addr
Host IDNew waist
Legacy IP With HIP
Figure 2.10. HIP creates a new thin waist between the transport and network layer of
the networking stack. End-points are addressed using cryptographic iden-
tities instead of network locations.
distributed topologies consisting of ordinary (not controlled by a trusted
third party) peers. Tampering is prevented by cryptographically signing
the locator mapping with the respective Host Identity. There has been
on-going interest in the scalability of HIP, with efforts put into distribut-
ing not only the lookup of identity-locator mappings, but also connection
establishment. The original HIP architecture introduced the RVS and
HIP Relay for enabling hosts between ﬁrewalls or strict NATs to connect.
Although these can be distributed and are designed to maintain only a
minimal amount of state, it still creates dependency points within the
network that could potentially become overloaded. The Hi3 architecture
[122] addressed the issue by introducing a fully distributed lookup and
connectivity overlay based on Secure-i3 [9] [166]. In this architecture,
hosts published the initial connection establishment packets to the over-
lay, where they are fetched by interested parties using a publish-subscribe
model.
HIP is a maturing protocol with currently a number of implementations
available for Microsoft Windows, Mac OSX, Linux and FreeBSD [170] [68]
[67]. Also, Helsinki Institute for Information Technology (HIIT) main-
55
Background
tains RVS servers for public use. HIP for Linux [68] is an open source
implementation of the HIP protocol for Linux-based systems. The project
has been developed at HIIT and features a number of extensions such as
NAT traversal, mobility and RVS support. As HIPL is also available for
Linux-based mobile systems, it was chosen as the platform for our proto-
type.
2.6.1 HIP overlay networking
As HIP provides a model where the identity of connection end-points are
not tied to the network structure, the model itself can be adopted to dif-
ferent types of underlying network architectures. Recently the IETF HIP
working group [72] has explored the possibility of combining HIP with
overlay networks, resulting in the HIP Based Overlay Networking (HIP
BONE) proposal [27]. The proposal deﬁnes a model that does not rely
on the traditional Internet protocol addresses for locators. Instead, it
utilizes different types of overlay networks for routing packets based on
the HITs. This proposal is designed to enable overlay-based applications
(such as P2P applications) to be better able to use HIP. These applica-
tions would often beneﬁt from the security and mobility that HIP could
provide, but due to their distributed nature cannot rely on the IP-based
routing that HIP has previously required. The HIP BONE proposal ad-
dresses this issue by deﬁning the required extensions for HIP to support
overlay network-based routing.
However, the HIP BONE framework provides only a high-level model
for HIP overlay networking, with the integration details left for applica-
tion designers. One of the overlay networks which has been proposed as
an instance for the HIP BONE framework is the IETF P2PSIP protocol,
RELOAD. The RELOAD protocol (discussed in Chapter 2.5.2) provides an
overlay network framework for different types of distributed applications,
such as multimedia communication. The authors of [93] describe an alter-
ation to the base RELOAD framework, which updates some of the func-
tionality of the Forwarding and Link Management module to be based on
HIP (and associated network security protocols). This draft also speciﬁes
a model for combining the identities used in HIP and RELOAD, as well
as how the different RELOAD message types should be used to convey
HIP-related parameters. However, it relies on relatively new extensions
to HIP, most notably the multi-hop routing extension [25] and the data
packet extension [26], and should be considered highly experimental.
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2.7 Teredo
Teredo [71] is an IPv6 over IPv4 tunneling protocol designed to traverse
NATs and other network middleboxes through the use of UDP encapsula-
tion and hole punching techniques [49]. Teredo uses a public server, the
Teredo server, for initializing the connection between the Teredo clients,
removing the need for each client to have a public IP address. The Teredo
protocol is designed to be simple and light, both in packet overhead and
load on the Teredo server. The server load is kept minimal by only for-
warding the initial packet and encoding the state into the Teredo IPv6
addresses. This has contributed to its popularity, and Teredo is currently
available for a wide range of operating systems (including a built-in sup-
port in Microsoft Windows), with a number of organizations maintaining
open, free, Teredo servers.
Teredo was developed as an improvement to the 6to4 [30] IPv4 to IPv6
transition protocol which required the hosts to obtain public, globally ac-
cessible, IPv4 addresses. On initialization, the client hosts, Teredo clients,
contact a public Teredo server through IPv4 UDP, which assigns them a
unique IPv6 Teredo address. Before assigning this address, the server will
check the type of NAT (if any) the client resides behind (using a secondary
source IP address for probing). The client address consists of ﬁve ﬁelds, as
depicted in Figure 2.11. The ﬁrst ﬁeld is the Teredo preﬁx, 2001:0000/32
and the second the Teredo server’s public IPv4 address. The third ﬁeld
contains a 16-bit ﬂag ﬁeld which is used to indicate the type of NAT the
client is behind. The rest of the address contains the public IPv4 ad-
dress of the client or its NAT and the port number used (as seen by the
server). When contacting another Teredo client, that client’s server ad-
dress is decoded from the Teredo IPv6 client address, and an initial ses-
sion set-up packet (Teredo bubble) is sent. This is forwarded by the server
to the client, which decodes the initiating client’s IPv4 address from the
received packet, and tries to establish a connection by sending ICMPv6
ping packets directly to it (hopefully opening a route through any possible
middleboxes in between).
Teredo does have a few drawbacks. The additional encapsulation and
server relaying obviously adds a small amount of overhead compared to
native IPv6 connectivity. More importantly, the NAT traversal method
used is simple, and does not penetrate all types of NATs. Although exten-
sions have been developed to the core Teredo speciﬁcation to improve the
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Figure 2.11. The Teredo client address contains the Teredo preﬁx, the server’s IPv4
address, ﬂags indicating NAT type and the client’s public IPv4 and port.
Adapted from [71].
NAT traversal capabilities, some undocumented while others, such as the
SymTeredo proposal [70], not, they have not been ofﬁcially integrated to
the Teredo protocol.
2.8 P2P HTTP
P2P web services have received a fair amount of interest through a num-
ber of proposals [16] [52] [152] [44]. Web services is a term used to de-
scribe a service model where remote procedure calls are made over HTTP
using technologies such as Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) for data
exchange, Universal Description Discovery and Integration (UDDI) and
Web Service Deﬁnition Language (WSDL) for service discovery. This model
is based on a centralized lookupmechanism, where services are registered
and found using a single service broker.
The proposals for P2Pweb services depict architectures where end-users,
the peers, could act as both consumers and providers of services, using a
distributed lookup mechanism for rendezvous. Although in line with our
goals, these proposals concentrate on distributing the lookup, ignoring
deployment details such as network obstacles (middleboxes) and certain
security aspects (strong identities). Although suitable for limited environ-
ments, these do not scale to global networks.
2.8.1 Web caching
Distributed web caching and content sharing is a topic closely related to
P2P HTTP. These systems focus on locating static resources (such as im-
ages or markup pages) using the HTTP protocol, instead of establishing
a connection with an end-point for dynamic interaction. Although there
are a large number of proposals in this area [157] [165] [110] [179], the
Squirrel web cache [76] serves as a good example for demonstrating the
key ideas as it provides a clear model that has been thoroughly analyzed
[33].
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The Squirrel web cache is based on creating a structured (Pastry-based
[147]) overlay between the peers in which responsibility for content is di-
vided equally between the peers according to the address, the Uniform
Resource Location (URL), of the content. Requests are delegated to the
peer responsible for that content, which can act according to two dif-
ferent schemes proposed by the authors of Squirrel [76]. In the home-
store scheme the responsible node either returns the content (if cached)
or fetches it from the source server. In the directory scheme the responsi-
ble node maintains a list of peers that have recently accessed the content,
and forwards the request to one of those. In content distribution schemes,
similar models can be used to distribute the load between the peers of
the network. These schemes however, focus on the efﬁcient distribution of
the load, without considering connectivity issues or security, and are thus
suited only for networks with trusted peers.
2.8.2 Personal web services
Nokia’s Research Center has developed a personal mobile web server for
Symbian Series60-based smartphones [119]. This Apache HTTPD [13]
based software can serve both static content and dynamic, context-de-
pendent, pages written in PHP5 or Python6. These mobile web pages are
thus able to serve as a personal information center integrated with the
core mobile applications. For instance, information from the phone’s cal-
endar can be utilized as well as any photographs or short messages found
on the device. Compared to the P2P web service proposals, connectivity
has been carefully addressed, as it presents one of the greatest challenges
in cellular environments. To reach the mobile web server, the system re-
lies on a public server for relaying all data trafﬁc. Although this adds to
the latency, it is considered satisfactory for the intended use.
Opera Unite7 offers a similar P2P web experience for desktop comput-
ers. Instead of a dedicated server application, it is based on JavaScript
applications that are run within the Opera web browser itself. As with
the mobile web server, it uses a centralized model for authentication and
rendezvous, and does not provide an interface for external applications.
It does embrace the concept of P2P web services by packaging the ap-
plications into so-called Unite service packages, and providing a catalog
5PHP: Hypertext Preprocessor http://www.php.net.php
6Python programming language, http://www.python.org
7Opera Unite, http://unite.opera.com/
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service for easy distribution.
2.8.3 P2P social networking
With the overwhelming popularity of social networking services seen to-
day, a number of projects have sprung up that aim to create decentralized
versions of these services. Although these can be seen as instances of the
personal web services discussed in Chapter 2.8.2, they are specially tai-
lored for social networking only. These create a social overlay for different
types of activities, instead of a generic HTTP network. The driving force
behind these is often also rooted in the fear of the power and control the
popular centralized social networking sites have over people, not so much
in developing a more scalable solution for these services. As users become
more dependent on social networking services, providing themwith status
updates, images and other personal information, concern has been raised
over how this growing amount of sensitive data is being used. For in-
stance, selling it to advertisers (to provide targeted advertisements based
on interests) can provide a lucrative source of income. Furthermore, sud-
den changes in site policies could publicly reveal more data than users
expect, which could lead to embarrassment or be used for social engineer-
ing and even identity theft.
P2P social networking projects such as Diaspora, GNUSocial and Apple-
Seed are creating rich web-based environments where users can connect
and interact without handing information over to a third party. The data
is stored locally, and shared only with trusted friends. This gives users
more control over their on-line identity, but with a number of drawbacks.
Users must host the social networking software on their local computers,
and be able to connect with their friends to share. This ties the service to
speciﬁc computers, and requires them to be regularly connected to the In-
ternet. In practice, the users need to set up a personal web server running
fairly complex software. Furthermore, these need to be publicly exposed
to the Internet, allowing incoming connections, which can be problematic
for normal home-users.
2.9 Bloom filters
Bloom ﬁlters, conceived by Burton H. Bloom [22], are space-efﬁcient prob-
abilistic data structures used to determine whether an element is part
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of a set. Although several variations exist, the basic Bloom ﬁlters use k
different hash functions to compress the element’s into a k- bit signature,
which is stored in the m- bit Bloom ﬁlter.
An empty Bloom ﬁlter consists of m bits, all set to zero. When adding
an element, we use the k hash functions to obtain k bit positions within
m, which are set to one. As compressing a hash value into a single bit
entry (essentially performing a modulo m) will cause collisions between
the signatures of different elements, the Bloom ﬁlters are probabilistic in
nature. We can therefore determine with certainty whether an element is
not part of a set, but only within a certain probability whether it is part
of it. To keep these false-positives low, the values of m (ﬁlter size) and k
(number of hash functions) needs to be chosen according to the expected
size of the set [177].
When adding a value to a Bloom ﬁlter, the probability that a single bit
within anm- sized ﬁlter will be set by single hash function is 1
m
. After this
single insertion, the probability that a randomly chosen bit is unset (not
set by that hash function) is therefore 1− 1
m
. When using k hash functions,
the probability that a single bit remains unset after the insertion of a
single element becomes then (1− 1
m
)k, and after n elements (1− 1
m
)kn with
the implication that the probability that the bit is set 1− (1− 1
m
)kn. For an
arbitrary value to be falsely seen as present in the Bloom ﬁlter, we need
all k hash functions to produce a value that is set in the ﬁlter. Therefore,
the false positive probability becomes:
p = (1− (1−
1
m
)kn)k (2.1)
The advance knowledge of the number of elements any ﬁlter will store
becomes especially problematic when these Bloom ﬁlters are passed and
edited by multiple users. A too optimistic choice of values for m and k
(small ﬁlter size) will easily result in overfull ﬁlters, rendering the con-
tent useless. On the other hand, a ﬁlter that is too large, in proportion
to the number of elements stored in it, looses its efﬁciency and becomes
essentially a bloated hash table. Being able to scale these ﬁlters dynami-
cally has therefore, quite naturally, gained much attention with a number
of more or less efﬁcient schemes proposed.
Scalable Bloom Filters (SBF) [11] presents a scheme where Bloom ﬁl-
ters are grown dynamically to keep the false positive probability within
a speciﬁc bound. The ﬁlters are expanded adding new slices when the
ﬁll ratio (percentage of bits set) of the ﬁlter exceeds a pre-deﬁned value.
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These new slices are subsequently used for adding new elements, and de-
termining memberships is done by checking all slices. In order to keep
the false positive probability from linearly increasing, the ﬁll restrictions
are tightened for each successive slice (by increasing the size of the ﬁlters
or lowering the ﬁll ratio threshold). For instance, by doubling the size of
each new slice, the total error probability will be the sum of a geometric
series, for which we can choose the parameters so it converges at a speciﬁc
value. Dynamic Bloom Filters (DBF) [57] presents a similar scheme, but
with looser control over the growth of the total error ratio.
Although both schemes adds a degree of dynamicity, providing a more
efﬁcient way of using Bloom ﬁlters without knowing beforehand the ele-
ment count, they do change the basic structure of Bloom ﬁlters. As the
ﬁlters become structurally matrices, certain operations (such as unions
and intersections) are complicated or impossible.
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3. A secure peer-to-peer framework
Our research begun with the design of a P2P framework, whose primary
purpose was to serve as a platform for studying applications in provider-
less environments. However, the architecture of the framework itself was
also in focus, as we aimed to address the topic as broadly as possible,
including deployability and cost, which relates to how the network, and
therefore our framework, is built. The framework should be able to oper-
ate in different types of networking environments, with different types of
data. As discussed in Chapter 1, the common approach to P2P network-
ing is to create unique systems, each tailored for a speciﬁc application or
environment. Our focus was not on a speciﬁc application, but rather an
easily deployable utility that could be adapted to different uses.
As the trend in personal computing is clearly moving towards mobile
environments and embedded devices, with location-independent connec-
tivity, one of the key inﬂuences on the design was the requirements of
these mobile, resource-limited, devices. Although the features, capabil-
ities and processing power of mobile devices are growing exponentially,
there are certain factors (such as cost of cellular networking and battery
life) that will continue to limit what is feasible. This lead us to the follow-
ing requirements that the design should fulﬁll.
Mobility and strong identities. The popularity of different types of
Internet- enabled devices has shown that users are not tied to a single
one, but choose one based on convenience, location or mood, to access the
same service. As many of these, especially hand-held mobile devices, are
often carried on person and tend to change network location frequently,
the framework should support both identity, and network, mobility. We
can not rely on devices being accessible at ﬁxed locations for a long pe-
riod of time, or that the network around them remains static. Therefore,
we should not rely on trusted authorities to authenticate and secure the
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Figure 3.1. The design principles and their importance for different use-cases and envi-
ronments.
users, but instead use a strong, self-verifying, identities.
Reliance on infrastructure and closed environments.. Aside from
authentication, the framework should not rely on other infrastructure ei-
ther, but be able to operate in completely closed environments. Connec-
tion establishment and peer lookup is commonly performed using public
servers, or well-known peers. However, future networking environments
may become more fragmented than today, for instance due to security con-
cerns, or personal- and proximity networking. The framework can still
use public nodes to ease connection establishment, but should not be com-
pletely reliant on them.
Connectivity and end-to-end security. Users should be able to con-
nect, independent of their location. As a large proportion of the end-hosts
may reside behind various network obstacles (such as ﬁrewalls or NATs),
the framework should provide a solution for traversing these. We also
need to provide multiple layers of security. Data may traverse through in-
termediate nodes, and should be protected against eavesdropping and in-
transit modiﬁcation. Finally, data management. The framework should
be optimized for mobile devices, minimizing the amount of data these need
to process, in order to spare memory and power consumption. Figure 3.1
summarizes these aspects, together with their importance for different
types of users.
In the following chapter, we review the design and implementation of
our framework in order to provide the context of the research. Lastly, we
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highlighting the technological advances of the framework compared to the
state of the art.
3.1 System overview
By deﬁnition, a fully distributed P2P system treats all peers equal and
relies only on these, the end-user devices and applications, to operate.
However, to achieve the required level of security and connectivity in all
environments, two additional roles were introduced in our design: the
identity authorities and the overlay infrastructures. Following is a high-
level review of the actors of the framework, illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2. The components of the P2P framework. In addition to the users and peers,
identity authorities and overlay infrastructures can be present. P2P connec-
tions are made using a data protocol such as HIP.
The peers are the ordinary end-users’ nodes. These devices run either
applications that are able to directly communicate with the overlay, or a
P2P framework daemon that connects legacy applications to the system.
Connections between peers are established using a suitable data proto-
col, such as HIP BONE (as explained in Chapter 2.6.1). Furthermore,
the peers contain everything needed to manage their security themselves,
which make them independent, and able to move between different types
of environments easily.
The identity authorities are trusted nodes that solve the introduction
problem in larger environments. These act as authorities, providing ver-
iﬁcation that an identity (a public key) belongs to a speciﬁc user through
a digital certiﬁcate. Without these authorities, it is hard to keep track
of identities, and impossible to verify new ones, leading to impersonation
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and misbehavior, as malicious activity is hard to attribute to a speciﬁc
peer. Essentially these authorities ensure uniqueness and consistency of
identities.
TheOverlay infrastructures are collections of network resources that
can be utilized for more efﬁcient networking. These can be anything from
simple on-line storage sites to public peers and overlay networks. These
entities need to offer only semi-persistent storage in order to be useful.
3.1.1 Identity management
Our framework uses a strong, public key-based identity scheme, on which
much of the security is based. Each user generates (or is provided) a pub-
lic key pair which is used as their unique electronic identity in the system.
This key pair is used for authentication during data session, and to elec-
tronically sign and encrypt the data packets stored in remote storage and
overlays. As the integrity and conﬁdentiality of data is thus ensured, we
are less dependent on the quality of the underlying storage service.
However, as public keys are both inconvenient and unintuitive to man-
age directly, the system binds these identities to human-readable identi-
ﬁers, names. Similar to how domain names are mapped to IP addresses,
only these names are exposed to the end-user and the client applications
when referring to other users. These identiﬁers follow an email-like user-
name-domain structure, which allows for ﬂexibility, as the uniqueness of a
name can easily be controlled within the context of a speciﬁc domain. Fur-
thermore, similar schemes are widely used in current applications, mak-
ing it easier to adapt legacy applications to our framework. For securely
mapping the identiﬁers to public keys, we use electronic certiﬁcates.
The identity authorities are trusted third-party certiﬁcate authorities
used to securely introduce peers to each other. These authorities issue
certiﬁcates presented during peer connections, that bind the public key
of a user to the user’s unique name. Compared to public-key infrastruc-
tures, identity authorities do not follow a hierarchy, and can be created
at will, as long as both parties of a session trust the same. For instance,
enterprises can maintain their own authority for issuing certiﬁcates to
corporate-speciﬁc identiﬁers. At the same time, users can also trust the
certiﬁcates issued by an authority created within a small group of close
friends.
Although the scheme requires the users to trust the authorities behind
the root certiﬁcates, it is not designed to provide trust between the users.
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The goal is merely to provide a guarantee of the uniqueness of an identity
in order to prevent identity theft and spooﬁng (much like the authentica-
tion scheme speciﬁed by OpenID [3]).
Furthermore, the identity authorities are not the only way in which
peers can be introduced. The framework does not require that the iden-
tity certiﬁcates are issued by any speciﬁc authority, but support also cer-
tiﬁcates issued by other peers the user trusts, similar to the web-of-trust
used by PGP. This ﬂexibility enables identity mobility by allowing users
to issue temporary certiﬁcates even of their own identity. For instance,
instead of transferring ones identity to a rental device, we can just issue
a certiﬁcate that borrows our identity for as long as we use the device.
Alternatively, we can utilize third party identity- and key management
systems. For instance, SafeSlinger[46] provides an easy-to-use and secure
system for exchanging public keys within a group of users. These keys, or
identities, can be accessed from other applications using their API.
Establishing actual trust in users is a complex and highly subjective
decision, resolved on a completely different layer. The identity scheme
only veriﬁes that the name a user is using actually corresponds to his
cryptographic identity, when processed within the framework. Figure 3.3
illustrates this process, and how identities are handled in our model.
Figure 3.3. A high-level view of the identity handling. Users and applications use identi-
ﬁers, names, when addressing remote peers. The identity management of the
framework translates these into identity keys using the overlays. The iden-
tity of the local user is used to verify the mapping, using identity authorities,
stored contacts or relationship information.
3.1.2 Overlay infrastructure
The overlay infrastructures are resources that provide lookup- and ren-
dezvous services that assist peers in ﬁnding, and connecting, to each other,
similar to what overlays and BitTorrent trackers do. The framework is
not tied to a single overlay or type of network resource, and can even op-
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erate without any. The type of resources that may be used include both
ones created speciﬁcally for the framework, such as overlay networks, and
dedicated servers or public, well-known, peers. The requirement for act-
ing as one consists of providing some storage space and offering a simple
key-based interface for accessing data.
The framework deﬁnes a very basic set of operations that these re-
sources must support. At a minimum, these include only the three storage
operations put, get and remove. In addition to these, the framework can
make use of signed operations, publish-subscribe services and message
routing. The signed operations are designed to ease the burden on the
clients when fetching data published by a speciﬁc peer. Instead of the
client having to ﬁlter the response entries, the overlay can be instructed
to do so before returning the results.
For best performance, the storage services should naively support an in-
dexing scheme based on cryptographically generated keys, such as hash
digests. These are primarily used for locating peers by retrieving self-
published information packages that are indexed, for example, using the
digest of the identity identiﬁer. As the storage services are open and even
unreliable (with regards to availability and eavesdropping), there are a
number of security issues to consider. The data packages are signed, elim-
inating spooﬁng, but polluting the storage with invalid entries is still pos-
sible. The signed storage operations are designed to mitigate this threat,
as the storage would only accept properly signed content and is able to
ﬁlter the request results according to the signer. In Chapter 5 we discuss
our privacy extensions which further address these issue by obfuscating
the lookup keys.
3.1.3 Connectivity
As different environments and applications may require different types of
data protocols and connection types, we do not limit ourselves to a speciﬁc
data transfer protocol, but instead create a ﬂexible model where we allow
different types of existing (and possible future) protocols to be used. This
modularity is however hidden from the client applications, presented only
through a common interface. In our model, as we do not rely on overlay
routing being possible, we need efﬁcient methods for traversing the net-
work obstacles present today that prevent direct connections.
Our focus has been on using the existing, stable, solutions Teredo [71]
and the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [121]. Currently these protocols are
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the most promising candidates for enabling P2P connections for ordinary
end-users. Although competing technologies, such as routable IPv6 ad-
dresses and Mobile IP, has had some success, they are still inaccessible to
many and do not solve network middlebox traversal completely.
By using HIP, we also relieve the application layer from solving a num-
ber of other issues. HIP is designed with security in mind, and provides
strong authentication between end-points and encryption of the data traf-
ﬁc. Furthermore, HIP provides features such as connection mobility and
multihoming which enables hosts to move between networks seamlessly.
More recently, as discussed in Chapter 2.6.1, there has been work on stan-
dardizing extensions for HIP to support certiﬁcate-based authentication
and construction of overlays based on the Host Identities. These show
great potential for further improving the usefulness of HIP in P2P sce-
narios.
Teredo provides a widely deployed and slightly lighter platform for NAT
and other middlebox traversal. Although lacking the security of HIP, com-
bined with a transport security, it is a potent alternative for P2P connec-
tions.
3.2 Prototype implementation
A working prototype implementation was needed to gain sufﬁcient experi-
ence and insight into potential issues of the framework design. We needed
to asses the usability of applications adapted to our P2P model, and the
feasibility and performance of overlays constructed using only simple, and
possible unreliable, components (as described in Chapter 3.1.2). Further-
more, we needed a prototype which would operate in the same types of en-
vironments and devices we see future applications being used on, namely
mobile networks and hand-held devices. The applications should portray
the activities we expect users to engage in, not only demonstrate the tech-
nical performance of the framework.
This led us to design the prototype as a network proxy for existing,
legacy, application, replacing the centralized service provisioning these
rely on today with our distributed model. Although integrating the frame-
work as a part of speciﬁc applications, or even constructing completely
new ones could provide a more seamless experience, our approach made
integration easier, allowing us to experience with more, and different
types or applications.
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The prototype was implemented on the GNU/Linux operating systems.
Linux was chosen for its versatility, as it allowed us to experiment with
applications both on personal computers as well as hand-held mobile de-
vices and smartphones. The prototype was designed with the limita-
tions of mobile Linux operating systems (such as Maemo 1 and MeeGo
2) in mind, as an efﬁcient background daemon. The prototype was imple-
mented in the C language, with only a few external library dependencies,
making it easy to port to different types of Linux environments.
The daemon acts as a network proxy, intercepting trafﬁc from local ap-
plications which it maps, in an application speciﬁc manner, to our P2P
model. In the following we will review some of the details of the im-
plementation that are important for understanding how the experiments
were conducted.
3.2.1 Architecture
The prototype was designed to be highly modular, making it easy to exper-
iment with new components and features. This modularity was achieved
by separating functionality into units offering clear interfaces for perform-
ing tasks, receiving updates and modifying the behavior of the module.
For instance, following a successful peer connection establishment, an
event is issued which modules can dynamically choose to receive. These
can be used, for instance, to initiate data synchronization between the
two.
At the core of the prototype is an asynchronous, multi-threaded, event
engine (the processor module). The event-based architecture enables
complex concurrency, while supporting also long-lived tasks through worker
threads. Application events (e.g., signaling for a VoIP call) may result in
a large number of networking operations, such as lookup and connection
establishment, which would easily stall the whole system otherwise. Fig-
ure 3.4 depicts the architecture of the prototype’s components.
The ident module contains the identity-related logic. It manages the
locally stored identities and performs all identity-related cryptographic
operations. It also provides an interface for utilizing identities from ex-
ternal identity modules, either as the primary identity, or as temporary
ones by acquiring certiﬁcates authorizing it for a ﬁxed period of time. This
design allows for mobility, as we can use identities stored on smart cards
1The Maemo development platform. http://maemo.org
2http://meego.com
70
A secure peer-to-peer framework
sipp
SIP application
support
extapi
HTTP proxy, registration 
interface, Web cache
olclient
Overlay lookup 
and routing
conn
Connection
management
ident
Identity management
processor
Core services
IPC, configuration, event handling
netio
Networking utilities
overlay modules
Overlay network support
hipapi
HIPL support
opendht
OpenDHT support
broadcast
LAN Broadcast
pymod
Python run-time
environment
ac
access control
trustman
Trust management
identity module
identity module
crypt
Crypto library
utils
General data management
Core modules
Application
interfaces
Low-level
utilities
Figure 3.4. A high-level overview of the modules of the prototype.
or mobile phones while accessing the network from a untrusted computer.
In addition to managing the identity, the ident module keeps track of
relationships, and provides access control and trust management based
on these. Though sub-modules, it maintains a database of application-
provided reports about encounters with external identities (users). These
reports contain information such as the context of the encounter (e.g.,
voice call or email) and the trust gained or lost, which is summarized and
made available for all other applications using the system. This allows
applications to better identify unknown peers, as they are provided with
a track record- where or how that peer has been encountered before, and
what the peer’s behavior has been.
The conn module manages the data exchange with remote peers. It
provides a simple interface for either packet- or stream-based communi-
cation using only the peer name and a service identiﬁer. These service
identiﬁers refer to speciﬁc application instances, much like port numbers
in TCP. And in a similar manner, modules need to register handlers for
them in order to receive data. Communication with remote peers is thus
completely hidden behind a single interface, independent of the type of
connection used. The prototype supports currently connections made us-
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ing HIP, plain IP and Teredo.
The olclient module provides an abstraction for interfacing with the
overlay infrastructures. The actual interaction logic of any overlay is
packaged into sub-modules, which provide a common interface for the
overlay operations discussed in Chapter 3.1.2. The olclient module is-
sues each request on each one of these sub-modules in parallel, returning
the results (e.g., for fetching resources) as they become available. Cur-
rently we have implemented sub-modules for OpenDHT, for a proprietary
web-based hash table lookup, and for local area network (LAN) broadcast-
based lookup. These provide lookup for both global deployments as well
as closed, ad-hoc, networks.
In addition to these, the prototype contains a set of utility modules,
and application-speciﬁc modules through which the applications interact.
These are explained in more detail in Chapter 3.3.
3.2.2 Overlay use
For peer lookup and connection establishment, we use a system of reg-
istration packets. The registration packets are electronically signed data
containers that contain all the information needed to establish a direct
connection, including current IP addresses, NAT traversal information
(such as HIP RVS or Teredo addresses). They contain an internal and
external part (as illustrated in Figure 3.5). The internal part contains the
connectivity parameters as well as other, application-speciﬁc extensions.
This data is signed with the identity key of the user (the publisher), with
the signature, as well as any relevant identity certiﬁcates, contained in
an outer envelope.
The internal part of the registration packet is meant to describe the cur-
rent state of the user. Not only does it contain the connectivity-related
parameters, but it can also include application-speciﬁc data such as the
current status of the user, application version or other information rele-
vant to a remote peer.
As these packets are signed, and relatively light-weight, the system is
able to use any type of network storage that offers limited storage and
a way of indexing data. This highlights one of the differences between
our system and many other P2P systems. We do not stress building an
optimal overlay network for locating users and distributing data, but are
able to use a number of existing services for it, even simple web-sites.
This approach is similar to the peer discovery mechanism of BitTorrent,
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Figure 3.5. Contents and structure of the registration packets. In addition to connectiv-
ity information, the internal part may contain application-speciﬁc parame-
ters.
where trackers offer a simple interface for storing, and fetching, peer in-
formation. Furthermore, we can use redundancy to create a sufﬁciently
reliable system, even if the individual storage services are unreliable or
untrusted. This eliminates the need to deploy custom servers to bootstrap
the system, making the system accessible for ordinary users that do not
have the necessary resources or know-how to maintain the infrastructure.
Prime examples of these open, free, storage infrastructures are cloud-
computing services such as Google’s AppEngine3 and Heroku4. These
allow users to deploy web applications, and provide different types of
storage API with database-like features. Using these cloud services, a
suitable storage back-end can be created, as we have done, with little ef-
fort. Other possible infrastructures include Amazon’s SimpleDB service5,
which offers similar free quota-limited services. But even simple ﬁle stor-
age services such as DropBox6 can be used, as ﬁle names can easily be
3http://www.appengine.com
4http://www.heroku.com
5http://aws.amazon.com/simpledb/
6http://www.dropbox.com/
73
A secure peer-to-peer framework
Figure 3.6. Sequence diagram over how the olclient manages the overlay modules during
get and subscribe calls. The key and return data are processed according to
the type of call (obfuscation, encryption) fore issuing the request or returning
the data.
used as indexes.
The management of the different types of overlay infrastructures (stor-
age and routing services) is contained in so called overlay modules within
the olclient. These modules are registered with the olclient manager ei-
ther at start up or dynamically. The olclient manager controls these mod-
ules and delegates the calls appropriately. For instance, when retrieving
an item, the olclient forwards the request to the appropriate functions of
all of the registered overlay modules. As certain functions, such as re-
trieving data items signed by a speciﬁc user, may not be supported by all
modules, the olclient manager simulates the call by examining and ﬁlter-
ing the content retrieved using unsigned calls. The process is illustrated
in Figure 3.6.
3.3 Application integration
An important part of validating our P2P model was to be able to use real
use-cases and situations to evaluate it. The prototype model was designed
to be ﬂexible, supporting different types of data models and communica-
tion patterns. But as the prototype was implemented as a network proxy,
it set some limitations on the types of applications we could support with-
out having to modify the applications.
The ﬁrst type of applications we considered was real-time communica-
tion applications. These are in many ways ideal for P2P communication
systems, as they are based on exchanging data produced by the end-users.
These are also highly personal applications, as we use them to communi-
cate with people we have a relationship with. SIP was chosen as the pri-
mary protocol for real-time communication applications. SIP is an open,
well documented protocol suitable for a wide range of different applica-
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tions, including audio- and video calls, instant messaging and ﬁle trans-
fers. SIP is also easy to work with, supporting network proxies, and a
convenient messaging syntax. It also enjoys a wide acceptance and de-
ployment, with numerous implementations.
Secondly we focused on creating an interface for HTTP-based applica-
tions. Although HTTP was originally created for the World Wide Web
(WWW), it has been adopted by a wide range of applications as a generic
communication protocol. Even though thought of as a client-server proto-
col, it is not bound to centralized management, making it suitable for P2P
trafﬁc as well. In the following chapters, we present the details of how
these protocols were integrated. We conclude with a discussion on how
the prototype relates to a more generic framework.
3.3.1 SIP
The SIP protocol adapted well to the P2P model, as it uses similar user
identiﬁers as our framework, and is designed to support network proxies
and processing of the signaling by these. As explained in Chapter 2.4, SIP
supports distributed environments, but uses centralized, domain- based,
authentication and lookup. These we replaced with the framework’s own
identity scheme and lookup, mapping the SIP identiﬁers (AORs) directly
to the framework’s. Applications (such as a VoIP application) could there-
fore be switched to our framework by simply conﬁguring them to use our
daemon as proxy for all signaling.
This SIP module accepts and interprets SIP signaling, parsing andmod-
ifying certain parameters (such as routing queues) to ﬁt our network
structure. Signaling destined for SIP servers (such as status updates and
registrations) are captured and responded to appropriately. Signaling des-
tined for remote peers (such as VoIP calls), results in a P2P connection to
be established using the framework’s lookupmechanism, and the message
being forwarded. Our implementation supports all standard signaling, as
well as the most common extensions to the protocol. Beside audio- or video
calls, these include instant messaging and presence.
As security is one of the main topics of our research, the SIP module
contains a multi-layered ﬁltering system, with interfaces for examining
and modifying both locally and remotely received signaling. Using these
interfaces, we have added validity checks for the signaling, black- and
white list ﬁltering, and ﬁltering based on social networks (as presented in
Chapter 7). We also modify the session parameters in order to ensure that
75
A secure peer-to-peer framework
the data (such as the audio stream during a phone call) is routed securely
through the encrypted P2P connection. Throughout this processing, the
prototype will still behave as a normal SIP proxy, responding appropri-
ately to the SIP application without the application being aware of it.
3.3.2 HTTP
The HTTP support was implemented to enable P2P exchanges of not only
web- based content, but any type HTTP- based data, such as RSS updates
and remote procedure calls (RPCs) using REST or SOAP interfaces. As
with SIP, the goal was that users could use existing HTTP-based clients
to access these P2P provided services, and standard HTTP servers for
providing them. This required creating an URL mapping scheme, a ser-
vice registration interface and to include authentication data to the HTTP
headers.
In order to support legacy applications, we needed to preserve the URL
syntax of HTTP, and use a mapping mechanism to convert host names to
the identiﬁers used by the P2P framework. As explained in Chapter 3.2.1,
the prototype uses service identiﬁers to refer to the applications of, or
services offered by, a peer. We simply mapped the host name of an URL to
the peer name, and the port number to these service identiﬁers. However,
as the at character (@) of the peer names has a special meaning in HTTP,
it is replaced with the sequence .at.. For instance, the URL
http://alice.at.example.com:1000/get_rss
would result in a request to a service registered as service 1000 on user
alice@example.com.
The HTTP application handler was implemented as both a standard
HTTP proxy as well as a local HTTP server using URL rewriting. As with
SIP, the protocol handler parses the requests and establishes a peer con-
nection in order to forward the request. In order for the recipient to be
able to forward the request to the right HTTP- based server, we added a
service registration interface. This REST- based interface allows applica-
tions to reserve a service number of the local identity by providing a local
TCP port where the requests should be forwarded.
As all P2P HTTP requests will be routed through the local P2P proxy,
they will all seem to be originated from the local host. Although these
requests go through a similar ﬁltering process as SIP, and there are mul-
tiple ways of adding authentication to HTTP, we also include the identity
of the remote peer to each request. The HTTP headers of each request
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is rewritten, adding custom X-P2P-From and X-P2P-To headers specifying
the source (remote) and target (local) peer identiﬁers. Although legacy
applications may not use them, new ones can beneﬁt from this automatic
authentication and single sign on mechanism.
3.3.3 Towards a generic framework
It might seem contradictory to speak of a generic application framework,
as the application protocols we chose to support (SIP and HTTP) each
required separate adapters that both leveraged protocol- speciﬁc features.
Supporting additional applications would require analyzing the protocol,
in order to adapt it to the new environment. However, the SIP and HTTP
protocols represent two important types of communication patterns, to
which most other application protocols adhere.
As we move towards new network architectures and applications, we
may need to create new, or improve old, application protocols to better ﬁt
those environments. However, the purpose of the prototype is not to show
how any application can be integrated, but that most any type of applica-
tion can. The SIP and HTTP protocols were merely two convenient, and
well-suited, protocols for our work.
3.4 Summary
The goal of our framework has been to design a platform that enables
experiments with networking applications in a distributed environment
to study the issues they face. As the nature of the Internet is evolving
beyond what it is designed for, there has been an active debate on new
architectures. Many of the proposals put forth [96][168] show a trend to-
wards models that favor more decentralized architectures. In these we
have to rethink how applications operate, when there is limited access
to established authorities. Although the architectures themselves have
received a lot of attention, the impact these have on the design and oper-
ation of applications is often ignored. We have designed and implemented
a framework that emulate these environments, in order to study the se-
curity and usability issues of the applications.
Secondly, our framework is designed to be usable today, easily deployed
in both current and future networks. The security is based on strong
identities, which also allows for features such as mobility. The underlying
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theme in our model is to tie these identities more closely to the application
we use, and therefore to how we interact. By having a solid foundation for
identifying not only hosts, but the users behind application instances, and
even individual data, we can gain a more profound view of our network
environment. This can be used to create a much richer context around
the information we handle, enabling us to make better decisions. Our
framework presents thus a more user-oriented environment for applica-
tions than the current host- (and network-) oriented one of today.
3.4.1 Technological advances
The implementation relies heavily on the HIP protocol and strong identi-
ties to provide connectivity and security. Although these components are
not novel, the fact that we demonstrate how the model enables provider-
less overlays that can be deployed easily, and cost-efﬁciently, binding cryp-
tographic identities to application instances to enhance security and con-
trol, we feel is of value. In short, the advantages of our model, compared
to the current state of the art are:
I A cross-application identity model that authenticates users not only on
a host level, but can even be used to control single application instances.
Compared to existing models, this provides more accurate identiﬁcation,
as the user is better able to control which applications are able to use
his credentials. Remote peers, and even network middleboxes, also have
more control. For instance, the model enables remote peers to block, or
whitelist, network access for a single application, instead of applying the
same policy to all trafﬁc from the host.
II Use of generic networking resources (such as on-line storage and
cloud services) to create a platform for different types of applications and
services. Currently new services require support from dedicated net-
work resources. We demonstrate, through prototype validation and per-
formance measurements, that by combining a HIP-based identity man-
agement and overlay with a generic lookup mechanism, it is feasible to
construct private, and public, P2P overlay networks.
3.4.2 Related work
Our framework shares some aspects with existing P2P frameworks and
applications. However, as it is designed as a P2P framework, not bound
to any single application, it does differ substantially from most. For in-
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stance, content sharing systems, arguably the most prominent use of P2P
today, operate with such different prerequisites and goals, that only cer-
tain details can be compared. These systems are optimized for locating
and acquiring content without much care for the source, while we concen-
trate on the interaction and relationships between the nodes.
It does share some architectural similarities with BitTorrent, as noted
in Chapter 3.1.2. Our overlay infrastructures serve a similar function,
and operate in a similar manner, as the trackers of BitTorrent. As with
BitTorrent, we require only a simple interface to be provided by these
resources, while the implementation of those are left to the maintainer.
The end-user can participate, as in the BitTorrent DHT overlays, but is
not required. Furthermore, the system is not bound to a speciﬁc set of
these network resources, and does not have to maintain a connection after
suitable peers have been located. This eases the deployment of the sys-
tem, and adds resilience, as it can use multiple simultaneously. Although
the incentive mechanism is often quoted as the reason for BitTorrent’s
success, the minimalistic requirements for deployment has made it very
approachable and easily adaptable.
Of the more generic systems, the RELOAD protocol (discussed in Chap-
ter 2.5.2) comes, in many ways, the closest. Similar to our framework,
it provides P2P networking for applications that provide interaction be-
tween users, but without being tied to a speciﬁc type of application. Com-
pared to content sharing systems, the purpose is to establish links be-
tween the applications, not only fetch content. In these systems identity
management becomes important, and RELOAD has opted a for public
key- based scheme similar to ours. This enables secure authentication and
for verifying the authenticity of content published in the overlay through
electronic signatures.
However, REALOAD targets more established and stable environments
than we do. Although it has a very modular architecture for supporting
different types of overlay management, it does require that peers partic-
ipate, and features even dedicated trusted nodes, the enrollment servers,
for assigning responsibility. The network itself is relied on to perform cer-
tain tasks, such as access control, while our framework does not place any
trust in the overlay infrastructures. Furthermore, even though RELOAD
is not bound to a speciﬁc application, it does serve only a single one at
a time. An identity is bound not only to a user, but also a speciﬁc appli-
cation. Our framework uniﬁes all interaction from a user under a single
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identity. This enables us to easier form relationships with our peers, as we
can interact in different ways while being conﬁdent of the other’s identity.
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4. Evaluation
During our research, we have applied our prototype to different envi-
ronments and uses, recording the implementation’s behavior and perfor-
mance. To demonstrate the feasibility of our model, we present the most
essential of these evaluations. First, we examine the networking perfor-
mance. This is important for understanding how the technologies dis-
cussed impact the responsiveness and overall experience of the applica-
tions. We continue by evaluating the prototype on a mobile device, show-
ing how well the proposed framework performs, and the resource require-
ments in terms of CPU and memory. Lastly we present the results from
our experiments with different overlay infrastructures, quantifying the
resource usage and requirements for deploying a network.
By examining the framework from these angles, we believe that the
evaluation provides a good understanding of the feasibility of our model.
Not only in terms of the hardware that we can expect to support it, but
also how easy it would be to deploy and the user experience.
4.1 Networking performance
The goal of the network performance evaluationwas to determine whether
the technological solution we have outlined can deliver a satisfactory user
experience for ordinary users. Three conﬁgurations were used. First
utilizing HIP for both NAT traversal and security. Secondly using only
Teredo for NAT traversal. Finally we evaluated a combination of Teredo
and HIP. In this conﬁguration the data was secured using HIP, but encap-
sulated for NAT traversal using Teredo. Although using the native NAT
traversal extensions of HIP is surely more efﬁcient than combining the
two protocols, it can require RVS servers that are not as widely deployed
as Teredo. This makes the hybrid approach an interesting alternative
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for secure, and NAT-traversing, connections. Three characteristics were
measured; the initial connection set-up time, latency and the effect of the
protocols’ overhead on bandwidth.
4.1.1 Test set-up
The measurements were performed using the P2P HTTP interface of the
prototype. The client peer issued a request for pre-conﬁgured resources
on the serving peer, and the duration of the different faces of the request
processing were recorded separately. The resources were served by using
the Apache HTTPD server that had been conﬁgured (registered) to accept
connections through the P2P prototype. The P2P HTTP client was run
on a Linux-based 2.2 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo desktop computer with 2 GB
of RAM, and the P2P HTTP server on a 1.4 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo laptop
with 4 GB of RAM. The computers were running the Debian GNU/Linux
4.0 operating system with a standard 2.6.28 version of the Linux kernel.
The HIP for Linux (HIPL) version 1.0.4 [68] stack was used for HIP and
Miredo 1.1.5 [118] for Teredo connectivity.
The overlay infrastructure we used for lookup was a simple Google Ap-
pEngine storage application consisting roughly of 20 lines of code. This
application offers an HTTP interface for storing and retrieving arbitrary
blocks of data using 160 bit keys. Similar to the interface offered by
OpenDHT [127], each item has an expiration date and can be protected
from unauthorized removal by a password. The default server for Miredo,
teredo.remlab.net was used for Teredo, and HIIT’s public RVS, ashen-
vale.infrahip.net, as the HIP RVS server.
As our framework is designed to enable new services to be deployed eas-
ily, without additional infrastructure investments, the main target group
are ordinary home users. The evaluation was therefore designed to mea-
sure the performance of the framework in networking environments that
ordinary, residential, users are faced with. Although this does introduce
more uncontrollable interfering factors than when done in a controlled
setting, the results describe better the performance of the framework from
the user’s point of view. With this in mind, the network performance eval-
uation was designed with the serving host behind a NAT on a residential
digital subscriber line (DSL) broadband connection. The client host was
placed 16 network hops away, on a different autonomous system. This
provided a realistic scenario for what can be expected in terms of net-
work quality for the potential users. The average round-trip times (RTT)
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Table 4.1. Round trip time (RTT) between network elements.
Source host Target RTT
Serving Client 194.2ms σ 0.7
Serving Lookup 37.6ms σ 0.2
Serving Teredo server 186.9ms σ 0.1
Serving HIP RVS 194.0ms σ 0.5
Client Lookup server 26.7ms σ 0.1
Client Teredo server 50.3ms σ 1.4
Client HIP RVS 1.0ms σ 0.0
between the network elements is presented in Table 4.1 to illustrate the
quality of the connections.
4.1.2 Connection delay
The connection delay is the time required to establish a P2P connection
and respond to a request, illustrating how quickly users are able to con-
nect to new peers. This delay was recorded using an internal logging
mechanism of the prototype which automatically recorded the duration of
each of the four main phases of the connection establishment. These are
the Lookup, the lookup of the registration packet for the remote peer. Con-
nect is the time needed to establish the actual P2P connection. Auth is the
duration of the handshake, during which the identity of the remote peer
is veriﬁed. Remote is the time the remote peer processes and responds to
the request. Finally Misc contains the sum of all additional processing
needed to establish the connection. This includes possible DNS lookups
and various internal processing.
As a result of the NAT traversal, the initial connection establishment
is more time consuming than subsequent requests. Both Teredo and HIP
use UDP hole-punching techniques, which are based on UDP encapsu-
lation and relaying of the ﬁrst packet through an intermediate (Teredo
server or HIP RVS). Figures 4.1(b)-4.1(d) show the times recorded for ten
requests for each one of the three conﬁgurations. Between each request,
both peers were reset to provide a fresh setting.
Teredo performs as expected, adding only the RTTs needed to involve
the Teredo server to the connection process, resulting in an average of
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1281 ms total. The HIP-based connections performed worse. The HIP
connection establishment adds an additional 3000 ms to the process, with
the total averaging 4026 ms. Only a small fraction (100 ms in Misc) can
be explained by additional chores related to HIP (such as mapping HITs
to IP addresses). As this delay is present both when relaying through the
RVS and Teredo server, the HIP NAT traversal cannot be blamed either.
(a) HIP connection delay. (b) Teredo connection delay.
(c) HIP / Teredo connection delay. (d) Connection delay averages.
Figure 4.1. End-to-end connection delay in residential networks when using different
transport protocols. Ten samples were measured for each conﬁguration. The
duration of each of the phases of the connection establishment are stacked to
form the total.
After performing additional experiments and researching the problem,
it was found to be due to the Linux kernel dropping the ﬁrst packet of
the IPSec ESP BEET tunnels created by HIPL. By default, HIPL uses the
kernel-based IPSec, setting up appropriate routing tables for packets ad-
dressed with HITs. These result in the HIPL daemon being activated to
perform the BEX when a packet destined for a new HIT is received. The
ﬁrst packet is subsequently dropped by the kernel while waiting for the
BEX to complete. As the system uses TCP for the P2P proxy connections,
the connection is completed only after the TCP retransmission timer ex-
pires, resulting in a new packet being sent.
Although this issue may be addressed in future versions of the HIPL
implementation, it should be noted that this affects only the initial con-
nection set-up, not subsequent requests.
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Figure 4.2. Average RTT and HTTP response times for each connection type. Plain TCP
HTTP connections were not possible as the serving host was behind a NAT.
4.1.3 Latency
The latency was measured using pre-established connections. This pro-
vides a view of what the end-user would experience after the initial con-
nection establishment, in terms of the responsiveness of the services. Fig-
ure 4.2 depicts the average RTT measured using ICMP ping packets for
each connection type, as well as the corresponding response times for the
actual HTTP content. The HTTP response time was measured by issuing
a request for a small (50 bytes) web page. The time recorded is the time
between the client application issuing the request and when it actually
had received the content.
The ﬁgures are very similar between the different connection techniques.
After the initial set-up, each protocol sends the packets directly between
the hosts, adding only protocol encapsulation. The slightly longer times
for the HIP/Teredo combination connections can be explained by the ad-
ditional encapsulation and processing.
4.1.4 Throughput
The throughput was measured as the maximum rate at which the serving
host is able to deliver data over a TCP connection. The measurements
were done using the iperf network performance measurement tool. Fig-
ures 4.3(a)-4.3(b) show the results when using the three different con-
nection techniques as well as without any encapsulation (plain TCP) as
reference. Each measurement was run for a duration of 20 seconds to
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(a) Throughput, per sample. (b) Throughput, average.
Figure 4.3. Throughput measured in Kbit/s when using different connection types.
obtain a stable result.
It should be noted, as seen in the graphs, that these are highly suscepti-
ble to external inﬂuences (other users, link quality and the Internet Ser-
vice Provider, ISP, policies), but still provide an insight to how these pro-
tocols affect the performance. As the ﬁgure shows, the encapsulation does
have a noticeable effect on the overall bandwidth. Both HIP and Teredo
decreased the maximum bandwidth from 426 Kbit per second to 394 Kbit
per second, a decrease of 8%. Perhaps surprisingly, the HIP/Teredo combi-
nation resulted only in an additional 1.5% decrease from that value, with
a maximum bandwidth of 388 Kbit per second.
Figure 4.4 compares the total IP packet size generated by a 238 byte
HTTP request using the different connection types. As the ﬁgure shows,
Teredo and HIP add approximately an equal amount of overhead to the
data packets (40 and 42 bytes in this example, although the ESP header
length may vary due to padding). This corresponds quite well to the
throughput measurements. It should be noted that although the Tere-
do/HIP combination adds the most overhead, it is only 42 bytes more per
packet. Although this is roughly a 33% increase in the total amount of
overhead compared to plain Teredo, it is below three percent of a typical
network MTU of 1500 bytes.
In this example, our prototype is responsible for generating roughly 30
bytes per HTTP request of additional data (modiﬁcations made to the
original HTTP request, packet type- and stream-management identiﬁers).
This is a relatively high ﬁgure, and can surely be optimized in future re-
visions.
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Figure 4.4. Comparison and content of a packet containing 238 bytes of application data
produced by the different protocols.
4.2 Performance on a mobile device
For evaluating the framework’s performance on mobile devices, we used
Nokia Internet tablets (N800 and N810), as they feature a suitable OS for
the prototype and currently represent lower-end smart phones in terms of
hardware speciﬁcations (which highlights any issue we face).
We used the built-in Internet call and instant messaging application for
conducting the evaluation. This application supports the SIP protocol,
and can therefore be used together with the P2P framework without mod-
iﬁcations. During our evaluation, we used the devices in two different
network environments. Connectivity is provided through a wireless LAN
(WLAN) interface, which we used both in managed (connected to a WLAN
access point), and ad-hoc modes. This provided a view of how the applica-
tion performs when connected to a global network, as well as the usability
in closed networks.
The most notable issue was the latency created by the HIP base ex-
change. As noted by Khurri et. al. [94], the throughput of IPSec on these
devices is sufﬁcient for the data of multimedia sessions, but the delay
caused by the base exchange is considerable. As our prototype provides
no indications of the state of the HIP stack, it can lead to frustration as
the user is unsure whether the call is progressing. However, this affects
only the initial connection set-up. Subsequent requests are not affected,
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and are delivered with the latency comparable to that measured in Chap-
ter 4.1.3.
4.2.1 Connection delay
(a) HIP connection delay. (b) HIP connection delay after initial BEX.
(c) Connection delay using plain TCP. (d) Connection delay averages.
Figure 4.5. Measured connection delay on Nokia N810 with and without HIP.
The connection delays were measured using two Nokia N810 Internet
tablets connected through an ad-hoc WLAN network. The tablets were
situated near by, to minimize possible network interference. This al-
lowed us to concentrate on the performance of the tablets, as the impact of
the network has already been evaluated previously. Local network UDP
broadcast was used for the lookup. We used HIP for the P2P connections,
but also compared with using plain TCP to highlight the affect the strong
security has on these devices.
The connection delay was recorded by the same internal logging mech-
anism, presented in Chapter 4.1.2, over ten calls. Three sets of measure-
ments were taken. First using HIP for the P2P, and resetting both devices
between each call. This illustrates the delay of the initial request (or call)
between the mobile devices. Secondly we measured the delay when a HIP
connection had been pre-established, illustrating the delay of subsequent
requests between the two. Finally we measured ten calls when the P2P
connection is established without HIP.
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Figures 4.5(a)-4.5(d) show the time recorded for each of the three sets.
Using HIP on these mobile devices increases the initial connection delay
substantially. However, after a connection has been established, HIP af-
fects the performance only slightly.
(a) VoIP application inactive. (b) VoIP application active.
Figure 4.6. Call set-up delay with HIP.
(a) VoIP application inactive. (b) VoIP application active.
Figure 4.7. Call set-up delay without HIP.
Figure 4.8. Call set-up delay averages.
In order to understand how the overall experience is impacted by these
delays, we measured also the overall call set-up delay. This is the total
delay a user experiences, which includes both the delay caused by the
networking stack, as well as the time required by the VoIP application
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for processing the signaling and updating the UI. In addition to the three
conﬁgurations used for the connection delay (HIP, pre-established HIP
and plain TCP), the call delay was also measured when a P2P connection
had been pre-established (subsequent calls to the same peer). Further-
more, the call delay was measured both while the receiver was initially
idle, as well as when the VoIP application had been pre-loaded.
Figures 4.6-4.8 show the times measured for each of these conﬁgura-
tions. Although 4.5 seconds for establishing the HIP connection (Fig-
ure 4.5(d)) seems long, the additional delay caused by the built-in VoIP
application is much longer. As Figure 4.8 shows, merely starting the ap-
plication consumes approximately two seconds, leading up to an over ten
second average delay when placing a call to a remote user without a pre-
established connection.
4.2.2 CPU usage
As the results presented in Chapter4.2.1 showed, although the perfor-
mance of the prototype on the mobile N810 tablets may seem poor, it is not
excessively worse than the overall application experience of those devices.
The Nokia N810, released in 2007, features a 400 MHz single core ARM
processor (TI OMAP 2420) and 128 MB of RAM. With the rapid develop-
ment pace of electronics, this represents a rather low-end mobile device
today, when modern smartphones feature multiple core processors, efﬁ-
cient 3D graphics capabilities and giga bytes of RAM. However, by mea-
suring the CPU usage on the Internet tablets, we can analyze how the
lack of processing power affects the framework. This can be used as an
indicator for how future, more efﬁcient, devices may cope with the system.
We measured the CPU usage of the Nokia N810 tablets during the
connection delay measurements presented in Chapter 4.2.1. The mea-
surements were done by polling the Linux CPU usage counter (available
through the /proc/stats device) at 0.5 seconds intervals. This provides
data on what types of tasks the processor has been occupied with during
each of the 0.5 second intervals. The CPU utilization can be calculated by
subtracting the different tasks (such as kernel and user processes, inter-
rupt request processing) from the total.
Figures 4.9(a)-4.9(c) shows the CPU utilization measured when placing
the calls in the three different conﬁgurations. The measurements have
been adjusted as close as possible to start at time zero for each itera-
tion, and depict identical sessions where the recipient answers the call
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and keeps it open for 10 seconds. The left-hand side graphs show all of
the individual measurements plotted in the same graph, while the right-
hand graphs show the averages of these, as well as a typical instance (the
median for each point).
(a) HIP, including initial BEX handshake.
(b) HIP, with pre-established connection (no BEX).
(c) Without HIP
Figure 4.9. The CPU utilization on a Nokia N810 Internet tablet when making a 10 sec-
ond long P2P VoIP call. The right-hand graph shows all 10 measurements,
while the left-hand the average (dotted line) and median (continuous line).
A clear pattern can be seen in each on of the graphs. When initiating
the call, the CPU utilization rises sharply to 100%, as the VoIP application
initializes itself and the P2P proxy establishes the peer connection. As the
signaling is transmitted to the remote user, the CPU utilization drops, as
it waits for a reply. At 6-10 seconds into the measurement, depending
on the connection establishment type, it rises again as the response is
received and the call connected. It continues relatively low (at 10-20%) as
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the call is in progress, but rises again as the call is disconnected.
Although the initial spike in CPU utilization lasts longer for when no
pre-established HIP association exists (Figure 4.9(a)), it is only one or two
seconds more than in the other cases. Furthermore, the spikes when the
call is ﬁnally connected and disconnected have little to do with the P2P
prototype, as these do not require the prototype to perform additional pro-
cessing. We can conclude that the P2P prototype itself is not as restricted
by the low processing power of the Nokia N810 as its own built-in VoIP
application, which was partly illustrated by the call delay measurements
as well. In addition, the use of HIP for the data connection does not seem
to be an obstacle, as the CPU usage remains at approximately 20% during
the call (compared to 10% when not using HIP).
To measure the CPU usage of only the P2P prototype during calls more
accurately, we repeated the measurements using the P2P HTTP interface
of the proxy. This removes the load caused by the VoIP application, high-
lighting the processing characteristics of the P2P prototype. The measure-
ments were done using the wget command-line utility, adding a minimal
amount of additional load. As we wanted to measure only the CPU usage
during connection establishment, the recipient peer did not have a HTTP
server responding, but returned an error instead.
Figures 4.10(a)-4.10(c) shows the results of ten measurements for each
connection type. As the graphs show, the BEX of the HIP connection es-
tablishment consumes signiﬁcantly more processing power than the rest
of the exchange. Again, the use of HIP for the data connection is not an
issue, as the CPU usage after the BEX (Figure 4.10(b)) is only slightly
higher, on average, compared to the non-HIP (Figure 4.10(c)) connection.
4.3 Load on storage
As our framework establishes direct P2P connections using information
(the registration packets) stored in the overlay infrastructure, the load on
these storage service presents the main factor affecting the scalability of
the system. Increasing the number of users does not increase the load on
individual peers, or affect the connections between these, only the load
on the storage service. The number of peers the storage service can serve,
and how well, limits thus how large a population is able to use the system.
The overlay infrastructures, as explained in Chapter 3.1.2, need only to
provide a simple key-based data storage service. In our prototype, we im-
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(a) HIP, including initial BEX handshake.
(b) HIP, with pre-established connection (no BEX).
(c) Without HIP
Figure 4.10. The CPU utilization on a Nokia N810 Internet tablet when making a P2P
connection. The right-hand graph shows all 10 measurements, while the
left-hand the average (dotted line) and median (continuous line).
plemented support for a simple HTTP- based interface containing three
key- based operations: get, set and remove. During our evaluation, we
monitored the network trafﬁc and recorded that storing a registration
packet generated roughly 3.2 kilo bytes (KB) of upstream, and fewer than
200 bytes of downstream data in total when using this HTTP-based stor-
age interface. A single lookup resulted in approximately the same amount
of data, although in reverse directions. Storing a packet required also
roughly 3.2 KB of storage space.
Considering a system of a thousand users updating their status once
every ﬁve minutes (as was the default in our prototype), maintaining the
system would generate approximately 900 MB of upstream and 56 MB of
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downstream trafﬁc in 24 hours, with 3.1 MB stored in the database at any
time (assuming old packets are replaced when updated). Using the ﬁgures
from Facebook1, arguably the most popular social networking site today,
the average number of friends per account was 190 as of May 2011 [173].
Assuming a similar social network, and that each user would contact, on
average, each one of his contacts once a day, it would add another 37.1 MB
of upstream and 593.8 MB of downstream trafﬁc. This interaction would
total in 937.1 MB upstream and 650 MB downstream trafﬁc per 24 hours,
with 3.1 MB of data stored at any given time.
To better understand the scalability and cost efﬁciency of the frame-
work, we examined the pricing policies of Google’s AppEngine andHeroku,
two commercial platform as a service (PAAS) providers. Although there
are other similiar cloud- hosting services, these are amongst the most
popular, and offer representative pricing models.
Both Google’s AppEngine and Heroku offer different pricing plans, in-
cluding a limited free one, based on the amount of resources (storage,
processing power and bandwidth) that are used by the application. Cur-
rently the AppEngine limits the free service to 1 GB of data transfer per
24 hours, and 1 GB of indexed storage per application2. Heroku offers
more bandwidth (2 TB per month), but allows only 10’000 entries to be
stored in a relational database in its free offering3. Considering our ex-
ample of a thousand user population, both of the free plans offer enough
resources to meet our demands in terms of bandwidth and storage.
Beyond the free offering, the two follow different pricing models. Google’s
AppEngine scales in a ﬁne grained manner, dividing the resources into
very speciﬁc components. For instance, inserting an entry to the database
consumes 1-7 so called write operations, depending on whether an old en-
try is updated and the indexing used. Retrieving a value consumes 1-2
read operations and 0-1 small operations, depending also on the database
set up. Each of these operations have separate quotas, and can, together
with a wide array of other resources (such as storage space, bandwidth or
CPU utilization), be increased independently in small increments.
Heroku, on the other hand, offers ﬁxed plans with speciﬁc performance
guarantees that are purchased beforehand. Compared to Google’s Ap-
pEngine, these plans are much simpler, concentrating on easily under-
1http://www.facebook.com
2https://developers.google.com/appengine/docs/quotas
3https://www.heroku.com/pricing
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stood resources such as storage space, CPU utilization and add-on soft-
ware. Extending our naive resource consumption model beyond one thou-
sand users, we see in Figure 4.11(b) the total cost of hosting different sized
networks on these two platforms, when considering expenses related to
the bandwidth use and storage- related costs.
(a) Cost of hosting, small networks.
(b) Cost of hosting, large networks.
Figure 4.11. The cost, per month, of hosting different sized networks on Google Ap-
pEngine and Heroku. The ﬁrst ﬁgure shows the cost for smaller networks,
using the same scale for the cost of both systems. The second ﬁgure uses
different scales due to the dramatic difference in cost.
As the ﬁgure shows, Heroku provides orders of magnitude less expensive
hosting for our simple key-store application as the network size grows.
For instance, hosting a one million peer network would results in band-
width- and storage costs of over 42 thousand dollars per month on Google
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AppEngine4, while the same application on Heroku could sufﬁce with a
nine dollar plan (as of November 2013), mostly due to the looser band-
width restrictions and unrestricted database access on Heroku. These
calculations do not account for additional CPU resources required for pro-
cessing the requests, which would increase the cost depending on the
quality of the hosted application’s implementation and the performance
requirements.
In order to verify these assumptions, we implemented storage services
offering the HTTP- based interface on these platforms, as well as a stand-
alone version, and experimented with a small-scale simulation. We cre-
ated an application mimicking the requests made by the clients, and de-
ployed a 450 node network, simulating a medium sized community, us-
ing our department resources as well as the PlanetLab network. Both
the Google AppEngine and Heroku applications were deployed using the
free service plans of both. The stand-alone version was implemented as
a Python application using an in-memory database, and deployed on a
Linux-based 2.2 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo desktop computer with 2 GB of
RAM on the same local network as the client nodes.
We ran the applications for ﬁve days for each of the three storage im-
plementations. Each one of the client nodes made a registration request
using actual registration packages (stored under unique keys) once per 10
minutes. Call set-up was simulated by having each application request
190 randomly chosen registration packets per 24 hours. We recorded the
both the success rate of the registrations and call- set ups, as well as the
average response times.
The results were in line with our assumptions. The stand-alone and
Heroku- hosted applications performed well, with low latency and vir-
tually no operation errors (the success rate for all requests were over
99.99%). The Google AppEngine displayed also good response times on
all requests (indicating that the server never became overloaded), but the
daily quota was quickly ﬁlled (on average within 59 minutes after the
daily reset).
The quota that was ﬁrst exceeded was the Datastore Write Operations,
of which only 50 thousand operations is available per day in the free ser-
vice plan. Following it was the Datastore Small Operations, recording
4The calculations were based on the data consumption of our prototype imple-
mentation. The price quotes represent therefore the worst case scenario, as a
production-grade version would surely be more optimized.
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database management operation such as row counts, whose quota was ex-
ceeded on average after 185 minutes. The third quota that got exceeded
was the Database Read Operations, on average after 11 hours of the sim-
ulation. All other resource consumption of the Google AppEngine appli-
cation remained within their limits.
The storage space consumption (bytes stored in the databases) remained
far below the quotas on the commercially hosted services, and the band-
width use on Google AppEngine was only 8% of the downstream limit and
14% of upstream5. Heroku does not provide values for the bandwidth
utilization, but the fact that virtually all requests were completed suc-
cessfully indicates that the use was within the limits of the free service
plan.
4.4 Summary
The evaluation has shown that our prototype, and thus the model we have
proposed, is feasible both for different types of network environments,
and different types of devices. By using low-end mobile devices, we have
demonstrated that even though we emphasize security, the model does
not pose an unbearable burden on the devices when operating normally.
Furthermore, by creating storage services using free cloud resources, we
have shown that private overlays can be created using freely available
network resources. However, the evaluation did highlight some of the
weak points of the model.
The call set-up delays and CPU utilizationmeasurements of Chapter 4.2
did show that although the performance of low-end mobile devices is suf-
ﬁcient for casual communication, the devices can not serve a larger crowd
by themselves. The authentication procedure required for the strong se-
curity is resource-demanding, which can easily lead to mobile devices be-
ing exhausted connection requests. Malicious exploitation of this weak-
ness can be subverted using different types of ﬁltering (as discussed in
Chapter 7). Application that require maintaining a large set of connec-
tion should however be hosted on more powerful nodes.
The storage evaluations showed that although it is possible to host over-
lays using only free resources, the nature of the limitations of these dif-
fer, which affect how they can be used. Our experience with the cloud-
5The lower than expected downstream utilization was attributed to Google Ap-
pEngine’s use of HTTP transport compression.
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provided storage services showed that even though a resource might at
ﬁrst seem suitable (in terms of bandwidth and storage quotas), there
might be other issues that make them unusable for our model.
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5. Privacy extensions
Privacy in P2P systems has been an actively discussed topic for a number
of years, with research touching on a range of issues. Protecting users
and their actions is difﬁcult in P2P systems that rely on the close coop-
eration between nodes. Much of the work in this area has concentrated
on hiding the real identities of users [120] [54] [111]. This has often been
the most pressing concern in existing networks where users of content-
sharing systems risk legal reprimands, or are threaten by political and
social oppression when the networks are used to express ideas and opin-
ions. As long as the users cannot be identiﬁed or traced, there is no need
to hide the actions (such as content requests) unless the content itself
contains something revealing.
As we are creating a generic application framework based on strong,
persistent, identities, we need to re-examine the privacy issues. When
the services are provided by the end-users, networking also becomes more
personal, revealing not only what we do, but also with whom we interact,
and the relationships we have.
Communication applications, such as Internet telephony, are prime ex-
amples of applications that are very personal in nature, and where the
need for privacy is well understood. These have traditionally relied on a
system of trusted, centralized, servers for authentication and setting up
connections. The privacy of the users, with respect to the system oper-
ator, is non-existent. Although protective measures, such as phony ac-
counts, source address hiding and encryption of the data streams can be
used, the operator has all the means to track the call records and other
communication made through the system. This may not be a concern for
most consumers, since the operator is often seen as trusted; however, for
companies and governments this raises more fundamental issues. For in-
stance, many companies block the Skype communication application as
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its call routing protocol is proprietary which makes it impossible for to
verify its security.
As described in Chapter 2.1, P2P systems form a network between the
participating nodes, used to collectively perform tasks and manage re-
sources. P2P communication systems, in particular, use this network to
replace the centralized service provider, and relies on it everything from
connecting the calls to managing presence, contact lists and other data.
In the model we are proposing, the role of the trusted service provider
is taken by the overlay infrastructures. The control of these is shared
amongst the peers, with the implication that anyone that is part of the
network can track the communication made through it. As these opera-
tions, and data, are so inherently bound to the users involved (through
electronic signatures), simply hiding the source of requests becomes ir-
relevant. Furthermore, as we are designing a system to be used with
different types of overlay infrastructures, we cannot rely on being able to
control who within those infrastructures are allowed to access our data.
A more systematic privacy mechanism is needed.
In this chapter, we examine a simple application-level model for enhanc-
ing privacy in distributed communication systems based on persistent
identities. We review the details of the threat in current systems, which
we follow by presenting our solution, discussing its beneﬁts, tradeoffs and
possible alterations. As the model imposes restrictions on the accessibil-
ity of users, we continue by discussing issues related to the usability of
the solution. Finally we present how the model was implemented, and
compare it to existing privacy enhancement schemes for P2P systems.
5.1 Problem scope
As there are few public P2P systems based on strong, persistent, identi-
ties deployed today, there has not been much effort put into solving the
privacy issues in these environments. The common approach has been to
encrypt the data passed within the overlay, although it still leaves the sig-
naling (between whom the data has passed) vulnerable. This is also the
approach taken by the IETF P2PSIP working group [74], arguably the
most prominent attempt at creating an open standard for these systems.
As described in Chapter 2.5, the P2PSIP protocol deﬁnes a highly modu-
lar framework supporting different applications (called Usages) as well as
overlay network types [78]. The network module of this framework offers
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message routing, key-based storage and connectivity services through a
common interface, independent of the underlying network structure. Al-
though there are few restrictions, the underlying network is assumed to
be a distributed hash table (DHT)-like structured network, with efﬁcient
key-based routing, where the storage service scatters the data throughout
the network.
The P2PSIP protocol deﬁnes three operations for the SIP Usage; reg-
istration, lookup and connection establishment, which correlates to our
model of registration packet management and use of overlay infrastruc-
tures for connection establishment. Registration and lookup is based on
managing data packets in the network under keys made from the hash of
SIP AORs. Connections are established by completing an ICE procedure,
where address candidates are exchanged by routing data packets over the
network. These operations offer a number of opportunities for curious, or
malicious, users to eavesdrop.
Assuming a DHT-like overlay (such as Chord), where responsibility for
data is assigned using a key proximity function, any node with a suitable
NodeId, along with every node in-between, is able to intercept registra-
tions. Even if these nodes were trustworthy, it is trivial to request the
information using the public SIP AOR. To establish a SIP session, the
caller fetches the registration packet for the responder, and connects us-
ing the Attach function. Again, the node maintaining the registration
packet, and all nodes in-between, can easily monitor from whom the user
receives calls. And even though that path is secured, Attach-related mes-
saging offers yet another opportunity to track the call.
As noted in the draft [78], end-to-end encryption of the payload could
be used to mitigate some of these, although still leaving the storage keys
and NodeIds exposed. Also, a strong authentication mechanism and a
restricted identity acquirement procedure would prevent peers from po-
sitioning themselves in the network, decreasing the possibility for eaves-
dropping and sabotage in large networks [42]. Although our model rely on
a different mechanism for connection establishment, we do face the simi-
lar privacy issues when publishing the registration packets, as these are
publicly available in the overlay infrastructures under well-known keys.
The problem at hand is to introduce privacy mechanisms to P2P com-
munication that prevent intermediate nodes from intercepting and track-
ing the communication through the overlay, such as call signaling, while
maintaining strong, persistent, identities. We need a system that does not
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rely on cooperation from the overlay, but can be used with our model of un-
trusted, key-based, storage services. This results in a privacy mechanism
that is portable and easily adopted to other systems as well. Although,
as we will see, the mechanism may be simple, the key is to construct it
so that it is efﬁcient and usable, with the risks and potential trade-offs
understood by the end-users.
5.2 Solution model
The aim was to design a simple model which sets no additional require-
ments on the underlying storage service, using only the get, put and re-
move primitives. In addition to making the scheme adaptable to other,
similar systems, it does not prevent the use of additional privacy-related
enhancements, such as source address hiding, for even greater security.
The strong, cryptography-based, identity scheme used by our framework
plays a key role in protecting the privacy of users. It allows users to pro-
tect the integrity of their data and make it accessible only for speciﬁc
peers using public key encryption. Similarly to the P2PSIP protocol, this
is the ﬁrst step of the privacy enhancement: to encrypt the signed regis-
tration packet using the public key of peers that with whom we may want
to establish a session. We therefore publish this data only for a speciﬁc
set of trusted peers.
By encrypting the registration packets, as well as any other data we
store in the storage services, we ensure that only the intended recipient
is able to read the details of that data. In the case of the registration
packet, the user status, connectivity information and other application
information is safe. But as the keys used for storing registration packets
map directly to the public identities, encrypting the content of these pack-
ets alone does not prevent intermediate peers from tracking connections.
Size analysis can be used to identify registration packets and by monitor-
ing the keys used to store and request these, we can determine both who
is available as well as the recipient of a call. Although buffering and de-
coy packets can be used to make it harder, it seems unavoidable that the
storage keys should also be obfuscated.
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5.2.1 Storage key obfuscation
So far, we have assumed that users need to possess only the public keys
of the trusted peers in order to publish registration packets. We could
consider a scheme where the storage key (the name of the publisher) is
also encrypted using these. However, this is easily broken in systems were
the public keys are well known, as in our model. An eavesdropper could
simply re-construct this key, and continue monitoring who is present by
following the updates made to the data.
We could protect the publisher by publishing the encrypted registration
packets using a storage key tied to the recipient. For instance, if both
Alice and Bob would like to share their presence with Eve, they would
both publish their registration packets under the same key. As the key
for this index is shared and the content encrypted, intermediate nodes
cannot determine who the packets concern. This protects the publishers,
but reveals information about the recipient, such as the number of friends
and availability (a lookup reveals that Eve is online and probably about
to call someone).
The most practical solution we found is to simply use shared secrets to
obfuscate the storage keys. After encrypting the registration packet, the
storage key is formed by combining the shared secret with the user iden-
tiﬁer and computing a hash digest, similar to a password salting scheme.
The key will appear random, revealing nothing about either the source or
recipient of the packet.
5.2.2 Usability considerations
Besides the technical details, the scheme introduces a number of usabil-
ity issues that need to be considered. The need for a privacy-enhancing
scheme might be unclear for many users accustomed to traditional com-
munication systems operated by a trusted provider. Also, how such a
scheme affects the usability of the system, how certain contacts or ser-
vices might become unreachable as a result, is not apparent.
When activated, we need to have both the public key and a shared secret
with everyone that may wish to communicate with. Otherwise we, or
any service we are providing, will appear unavailable, ofﬂine. This might
make it seem as an extension of a presence scheme, allowing us to lay
hidden from unwanted contacts, or signaling when we are available. This
may cause confusion as there are already application-level controls for
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this. However, the purpose of the privacy scheme is not to limit who is able
to contact you, but to hide who does. This forms a layer below presence,
which in turn is used to ﬁlter visibility. Furthermore, although shared
secrets are often associated with close relationships, the model encourages
users to establish these with anyone they are in contact with. The aim is
to affect only the visibility of the P2P sessions, not to deﬁne the access
control policy.
As the scheme requires users to possess each other’s public keys, as well
as have established a shared secret prior to contact, bootstrapping is a
problem. High-security systems and concerned users might go through
the trouble of creating and distributing these manually. However, most
users do not appreciate the limitations and extra work, and would be sat-
isﬁed with a partial open exposure, at least at times, but with the privacy
enhancements used whenever possible. The shared secrets could then be
agreed on during the ﬁrst contact, stored to be used for subsequent ses-
sions. This means that users may apply the enhancements using different
policies, and we will not know whether a peer is using them at any spe-
ciﬁc instance. The scheme becomes conﬁgurable, with options reﬂecting
both the privacy requirements we have, as well as the ones we assume
the remote peers do.
This leads us to the question of how to present these options, modes,
to the user. Although related to the traditional concept of presence, it
has a slightly different meaning and effect, not familiar from centralized
systems. In the following chapter, we present how this is solved in our
model, discussing also the potential issues with our solution.
5.3 Implementation
The implementation of the privacy extensions included creating a local
peer database and modifying how the data in the distributed storage is
managed. The prototype maintains a database of the public keys and
shared secrets of all the peers it has been in contact with. Although it is
possible to manually conﬁgure a shared secret, a simple key-negotiation
protocol was implemented, which automatically establishes (or reconﬁg-
ures) a shared secret when connected.
The privacy enhancements, affecting how the registration packets are
retrieved and published, are activated from the settings of the prototype.
After analyzing different use-cases, we came to the conclusion that three
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different modes are needed:
Open. The registration package is published using both the open and
secret storage keys. Lookup is done using only the open key, even when a
shared secret has been established with the recipient.
Relaxed. As in the Open mode, the registration package is published us-
ing both keys. The lookup differs; if a shared secret has been established,
only the secret storage key is used, otherwise the open one.
Paranoid. When set to paranoid, only the secret keys are used, both
when publishing and performing lookups.
The Paranoid mode is the most secure; the prototype uses the privacy
enhancement fully, revealing as little as possible. But as discussed in
Chapter 5.2.2, for the enhancements to be usable, we also need to have
an option of being openly exposed, at least temporarily. The need for two,
nearly identical, modes is based on the assumption that nodes might get
reset at times for different reasons, losing the database of shared secrets.
This would result in two peers being in incompatible states, as one would
assume they share a secret while the other one does not.
The Relaxed mode operates using a best-effort principle. Whenever a
shared secret has been established, the privacy extensions are used with-
out even trying the open key. By falling back to the open key, we would
avoid the additional Open mode. But this could be seen as a violation
of the privacy of the recipient, if in Paranoid mode. By falling back on
the use of open keys in the Relaxed mode, either by using subsequent or
simultaneous lookups, we might reveal a relationship between the two.
Furthermore, the usability also improves, as the user knows beforehand
whether the privacy enhancements are used. The usability of our solution
is examined in more detail in Chapter 8.
Although the privacy enhancements primarily affect the management
of the registration packets, the overlay management was extended to sup-
port generic privacy-aware overlay use. These extensions to the olclient
module allows applications to specify a recipient for any data published
and the expected source for the data retrieved. Using this information, it
is able to apply the same privacy policies used for the registration pack-
ets to all data. This allows us to share application data, such as off-line
messages and web-cache indexes (discussed in Chapter 6) in a privacy-
conscious manner.
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5.4 Bootstrapping and configuration
The Relaxed mode is thought of as being the default scheme for most
users. As a shared secret is negotiated during the initial session, it will
provide a level of privacy without requiring pre-shared secrets and man-
ual conﬁguration. After establishing the shared secrets, users can switch
to the Paranoid mode to prevent intermediate nodes from tracking their
status (by preventing the publication of the open, unencrypted, registra-
tion packets).
These modes could also be implemented using warnings and a reachabil-
ity setting. When attempting a connection to a contact without a shared
secret, the system would warn the user, providing an option of canceling
the request. The reachability setting would control whether the open reg-
istration packet is published; whether people with whom the user does
not have a shared secret would be able to connect. However, these would
require cooperation with the applications that use the framework (e.g.,
the VoIP applications) in order to provide a meaningful experience.
The Open mode is intended primarily as a fall-back, in case of a reset of
the database of shared secrets, for instance after re-installing the software
or when changing devices. After such events, it does require that both the
user, and his contacts, at least temporarily switch to a lower (Relaxed or
Open) scheme in order to be able to connect. Although the database would
surely be saved, or synchronized, during these upgrades, establishing re-
lationships with users using the Paranoid mode still presents an issue.
Although the problem can be mitigated using various introduction- mech-
anisms, we may still need to resolve to out-of-band- communication and
manual conﬁguration in some cases.
5.5 Validation
To validate the privacy enhancements, we created a small test environ-
ment of four users to simulate a group of privacy-conscious peers. The
goal was to verify the effectiveness of the privacy enhancements by an-
alyzing what could be deducted from the trafﬁc. Furthermore, we hope
to get a better understanding of application privacy in general, including
factors beyond the control of the prototype that may impact the privacy
of users. The prototype, with the privacy enhancements, was deployed on
hand-held Nokia N810 Internet tablets. Each tablet was equipped with a
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unique identity, and the Internet call application conﬁgured to use it as
the SIP account. The tablets were given to a set of test users, who were
asked to use them for instant messaging, voice and video calls.
The tablets were connected using a standard IEEE 802.11b Wireless
LAN (WLAN) access point with a Dynamic Host Conﬁguration Proto-
col (DHCP) server to provide IP addresses within the 10.0.0.0/8 private
domain. The prototype was conﬁgured to use HIP for session security.
To simulate a P2P overlay, we used LAN broadcast as the back-end for
the distributed storage and lookup. To evaluate the enhancements, we
recorded and analyzed the network trafﬁc generated by the tablets, sim-
ulating the worst-case scenario where an intermediate can log all overlay
infrastructure trafﬁc. The purpose was to analyze what can be deduced
from the logs before and after the privacy enhancements.
Initially the prototype running on the tablets was set to the Open pri-
vacy mode. Although the keys used in the lookup are hashes of the SIP
AORs (and not readable identiﬁers), the identiﬁers they correspond to can
be read from the clear-text response. After a short while, we had compiled
a mapping of these, together with the IP address used by each peer (pre-
sented in Table 5.1).
Table 5.1. The hash to SIP AOR relationships found, with responsible IP address.
A sample from the recorded trafﬁc is presented in Table 5.2. From the
log we see Alice establishing a connection to Carol at 157 seconds. Even
though the actual data trafﬁc is secured by HIP, the pattern of relatively
short IPSec ESP bursts provides clues of an instant messaging session.
At 182 seconds, we see how Dave contacts Bob. The continuous ﬂow of
ESP suggests a voice or video call. At 195 seconds we see trafﬁc again,
most likely instant messages, exchanged between Alice and Carol.
After the initial session, the privacy mode was set to Paranoid, and the
devices rebooted to reset any existing IPSec security associations. A short
sample from the trafﬁc is shown in Table 5.3. Although we cannot de-
termine what was sought at 91 seconds, it is fairly certain that a call
was made between Dave and Alice. The lookup response is encrypted,
but the size ﬁts within what we would expect of an encrypted registra-
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Table 5.2. Samples of the trafﬁc log before the privacy enhancements.
tion package, and the data trafﬁc matches the pattern of a voice or video
call. The IP addresses used for the lookup and response reveal the peers
involved, assuming the hosts were provided the same addresses by the
DHCP server as before. Furthermore, the HITs used in the data trafﬁc
reveal with certainty the identities of the communicating peers.
Table 5.3. Samples of the trafﬁc log with the privacy enhancements in use.
To simulate the use of additional source-address- hiding techniques, the
HIP Host Identity database was reset on all devices, and the DHCP server
conﬁgured to provide addresses from a different IP range. A sample of the
trafﬁc is shown in Table 5.4. We can still see that a voice or video call is
made, but the peers remain unknown. We cannot identify the identiﬁer
for whom registration packets are sought, and the content of the response
is encrypted. The IP addresses are also unidentiﬁable, as are the HITs
used in the HIP BEX.
As the trafﬁc analysis shows, the privacy enhancement does a fair job
ensuring that the data managed in P2P communication systems reveal as
little as possible on the application level. However, for complete privacy,
we need to consider other factors as well. Using HIP to secure the data
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Table 5.4. Samples of the trafﬁc log with the IP andHIT reset, and privacy enhancements
in use.
connections provides many beneﬁts, but identiﬁes the end-points to out-
siders as well. Even without HIP and IP, hardware Media Access Control
(MAC) addresses, or other host identiﬁcation schemes might be used for
the same purpose. Although the session data is encrypted, trafﬁc analysis
may reveal the type of content. However, these issues are considered out
of scope for our work, as they relate to the general problem of communi-
cations privacy, and are being addressed by work such as the SlyFi [55]
design. Our focus is only on the data managed by the distributed storage,
and what it reveals; an issue speciﬁc to P2P systems.
5.5.1 Optimizing the data management
Although our model does well in protecting the privacy of users from in-
termediate nodes, it has tradeoffs. It increases the amount of data stored
in the overlay, as the registration packets need to be published separately
for each peer. Furthermore, it also requires that the peers perform a large
amount of cryptography. Even though the packets contain only the infor-
mation needed to connect, and are therefore relatively small (commonly a
few KB of uncompressed data), the overhead is noticeable and can become
overbearing.
As presented in Chapter 4.3, assuming an average of 190 contacts per
user, periodically updating a unique, 3.2 KB, registration packet for each
one would require transferring 608 KB per update, or over 6.5 MB per
hour assuming a ﬁve minute refresh period (eleven updates per hour).
Even though these loads may be manageable for high-end mobile devices,
they still create an unnecessarily large burden on the storage system.
Applying compression before encrypting the data may ease the storage
requirements, but it does nothing to lessen the amount of requests the
storage service has to process, as each entry still needs to be updated
separately.
A simple, but efﬁcient, optimization is to publish only links to the reg-
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istration packet for each user, while the registration packet itself would
only be published once. On initialization, a random index key for the
registration packet would be generated (the packet key). Furthermore,
a new, symmetric, encryption key would be generated, used to encrypt
the packet before it is published under the packet key. For each user, a
small link packet would be produced that contain the packet key, and the
symmetric encryption key needed to decrypt the content. This link packet
would be encrypted using the identity key of the contact, and published
under an index key according to the privacy scheme.
When retrieving the registration packet for a contact, only the link pack-
age is retrieved initially. The peer decrypts this using his identity key, and
ﬁnds the packet key and the encryption key used for it. The space saved
using this method is substantial: assuming 1024 bit RSA identity keys,
and sizes for the packet- and encryption keys so that the link package can
be encrypted using the identity key directly (e.g., 512 bit encryption key
and a 160 bit packet key), the link package would, theoretically, occupy
only 128 bytes. For the average user with 190 contacts, it means that only
24.3 KB of storage is needed to store the registration packet for all con-
tacts using the privacy scheme. Compared to the unoptimized approach,
this represents a drop of 96.0%.
Although the space savings are substantial, more importantly is the fact
that updating the registration packet for all contacts requires only a sin-
gle request. Neither the encryption or package key, contained in the link
packages, need to be updated, only the registration packet they point to.
Therefore, after the initial setup (creation and publication of the links),
the link- scheme does not, in theory, generate more trafﬁc then when not
using the privacy enhancements at all. The cryptographic load on the
hosts decrease as well, as there is only one packet to encrypt and sign for
each update. In practice however, the link packages need to be periodi-
cally refreshed, depending on the type of storage service used.
5.5.2 Data usage
In order to conﬁrm our assumptions regarding the data use, we recorded
the trafﬁc related to the publication of the registration packets when us-
ing the different privacy modes. The set-up was similar to what is de-
scribed in Chapter 4.3 to quantify the load on the storage service. We had
a single peer, conﬁgured with 190 contacts, using a web-based storage ser-
vice. This storage service application was conﬁgured to record the amount
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Table 5.5. Results of the storage use measurements using the privacy enhancements.
Disabled Normal Linked
Requests, total 133 25269 2416
Requests, per hour 11.1 2105.8 201.3
KB transferred, total 422.5 81972.6 2560.1
KB transferred, per hour 35.2 6831.1 213.3
Stored entries 1 190 191
Stored data, KB 3.2 616.4 189.3
and size of each request the client made, as well as the total number of
entries stored in its database.
The data trafﬁc was recorded over a 12 hour period using three differ-
ent client modes: with the privacy extensions disabled, with the privacy
extensions enabled using per-contact updates, and with the privacy ex-
tensions enabled using the link- scheme. The registration was published
with a short validity and updated once every ﬁve minutes. The link pack-
ages (when using the link- scheme), however, were published with a long
expiration time and updated only once an hour. The results of these mea-
surements are presented in Table 5.5.
As the results show, the values measured as in line with our assump-
tions. The differences between the expected and measured values in the
optimized mode is due to the data formats used in the prototype. Each
of the link- packages used the prototype’s generic XML package format,
which increased the size of the entries from the theoretical minimum.
However, as the results show, even without further compression, the data
usage of the optimized scheme does remain within reasonable limits. With
an average of 201.3 requests per hour (or 3.4 requests per minute) and
213.3 KB of data transfer per hour, it is manageable even for resource-
limited mobile devices.
5.6 Summary
This Chapter has dealt with the privacy issues in P2P systems based on
persistent, strong, identities. We have highlighted the problems and pre-
sented a simple mechanism for hiding our activities, while adhering to a
very generic way of accessing overlays. By not requiring changes in the
structure or logic of the overlays, this mechanism can be applied to most
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existing systems.
The value lies in acknowledging the problem, and tackling the usabil-
ity issues our solution (or similar ones) unavoidably leads to, due to the
different operating modes (which are further examined in Chapter 8).
The model we have presented can be used as a blueprint for new, or
existing, systems based on similar philosophies (such as P2PSIP). How
it is implemented can vary depending on the nature of the application,
but our model outlines the problems, and possibilities, there are. Our
model shares many of the aspects of current technologies for privacy en-
hancement (such as Freenet[32], TOR [41] and OneSwarm [75]) in that
it provides protection from eavesdroppers, whether these are within the
overlay or outside of it. It does not provide attribution- free publishing
and consumption of content, although this could be achieved by applying
one of the technologies previously listed to the overlay. The main advan-
tage of our model is that it does not require changes to the overlay, and
is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst attempt at providing a complete
solution, not only to the technical challenges, but also usability issues.
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The World Wide Web (WWW) is arguably one of the most popular services
on the Internet. The ﬁrst web pages were simple: a bit of textual infor-
mation with embedded hyperlinks coupled with small graphics, authored
by a single author and delivered by a single server. As explained in Chap-
ter 3.3.2, these are well suited for P2P delivery, similarly to other services
based on HTTP. However, modern web pages are more complex and the
user’s experience of “the web” is often developed from myriad components
from a variety of providers and systems. For instance, a simple blog post
might include (i) content from the blogger, including the posts themselves,
a set of thematic images and backgrounds, etc., (ii) content from the blog
hosting services, which could include navigational aids, logos, etc., (iii)
content from third-parties associated with the blogger or the hosting ser-
vice (e.g., advertisements) and (iv) content from numerous readers who
left comments to the given post. The number of actors contributing to a
conceptually simple “web page” is potentially enormous.
Security in theWWWarchitecture is based on authenticating, and trust-
ing, the source server and securing the data during transport. The tradi-
tional assumption is that the content as secure as the server hosting it.
Within the context of P2P web, it means that we must grant the same
trust to each peer hosting any piece of content we access, or alternatively,
only access content from those we trust. This undermines the value of
P2P, especially in open systems, as we might not even know most of the
peers participating in the network. We need a way of securing the content
of the P2P web, so that not only static web resource, but also interactive
web applications can partly be hosted on untrusted peers. Secondly, we
need to address the availability of web resources, so we do not have to rely
on only a few trusted peers to access the content.
In this chapter, we introduce a model to secure the P2P web by adding
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integrity and accountability to not only web pages, but also individual ele-
ments. This not only allows web resources, and applications, to be hosted
by untrusted peers, but also protects the user from possibly malicious con-
tent on these pages. Furthermore, we present a novel scheme for cooper-
ative P2P Web caching. Together these construct a secure and accessible
P2P web environment.
6.1 Securing Web content
The approach we have taken to secure the P2PWeb is by using the strong
identities provided by the framework, and utilizing the ﬂexibility of HTML’s
syntax to implement integrity and accountability into web pages. This
allows for an unobtrusive, backwards- compatible way of verifying web
content.
6.1.1 Page structure
The ﬁrst aspect of securing content concerns protecting the integrity of the
overall web page, which in our framework is done by using the author’s
private key to cryptographically sign the markup document. This signa-
ture is included in a new HTTP header, along with the author’s public key
(the identity). Protecting the integrity of the page structure is not crucial
for the securing the individual content components (discussed below), but
only for conveying the overall intended composition of those components.
Providing over-arching page integrity is similar to signing data packets
published in the overlay, except that the integrity (or lack of) is visible to
the application (web browser). This allows for ﬂexibility, as we can verify
the content even if it is not distributed by the original author. Further-
more, the application can, in some cases, choose to ignore it in case the
content components are intact, as we will shortly see.
6.1.2 Content components
The HTML syntax is based on tags, such as <div>, that both structure
the document and deﬁne part of the appearance of elements. These tags
support attributes containing information that can be used for anything
from indexing the page, to deﬁning behavior. Some attributes, such as
id, are standardized, but in practice HTML allows liberal use of custom
attributes which have application-speciﬁc meaning.
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The basis of our approach to securing individual content components is
to add cryptographic signatures to content blocks within the web page.
Different blocks can therefore be authored by different users with in-
tegrity and accountability information that directly map the content to
the author. This gives browsers and end users the ability to enforce pol-
icy decisions on what components to render, omitting possibly malicious
components based on their knowledge of the authors. The signatures are
included in custom attributes of the HTML tags, making them rendable
by nearly all legacy browsers (which will ignore unknown attributes).
We offer two approaches for securing these elements. First, the signa-
ture can be interpreted literally, meaning that the signature is made from
the actual markup within the tag. This ensures that the content of the tag
is precisely what the author intended and allows for no possibility of the
site maintainer customizing the look or formatting of the content. This
tradeoff may well be useful in some circumstances. The second approach
is to add the signed content as a custom attribute to the tag, and use it for
decorating the content when rendering the page. The data is provided in a
safely encoded (base64) format, which is decoded, validated and inserted
into marked locations within the content.
Although technologies such as Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) provide a
degree of customization without changing the markup of a page, the sec-
ond approach gives the maintainer more freedom in designing the site’s
look and feel because it separates the content from the formatting. How-
ever, in some cases the formatting of the content is fundamental to the
content (justifying the ﬁrst approach). For instance, consider an HTML
table. In this case, the content author may wish to secure the formatting
to ensure that rows and columns are constructed properly. Our frame-
work treats both options as valid and leaves the decision of which to use
to the author.
In addition to signing the content in the markup, we may include signa-
tures for external objects. For instance, we may include images, scripts or
other content from outside the system (the normal “centralized” web).
6.1.3 User-generated content
In order for the the content securing scheme to be useful, we need a
method for users to produce signed content suitable for it. This we achieve
by cryptographically signing user-submitted data to a web page (such as a
blog submission) with the user’s identity. This enables the web site to re-
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ceive signed blocks of data, which it can then be used as a secure content
component accountable to the author. This does require careful planning
of the web site structure so that the submitted data will be usable as con-
tent. This is achieved by deﬁning the format of the custom data tags to
match the HTTP POST syntax.
6.1.4 Security policies
So far, we have only discussed the mechanics of methods for verifying the
source of web content, without considering how that information is used
or affects the web browsing experience. As explained in Chapter 3.2.1,
the framework provides information about the identities, from which we
can asses the trustworthiness of an actor. Content from trusted sources is
fairly easy to handle. However, there are different approaches to dealing
with untrusted content. The harshest option is to block untrusted content
completely, not rendering or loading it at all. Although effective against
potential threats, this easily cripples the browsing experience, rendering
the web useless. A less sever option is to sanitize the content by turning
all or part of the markup into plain text. As for the presentation, we could
prevent certain elements which can result in disturbing the layout of the
site (such as positioned <div>s), while allowing changes in text color or
other minor modiﬁcations.
Functional components—such as embedded JavaScript or external Flash
applications—could be either disabled completely or allowed to run in
a restricted environment. Sandboxing such content is effective but re-
quires close cooperation from the run-time environment. JavaScript, due
to its dynamic nature, allows partial restrictions to be applied within the
browser. We could for instance disable popups, network access (“Ajax”)
or browser redirects. Obviously, when content is received with an invalid
signature great precaution should be taken, preferably not rendered at
all. The particulars of how which of these restrictions are imposed and
how they are applied are policy decisions and should be set according to
the browser preferences (either set by the user or an administrator). We
stress that these policies are local and not assigned by remote web pages
or components thereof.
116
Secure P2P Web
6.1.5 Implementation
As part of our research, we created a prototype implementation to gain
a better understanding of the feasibility, technical challenges and usabil-
ity of our model. The prototype was implemented as a Mozilla Firefox
plugin for Linux, which connects to the P2P framework through the in-
terfaces described earlier, in order to access the identity and relationship
database. The plugin consists of three parts; an XPCOM1component that
processes the raw HTTP streams, a JavaScript application that alters the
rendering and a small user interface for displaying security information
and for controlling the security policies of the prototype.
As a Firefox plugin, the development and deployment was considerably
easier than actually modifying the browser, but this model did also impose
restrictions which meant that all features could not be completed. The
prototype has, however, provided a initial understanding of how the model
we sketched could be implemented, and the technical challenges.
Page signing
We use custom HTTP headers for both indicating support for the mech-
anism and for carrying page signatures. Support for the scheme is indi-
cated (both by the client and server) with the X-OP-Supports: true HTTP
header. Page signatures are inserted in the X-OP-SignatureHTTP header
(SHA-1-based RSA signatures in our prototype). Finally, the X-OP-Key
HTTP header contains the user’s public key, base64 encoded.
The stream processor inserts these headers in every request made by
the browser, signaling to supporting servers that pages should be signed.
The browser plugin, acting as a Firefox stream decoder, veriﬁes the page
signatures before passing the content to the renderer. The result of this
veriﬁcation is stored in the instance variables of the page window, acces-
sible for the other components of the plugin.
The stream processor also captures and signs the data of HTTP POSTs
made by the browser to supporting sites (enabling user-generated content
to be secured). These signatures are carried in the same headers as used
by the server for the page signatures.
Content processing
Our plugin alters the rendering process by executing a JavaScript appli-
1XPCOM (Cross Platform Component Object Model) is the component model
used by Firefox to expose much of the functionality (as object components) of the
browser to plugins, and allow custom components to be added or replace existing
ones.
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cation after constructing the initial DOM tree. This approach has ﬂaws
(allowing possible malicious JavaScript or content to be loaded), but al-
lows post-processing of the page, and alterations similar to what a proper
implementation would do.
Our prototype supports only the second of the two methods of securing
content elements discussed in Section 6.1.2—by including both the data
and signatures in element attributes. Three attributes are used: op_key
contains the public, op_signature contains the signature, and op_data for
the actual signed data. Both the signature and key are (as in the HTTP
headers) base64 encoded. The data attribute contains the data as URL-
encoded key-value pairs as this is the format in which we encode HTTP
POSTs. Therefore, data posted by users can be used unmodiﬁed in these
blocks.
These tags were rendered by decorating the content instead of com-
pletely replacing it. After verifying the signature, the plugin uses the
key-value data to complete ﬁelds within the tag. The target locations are
found by matching the keys of the source data to the element identiﬁers
(ids). As these are page-unique, we use the parent tag ID as a preﬁx to
create an unique namespace within it. For instance, a <div> with an ID
ofmsg01 and a data key title caused the renderer to replace the content of
the child element with the idmsg01_title. To support better customization
of the appearance, the rendering processor adds the result of the veriﬁca-
tion as an attribute op_status to the element. This is used to select a
suitable style when rendering. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate this process.
Figure 6.1 displays (truncated for readability) a signed <div>, which is
rendered (when judged as trusted) as shown in Figure 6.2.
<div id="sdiv5" class="entry" 
     op_data="header=Hi&message=Testing+123" 
     op_signature="OyjONQTCAR6Mv/sBjRaF.."
     op_key="LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQVUJMSUMgS0..">
<div>Posted 11:43:51</div>
<div id="sdiv5_header"></div>
<div id="sdiv5_message"></div>
</div>
Figure 6.1. The HTML source of a signed block.
<div id="sdiv5" class="entry"
     op_status="trusted">
<div>Posted 11:43:51</div>
<div id="sdiv5_header">Hi</div>
<div id="sdiv5_message">Testing 123</div>
</div>
Figure 6.2. The signed block after processing.
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div.entry[op_status="trusted"] {
     background: green; font-size: large;
} div.entry[op_status="invalid"] {
     display: none;
} div.entry[op_status="untrusted"] {
     background: red; font-size: small;
}
Figure 6.3. A CSS style sheet declaration highlighting the trustworthiness of the con-
tent.
As only the content of certain elements is modiﬁed, it allows the site
maintainer to control the visual appearance. Using the op_status at-
tribute, the site maintainer can provide a style sheet (such as the one
illustrated in Figure 6.3) highlighting in a site-speciﬁc manner the trust-
worthiness of the content blocks.
Before rendering the data values, the plugin sanitizes the data accord-
ing to security policies. In our current prototype, we support only full
sanitation (escaping all markup) which normally is applied to all content,
although the user can choose to bypass this from trusted personas (i.e.,
that have a good trust score).
Control interface
The control interface of our prototype is used to display information
about the current page and the signed tags, as well as to control how
the content is rendered. The interface is implemented as a small popup-
menu located at the bottom status panel, showing the trust status of the
current page, similar to HTTPS indicators. The controls allows the user
to block or completely hide untrusted and invalid data blocks, and choose
whether to sanitize content from trusted identities.
The prototype uses the relationship information got from the P2P frame-
work to classify the page as being either trusted, untrusted or invalid. In
addition to this classiﬁcation, the interface can display a simple human-
readable description of the track record, such as You trust this person,
knowing him well (through browsing).
External objects
Our approach to external objects (such asmedia ﬁles or JavaScript source
code) embedded in a page mirrors our handling of the tags, by adding
op_signature and op_key attributes to elements such as <img>, <script>
and <object>.
Due to how the page rendering in Firefox is structured, we are not able
to intercept or prevent these external objects from being loaded. How-
ever, we experimented with post-processing images, changing how they
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are displayed based on the trustworthiness of the keys. As with content
tags, images can be hidden completely, blocked or displayed with a warn-
ing.
Server library
As our mechanism only affects the HTTP headers and HTML content,
it can be implemented on servers using server-side scripting (without
changes to the HTTP server itself).
We created a PHP library for Apache’s HTTP server which automates
the page signing process. Applications need only initialize the library with
their private keys, and call ﬂush() at the end of each page transmission.
The library connects to the P2P framework, and uses its identity to sign
the content.
6.1.6 Related work
Ourmechanism is similar to the scheme used by different browser plugins
(such WebPG [4], Mailvelope [1]) to sign or encrypt either whole pages or
individual sections. These typically focus on web mail, but some support
more generic use. However, the focus of any of these is only on validat-
ing the source and data integrity, without considering how the content is
handled. The schemes appear also too rigid to be easily adapted by web
applications in a systematical manner.
Sandboxing individual HTML elements is discussed in [2] and shares
ideas with our approach. In particular, the idea of downgrading the priv-
ileges of individual content components. However, [2] considers only how
elements could be protected from each other and does not consider pro-
tecting the user from the content.
To our knowledge, our scheme presents the ﬁrst systematical approach
for increasing security by adding accountability to the web that is com-
patible with modern sites featuring user generated content. With this
approach, we area able to decouple the web page’s trustworthiness from
that of the serving node’s, making it possible to securely host content any-
where. This is important for P2P web, as replication is crucial for acces-
sibility and performance due to the relative instability of peers compared
to traditional Internet servers.
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6.2 P2P Web cache
Having addressed security concerns regarding web content in an environ-
ment consisting of untrusted peers, we focused on addressing availability
in P2P web. We approached the topic through the use of distributed web
caching, instead of active content distribution, as it provides a simpler,
unobtrusive, way of replicating content. Peers do not need to retrieve and
host content they have no use for themselves, which lowers the threshold
for participating in the absence of a working incentives mechanism.
As reviewed in Chapter 2.8.1, there exists multiple solutions for build-
ing a distributed web cache, and building one for P2P networks is only
a matter of engineering. However, using a traditional approach to dis-
tributed caching results in a system with a large amount of maintenance
trafﬁc. This may not be a problem for the intended audience of the propos-
als presented in Chapter 2.8.1 (such as data centers), but are problematic
for devices such as mobile, battery- operated, handsets. Therefore, we
decided to focus on the data management in order to identify what the pa-
rameters are that affect how data should be cached, in order to optimize
the maintenance of a distributed cache in P2P networks.
6.2.1 Data management strategies
The initial P2Pweb caching scheme we set out with follows a very straight-
forward approach to distributed caching. Each piece of content cached
results in a single entry in the overlay (advertising the availability of
it). The size of the local content store is managed using a simple least-
recently used (LRU) algorithm. As the storage ﬁlls up, the content that
has been least recently accessed will be discarded. Although this elemen-
tary data management scheme does demonstrate the usefulness of dis-
tributed caching, it has its drawbacks.
The diversity of the available content suffers. As the content within
the cache is replaced using a local LRU, it leads to popular sites being
over-represented. As a large number of the users will cache the same,
frequently accessed content, it will push out less popular items. A better
approach would be to use a cooperative replacement algorithm, which con-
siders also the popularity of the content within the whole P2P community.
For instance, a speciﬁc percentage of the LRU stack would be dedicated
to rare content. When expelling content from the cache, these would be
spared even though they have been less used than other content.
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Table 6.1. Dissection of the expire-times indicated in the HTTP headers of cacheable con-
tent.
Expire Objects % of cacheable content
0 seconds 365 13.8%
5 min or less 5 0.2%
2 hrs or less 106 4.0%
24 hrs or less 69 2.6%
1 year or less 315 11.9%
76 years or less 1189 45.0%
> 76 years 596 22.6%
Furthermore, as each one of the cached content items (each URL) pro-
duces an entry in the overlay storage, the scheme generates a large amount
of entries, and trafﬁc. A single web page can consist of dozens of images,
style sheets and other components that all need to stored and individually
advertised in the overlay. This could be improved using different types of
content grouping based on the URLs and context. In order to optimize
the data management strategies for the proxy, we recorded and analyzed
the trafﬁc log of a common2web-browsing session. Over the course of 30
minutes of active web browsing, 3771 HTTP requests were made, and
over 34 mega bytes (MB) of content data received. Of these requests,
2643 (70%) were considered cacheable (according to the HTTP headers),
which accounted for over 25 MB (73%) of the data. Furthermore, of these
cacheable objects 80% were marked suitable for long-term (over 24 hours)
caching (as presented in Table 6.1).
Although these ﬁgures represent only a single, speciﬁc, web-browsing
session, they show that, at least for the sites visited, there is a large
amount of content that can be cached for a longer period. This indicates
that a cooperative caching scheme is not dependent on instantaneous, or
quick, propagation of updates to the cache index in order to be useful. As
much of the content can be cached for more than a day, we can delay the
2We recorded the requests and meta data of a 30 minute long web browsing
session consisting of visits, and engagement, with popular sites from the Alexia
top 500 sites (http://www.alexia.com/topsites). Although this obviously provides
merely a snapshot of how a speciﬁc user used a particular set of sites, the log is
used to provide clues into what the parameters are that can be optimized in a
cooperative caching scheme.
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individual advertisements, and perform batch-updates instead to mini-
mize storage- and trafﬁc overhead. Analyzing the request log further, we
see that it consists of irregular bursts instead of a constant stream of re-
quests (Figure 6.4). This is, of course, expected as requests are made only
when the user loads a new page, after which there is a quiet period when
the page is viewed.
Figure 6.4. A snapshot of the trafﬁc pattern of a typical web browsing session. The re-
quests appear in bursts, as the user loads new pages. Each new page gener-
ates multiple requests as images, scripts, and other linked content is loaded.
Inspecting our trafﬁc log, we ﬁnd that the bursts found there consist
on average of 37.2 request to 1.7 different hosts over a 2.8 second period.
Although this varies depending on the site structure, the ones present in
this log seem to be using only few hosts for serving each page. A simple
improvement would therefore be to group the cached content according to
the URLs. For instance, all content within the same URL path, or from
the same host, could be grouped together in a single advertisement. The
overlay key for this would be constructed of the URL path or host name.
Although the scheme would decrease the number of entries in the overlay,
it would also lead to more frequent updates to those, as the addition or
removal of a single item within the group requires a new advertisement.
However, as indicated by Table 6.1, much of the content have so long ex-
piration times that we can afford to delay the advertisements without
rendering the scheme useless.
Inspecting the logs further, we ﬁnd that the average pause between
these bursts is 152 seconds, slightly over 2.5 minutes, meaning that on
average, the user spent 2.5 minutes on each page. In order to efﬁciently
group advertisements according to host (or site), we need to be able to
predict when the user has is unlikely to generate more requests to the
site, as that would be the optimal time to publish the advertisement. By
analyzing the pauses between accesses to content from the same site, we
ﬁnd that the vast majority (96%) is accessed within ten seconds of the
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previous request (due to the request bursts). However, of the remaining,
78% is accessed within 220 seconds, as shown in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5. The number of pauses between 10 and 1500 seconds between requests to the
same host. For instance, a 1200 second pause between requests to a single
host were encountered two times.
This shows that for the browsing session we are inspecting, after 220
seconds had passed since the last request to a particular host, it was
highly unlikely that the user would visit that site again. In order to more
precisely measure the potential beneﬁts from grouping, and delaying the
cache advertisements, we created a simulator for the caching mechanism.
The simulator performed a chronological walk-through of all requests,
grouping the cacheable objects based on the source host. After a spe-
ciﬁc time had passed, during which there had been no new entries from
the host, the advertisement was published, with the counters re-set. Fig-
ure 6.6 shows a graph over how the total number of cache advertisements,
and the average accessibility delay, were affected when varying the pub-
lishing delay. The accessibility delay is the time between when an object
has been received, and when a advertisement containing it is published.
As the ﬁgure shows, the overhead (amount of advertisements) drops
rapidly when the delay is increased up to 100 seconds, after which it slows
down and eventually settles at around 135. With 110 unique hosts in the
sample, this means only a 23% overhead compared to the ideal (one ad-
vertisement per host), and a 51% drop from the worst-case scenario (with-
out any delay). However, as the accessibility delay is directly tied to the
publishing delay (as it is always equal or greater), it does rise linearly,
prompting us to select the publishing delay based on a good balance be-
tween the overhead and accessibility.
124
Secure P2P Web
Figure 6.6. The total number of cache advertisements published, and the average acces-
sibility delay depending on the length of the publishing delay. Total number
of unique hosts in this sample was 110.
6.2.2 Self-adjusting expiration
In order to automatize this process, we created a self-adjusting caching
algorithm (presented in the Appendix) that strives to optimize the acces-
sibility without increasing the overhead. It is initialized by providing two
values describing the accessibility that the user is striving for: the maxi-
mum delay and the average. The maximum delay (Cache.MAX_DELAY in
the listing) is the ceiling for how long a cached object is kept without being
advertised, while the average (Cache.AVERAGE_DELAY) is the average
time the user is striving for. The algorithm keeps track of the publishing
times, and adjusts the publishing delay accordingly in order to converge
the average towards the user-deﬁned value. Furthermore, it records the
time at which each object is added, and forces a advertisement to be pub-
lished after the user-deﬁned maximum amount of time has passed, unless
the objects have been already advertised due to a publishing delay- time-
out.
Furthermore, it tries to optimize the accessibility by slowly decreasing
the publishing delay, even though the accessibility delay is less than the
user-deﬁned value. But only until it encounters an advertisement “miss”;
an object that would have been included in a previous advertisement, had
the publishing delay been greater than the current value, but less than
the user-deﬁned average limit. With this addition, the algorithm will de-
crease the accessibility delay, but only until the overhead (the number of
advertisements) increases, at which point it will back off by restoring the
publishing delay.
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6.2.3 Validation
In order to measure the performance of this algorithm, we recorded over
34 hours more of active web browsing over the duration of one week,
which we analyzed using a Python implementation of the algorithm. The
web browsing logs were obtained by using a HTTP proxy that recorded
the time of each request, complete with the HTTP headers relevant to
caching. From these entries the un-cacheable requests were removed, and
the remaining used as data for the simulator implementation. The logs
were collected from two separate hosts during daily web usage and com-
bined into a single continuous log (with inactive periods removed). As be-
fore, although this analysis reveals only how well the algorithm performs
against the web browsing patterns of the test subjects, it does provide a
view into what the tradeoffs are when optimizing the accessibility.
Figure 6.7(a) shows how the accessibility delay is varies during the
course of the sessions, and how the publishing delay is adjusted accord-
ingly when the target accessibility delay is set to 290 seconds. The graph
shows also how the accessibility delay would develop without adjustments
(the static mode), when the publishing delay is ﬁxed at the 290 seconds.
Figure 6.7(b), on the other hand, shows the cumulative amount of adver-
tisements produced by the two modes, as well as the ratio between the
self-adjusting (dynamic) and static mode.
Over the course of the sessions, the self-adjusting (dynamic) algorithm
produced 1762 advertisements, with an average accessibility delay of 113.8
seconds, while without adjustments (publishing delay set to 290 seconds)
it produced 1498 advertisements, with an average accessibility delay of
364.1 seconds. For these speciﬁc sessions, it means that the self-adjusting
algorithm increased the number of advertisements by 17.6%, while de-
creasing the accessibility delay by 68.8%. Overall, we can conclude that at
least for the types of browsing behavior we analyzed, the self-adjusting al-
gorithm decreases the accessibility delay substantially while moderately
increasing the overhead.
6.2.4 Security considerations
The P2P web cache provides one approach to increase content availabil-
ity and reduce stress on centralized nodes, but includes also a number of
serious security threats. An obvious threat is that the content advertised
cannot be veriﬁed. Without any protective mechanisms, malicious users
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(a) The development of the accessibility delay.
(b) The cumulative amount of advertisements.
Figure 6.7. The development of the accessibility delay and publishing delay, as well as
the cumulative amount of advertisements produced, during the web browsing
sessions when using the self-adjusting algorithm. The values for the static
mode is provided for comparison.
are free to advertise the availability of popular content which could in
fact be viruses or false data. Through the security scheme presented in
Chapter 6.1, we can verify that the content is what the author intended,
and limit the damage of untrusted content through sandboxing and sani-
tation. But this does not prevent peers from wasting time and bandwidth
retrieving falsely labeled data.
Currently our prototype fetches content only from peers that have been
veriﬁed by a trusted identity authority. Although this limits who is able
to claim having possession of any content, it relies on the integrity of the
identity authorities, which can vary. A more personal solution is pre-
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sented in Chapter 7, originally intended to prevent unwanted trafﬁc, that
can also be used for deciding which peers to use as content sources in P2P
web caching.
In addition to the threat of distributing false content, P2P web cache
raises privacy concerns. As the proxy publicly advertises the content
cached by the user, it acts as an open browsing history log. Furthermore,
as some sites may adapt its content or content URLs to a speciﬁc user,
it may contain sensitive data unless the HTTP headers have been appro-
priately set. But the issue does not only affect the user caching content.
The users requesting the content expose as well their browsing habits,
although to a lesser degree. This touches on the general issue of web
anonymity, which is hard to solve, especially as our framework is based
on relationships and strong identities.
It is clear that we should be very careful when choosing what data to
cache. This includes scrutinizing the content and related metadata (such
as HTTP headers), in order to ﬁnd clues to the nature of the content. Fur-
thermore, it could also involve changing the browser’s behavior. Similarly
to the anonymized (or incognito) modes offered by many web browsers, we
could have an open, or sharing, mode with clear visual clues. The browser
would warn the user (or switch automatically) whenever browsing sites
not meant to be cached (for instance, sites with a login form).
6.2.5 Related work
As reviewed in Chapter 2.8.1, there exists several solutions for decentral-
ized, or P2P, web caching. These are designed as either more scalable
alternatives to traditional, centralized web caches, or for environments
without a dedicated infrastructure. They rely on close cooperation be-
tween the nodes, and concentrate on efﬁcient distribution of data (com-
monly using a set DHT algorithm). Our focus is not on the structure
of the network or efﬁcient data distribution, but on optimizing how data
availability is announced in networks without a set structure. This can be
coupled with other distributed web caching solutions in order to minimize
the maintenance trafﬁc.
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6.3 Discussion
For P2P web to be viable, we need to address the inherit security threats
and availability issues. The web has become the most popular applica-
tion on the Internet, and subsequently an important channel for malware
distribution and other malicious activity. Currently we rely on the repu-
tation of the site, and the organization behind it. However, this does not
fully work even today, as we have seen cases where reputable sites have,
inadvertently, hosted malicious content. In P2P web even this becomes
void, as we, in order to increase availability, may have to rely on complete
strangers to host content.
The framework we present has the potential to offer the security crucial
for P2P web, but there are also downsides. These include the additional
processing required to sign and verify web content, increases the size of
web pages and the resulting increased load on peers. Also, the scheme
may not work well with certain types of content, such as streaming media.
On the other hand, the mechanism works well with existing protocols,
making it possible for servers to simultaneously serve clients that support
the scheme and those that do not. Using the indicators in the HTTP re-
quest headers, we can select which peer receive the secured version, while
omitting the signed version—and resulting overhead—for those that will
not use it. Even if legacy clients do get the secure content, the syntax
is backwards-compatible and users will have to rely on existing solutions
(such as script blocking) for security.
To address the availability issues, we propose the use of distributed web
caching, for which there are exists multiple solutions. Our contribution
is to design a scheme which makes these safe to use even in untrusted
environments, and to outline a strategy for optimizing the maintenance
trafﬁc. This is important especially for battery- powered devices, which is
the focus of our P2P framework.
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7. Preventing unwanted traffic
In the past years, unwanted and abusive messaging has penetrated al-
most all areas of the Internet, plaguing users by not only being distract-
ing, but also by potentially carrying malicious content (viruses) and using
up computing- and network resources. As we design a new networking
model, we should address this problem, especially as the aim is to create a
secure framework for applications hosted by the users themselves. These
are often more vulnerable than traditional infrastructure, as they do not
have the same resources to defend themselves. Many security threats in
our environment have been solved by using secure data protocols (such as
HIP) and a strong identity scheme (as described in Chapter 3.1.1). How-
ever, these do little to shield the user from unsolicited communication,
spam, that would waste the already limited resources of mobile devices.
There is a clear incentive for spam. Perhaps the most widely studied
manifestation is email spam, which has grown exponentially from virtu-
ally zero to a vast majority of all email trafﬁc [117][163]. It is estimated
to cause tens of billions of Euros in losses due to lost productivity, soft-
ware crashes and identity theft [164]. Although counter measures, such
as spam ﬁlters and virus scanners, have been deployed, some of the spam
will always reach its goal. Even though this may only be a small fraction
(as low as 0.00001% [86]), it is enough for the activity to continue to be
proﬁtable.
In communication systems, spam is not conﬁned to merely emails or
comments on blogs posts, but includes unwanted VoIP (Spam over In-
ternet Telephony, or SPIT) and other unsolicited application data pos-
sibly infecting the target with malicious code. Especially mobile users
would suffer due to the additional mobile data transfer charges and bat-
tery drainage. This problem has been anticipated, even dubbing VoIP as
the next medium for spammers [35]. A number of products have been
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developed to address the issue (such as [45][107]), and members of the
IETF SIP working group [73] have also recognized the problem, express-
ing their thoughts and possible solutions (as described in Chapter 2.4.1).
However, these mostly rely on the presence of a centralized authority and
are, in many parts, irrelevant for P2P environments.
Without a central authority, it is hard to keep track and block peers that
engage in this activity. Detecting a rogue peer as it establishes VoIP calls
to a thousand users simultaneously is easy in centralized environments.
But it is impossible for a single user to notice this, as it has no overview of
the whole system. The users of P2P networks can only rely on what they
know themselves or have learned from others.
For our framework, we have studied the use of relationships for pre-
venting unwanted and abusive trafﬁc. This is well suited for P2P envi-
ronments as it does not require a complete view of the whole system or a
large, up-to-date, database of the tell-tale signs of malicious activity. We
only need to keep a record of the peers we interact with, and exchange
this information with others. Compared to existing relationship-based
solutions, we focus on the privacy of users, and develop a probabilistic
method for discovering social connections.
7.1 Relationship-based filtering
Relationships create a network of trust between users. Considering some-
one a friend implies that we trust that person to a certain degree. Fil-
tering trafﬁc based on these friendships, for instance allowing friends to
connect unquestioned, while subjecting others to closer inspection, seems
natural and straightforward. However, it leads to a very strict model
where establishing new relationships is hard. We would need to use
out-of-band channels and manual conﬁguration to establish new relation-
ships, or subject each peer to limited trial periods during which we moni-
tor and assess the trustworthiness of that peer.
We have explored different ways of sharing relationship information for
establishing trust between users, in other words, solving the traditional
introductory problem in distributed systems. For instance, if Alice wants
to connect to Bob, who does not know Alice beforehand (and is wary of
accepting new connections), Alice might not get through. But if they both
have a mutual friend Carol, Alice could use her as reference. By leverag-
ing Bob’s trust in this mutual friend, Alice would seem more trustworthy
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(or at least more accountable) and Bob would be more likely to accept the
connection.
However, we wanted to extend the model from only one-hop social links
(friend of friend, FoF) to multiple. We wanted a model where we could
measure the distance to peers within our social network, and make deci-
sions based on that information. In distributed systems, only the users
themselves know who their friends are. Therefore, we need a way of
sharing this information between users, so that the social links can be
unveiled. This, however, raises two fundamental questions:
i How do we know whether the information is correct?
We need to verify that a claim of friendship is not made only by the
subject itself, but also by the partner it claims to be friends with.
ii What is the incentive for participating, as it requires us to reveal our
contacts?
We need to protect the privacy of the users. Few are willing to openly
publish a list of all of their acquaintances. We need a way to anonymize
this information while still be able to fairly conﬁdently establish the path
between users in a social network. This lowers the threshold for partici-
pating.
We approached the problem using a distributed relationship-sharing
mechanism based on bloom ﬁlters.
7.2 Related work
Finding common friends is a fundamental feature of most social network-
ing services. Furthermore, there has also been a number of attempts at
creating independent systems for providing this service in a more generic
manner for any application that may beneﬁt from that information. The
Pathﬁnder, designed by Juho Heikkilä, is a good example of such a sys-
tem. Architecturally it is similar to the identity authorities described in
Chapter 3.1.1. That is, a trusted third party service which can be dis-
tributed to several instances as long as both parties of a session trust the
same instance. Therefore, it solves the two fundamental questions by hav-
ing trusted Pathﬁnder nodes (information correctness), and by only using
anonymized data (lowering threshold for participating).
The Pathﬁnder provides an interface for users to submit their contact
list in an anonymized format. The anonymization is done by revealing
only the digest value (hash) of the names of the friends. The Pathﬁnder
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can use these to establish a network between users (as the hash of a user
name is consistent), even though it does not know the actual identity of
those users. Connection initiating peers query the Pathﬁnder to estab-
lish a link between themselves and the target peer. The Pathﬁnder uses
an efﬁcient algorithm for traversing its internal database, and returns a
signed statement containing the shortest path found. This is presented
by the initiating peer during connection establishment[66][100].
Although the Pathﬁnder (or similar systems based on trusted nodes)
provides a solution for discovering social links, it has a number of draw-
backs. The most apparent being accessibility. Our framework is designed
for distributed environments, where access to external networks or spe-
ciﬁc nodes may not always be possible. Secondly, it requires that both
users as well as all intermediate acquaintances trust, and use, the same
Pathﬁnder. The Pathﬁnder could to some extent be used in distributed
systems, as it does not need to be a single centralized component. In
overlay networks, we could share the responsibility amongst a number
of trustworthy peers. These Pathﬁnders could also collaborate, creating
an overlay between themselves for discovering social links. However, this
does not solve the problem completely.
On the other hand, attempts at solving this problem by using fully dis-
tributed mechanisms often have a number of security concerns. For in-
stance, the Loaf system uses viral propagation of Bloom ﬁlters constructed
from contact lists[31]. Users create these ﬁlters using the email addresses
of known, trusted, contacts, and attach them to the email they send.
These are then used by the recipients for whitelisting email received from
unknown addresses.
The loaf system has many of the traits we are looking for. It is fully
distributed, and provides some degree of privacy. However, on closer in-
spection, the security is superﬁcial. As the ﬁlters are publicly distributed,
they are easy to obtain. Engineering a value to ﬁt into a pre-deﬁned Bloom
ﬁlter is easy with any modern computing device. Even a low false posi-
tive probability of 1% would only take 100 attempts to overcome. Fur-
thermore, it is possible to check for well-known addresses in the ﬁlters,
revealing parts of the contact list. Furthermore, the loaf scheme extends
only to friends of friends, which is less than we require.
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7.3 BloomBuddies
The BloomBuddies scheme was designed to address these shortcomings
by using a multi-level viral model to spread relationship information and
a novel procedure for discovering common friends using Bloom ﬁlters. The
viral distribution mechanism is simple; when establishing a peer connec-
tion, both users share information about their contacts. Through this
exchange, the list of friends of friends (one social hop) of that contact is
obtained. However, as both users also have information regarding the
contacts of their other friends (acquired similarly), the peers continue the
procedure by exchanging those as well. This results in a list of contacts
two hops away. This pattern is continued until a predeﬁned hop distance.
As explained in Section 2.9, most variants of Bloom ﬁlters can be com-
bined (creating a union of all entries) by a simple bit-for-bit OR operation.
Therefore, instead of storing, and sharing the multi-hop Bloom ﬁlters sep-
arately, we simply combine all ﬁlters at the same hop distance that we
have received. By keeping these levels of ﬁlters separate, we can check
not only whether a previously unknown identity is somehow connected to
us, but also at which distance in our social network. Figure 7.1 illustrates
this process.
Figure 7.1. Viral propagation of relationship Bloom ﬁlters. For each hop, C’s information
gets pushed into a higher-level ﬁlter.
The simplest way of using these Bloom ﬁlters to spread relationship
information is to simply deﬁne a standard ﬁlter size and add the identity
of each contact (their public key) to the ﬁlter. However, this raises both
security- and privacy concerns, as discussed earlier. Scalability is also an
issue. With each passing, the number of elements in the ﬁlters may grow
exponentially, easily overﬁlling ﬁlters designed originally for only a single
node’s contacts. In the following, we address these issues, enabling secure
and trustworthy viral distribution of relationship information.
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7.3.1 Threat model
Before describing the scheme, we deﬁne the security threats of a loaf-
like, simple scheme in order to assess how successful we are in overcom-
ing those. The goal of the scheme is to discover a social link between a
connection establishing (or calling) party, and the target (callee) in a se-
cure manner without compromising the privacy of either. For our model,
we inspect the threats from the point of view of what a malicious peer
belonging to each of the different types of actors within this scenario may
hope to gain. These are the following:
Caller. As the primary purpose of the scheme is to ﬁlter connections
based on social trust, the caller has the most to gain from being dishon-
est. The primary goal for a malicious caller is to be seen as much closely
connected to the target than he is. As noted, in an environment where the
identities are self- generated (whether signed by a trusted third party or
not), it is easy to generate identities until one matching a Bloom ﬁlter is
found, falsely identifying the caller as belonging to a friend’s contacts.
Callee. The callee, although generally considered only as the potential
victim of an attack, may also misuse the scheme by luring users into con-
necting to it. As it is the caller’s duty to prove the relationship between the
two, the callee will obtain information during the handshake. Unless the
protocol is well designed, the caller might reveal too much. This includes
information that can be used to gain other users’ trust, or in performing
off-line analyzes of the social environment.
Intermediates. An intermediate is a peer that is a member of the
social link between the caller and callee. In general, we consider these
trusted with regards to correctly propagating the Bloom ﬁlters. After all,
the scheme is built on leveraging the trust for our contacts (the interme-
diates) in order to form new relationships. As any ﬁlter passing through
intermediates will always be one social hop further away than the inter-
mediate, there is no motive to alter the ﬁlters passing through, as they
will never be trusted more than the intermediate himself. However, there
is a privacy concern with handing over our ﬁlters to these. Even though
we trust our contacts to propagate the ﬁlters correctly, we do not want
them to be able to analyze the content (i.e., discover our other contacts).
Outsiders. An outsider is a peer that is neither an end-point of the
connection, nor part of any social link between the two. The main threat
of the outsiders, in our scenario, is to be able to analyze the structure of
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the social network from publicly available information.
We should note that these roles are often shared. For instance, the callee
and caller may possess the same information as intermediates, and there-
fore be considered as posing the same threat (discover our other contacts).
And each of the three other types can also act as outsiders. These cate-
gories merely reﬂect different positions peers can be in, and what they
may strive to unlawfully gain. Furthermore, these specify only the roles
within a one-directional authentication. For a complete authentication,
we would employ mutual authentication where the roles of the callee and
caller are exchanged.
7.3.2 Relationship keys
The ﬁrst step we take is to prevent outsiders and intermediates from be-
ing able to dissect and analyze the contents of the ﬁlters (and therefore
the structure of the social network) by obfuscating the entries (contacts)
put into them. As noted, this analysis is possible if the public, well known,
identiﬁers of users are used. In order to prevent this, we replace the public
identiﬁer with a value seemingly without any correlation to the identity,
but that can be proved by the owner of the identity to be tied to it. As we
are using public key- based identities, we use an electronic signature of
the identity key. This value is impossible to construct without the private
key of the signature, but can easily be veriﬁed and tied to the identity.
Although this prevents intermediates from arbitrarily dissecting the
Bloom ﬁlters to ﬁnd well-known public identiﬁers, it is only assuming
that the intermediates themselves are not friends with those contacts.
The signature value should be regarded as a secret, which users should
only give out to people that they trust. However, as keeping a shared se-
cret amongst all contacts is hard, users can create a set of relationship
keys which are used according to the type of relationship. For instance,
one key could be dedicated to close, trusted, friends, while another for
mere acquaintances. During connection establishments, the caller would
only need to prove that he is the owner of one of the keys that appear in
the ﬁlter by providing a signature made by that key over his identity key,
as well as the public part of the signature key.
If the ﬁlters a speciﬁc callee trusts are well known, or otherwise re-
vealed, this scheme does not efﬁciently prevent users from engineering
public keys whose signatures of an identity ﬁt into a speciﬁc ﬁlter. We can
enhance the scheme by inserting additional values to the ﬁlter that tie
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the key used to it more strongly. For instance, we could add the key itself.
Finding a false positive key in that model can be compared to ﬁnding two
interlinked random values that both pass as members of the Bloom ﬁlter.
This would decrease the probability from the false positive probability p
to p2, meaning that for a ﬁlter with an error probability of one percent, an
average of ten thousand keys have to be generated to ﬁnd a match. Al-
though the scheme can be extended even more (e.g., by adding signatures
of signatures), it would also increase the amount of data, and still remain
breakable given sufﬁcient computing resources. We need a more efﬁcient
method to decrease the probability of successfully generating a matching
key.
7.3.3 Detecting relationship-speciﬁc keys
Although the relationship keys prevent outsiders from generating iden-
tity keys matching the same Bloom ﬁlter patterns as speciﬁc well-known
users’, it requires that either the caller reveals his relationship keys, or
the callee the ﬁlters he trusts. As discussed, the caller can decrease his
dependency on a single key by using a set of keys, or even relationship-
speciﬁc ones, which are revealed only when needed. The problem is how
to know which ones to reveal to whom; assessing in which of our contacts’
network a speciﬁc user might reside. We need a scheme that allows the
communicating parties to compare and discover keys that they may have
in common, without either one revealing too much. This we achieve using
Bloom ﬁlter intersections.
Instead of the calling party sending the key signatures in plain text,
they are also added to a Bloom ﬁlter, which is given to the callee. By
sending the signatures in a Bloom ﬁlter, the calling party does not need
to reveal the keys directly, but rather in a anonymized, probabilistic man-
ner. As the ﬁlter contains multiple entries (possibly even false entries,
decoys), it can not be used to discover the Bloom ﬁlter pattern for the in-
dividual entries, as it is impossible to know which bit positions relate to
a single entry. The callee is therefore unable to discover a Bloom ﬁlter
pattern for any single one of the caller’s keys, to be used to construct a
fake relationship key in order to gain trust with other users.
However, the purpose of this ﬁlter is not to single out a speciﬁc key sig-
nature that might be present in the remote user’s relationship ﬁlters, but
instead limit the scope. The remote user uses this ﬁlter to perform an
intersection over the relationship ﬁlters he trusts, and sends back the re-
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sult. The caller can now check which entries are still present and select
one of those keys to present to the callee. As with the previous schemes,
we can lower the false positive rates using multiple values of the same
key (adding signatures of signatures), lowering the probability that a re-
lationship key is falsely identiﬁed as being in the trusted ﬁlters. It is, of
course, possible that more than one of the caller’s relation keys exist in
the callee’s ﬁlters, in which case the caller selects one to be used.
The caller does, in any case, need to ﬁnally reveal a relationship key
present in the intersection linking him to the callee. A dishonest callee
could therefore forge the intersection by simply returning the Bloom ﬁl-
ter containing the keys untouched (signaling that they all match). This
would prompt the caller to reveal one, even though he is not linked to the
callee. The dishonest callee would subsequently use that key to analyze
the structure of the social network, or to create a new key matching the
same Bloom ﬁlter pattern and thereby gain the same social status as the
caller. However, this can be prevented using decoy keys. By creating a
number of temporary, throw-away, keys, not used in any relationship, and
inserting those into the ﬁlter passed to the callee, the caller has a range
of keys to present to dishonest callees without revealing any of the real
relationship keys.
This still does not solve the problem of the caller creating specially engi-
neered keys to ﬁt the remote party’s trusted ﬁlters. In fact, by returning
the intersection of the key signatures and the trusted ﬁlters, the remote
user reveals a subset of the ones he deﬁnitely trusts. Even though the
trusted ﬁlters are kept secret, the caller will gain insight into those. For-
tunately, there are a couple of mechanisms we can use to minimize this
leakage. First however, we need to impose strict limits on the false pos-
itive probability (health) of the caller’s key ﬁlter. By limiting the false
positive probability of this Bloom ﬁlter, we efﬁciently limit what can be
deducted from the result of the intersection, as explained in more detail
in Chapter 7.3.4. In addition to this limit, we use partial intersections
and key escrow.
With partial intersections, we divide the relationship ﬁlters into two
separate parts; a public part which is used for the intersection, and a pri-
vate part which is used only for veriﬁcation. When establishing a relation-
ship, both parties share the public part of a key they associate with the re-
lationship, together with a signature of their own identity key, made with
that relationship key. The relationship key is added to the public part of
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the relationship ﬁlter, while the signature to the private part. During con-
nection establishment, the caller creates a Bloom ﬁlter composed of all the
relationship keys he has used (along with any number of decoys), which
is passed to the callee who intersects it with the public part of the rela-
tionship ﬁlters he trusts. After the intersection, the caller will discover
which of his relationship keys may be present in the callee’s ﬁlters. If one
is found, it is presented to the callee, along with the signature over the
caller’s identity key. The callee can now verify that the caller is linked by
checking the private relationship ﬁlter for the inclusion of the signature.
Although the scheme requires the maintenance of two separate ﬁlters
for each hop, the total amount of data that has to be distributed (the re-
lationship ﬁlters) will not increase. Compared to using a single ﬁlter with
two different values per key (the relationship key and the signature), we
would need to double the ﬁlter size in order to see similar false positive
probabilities as we see when using two separate ﬁlters. Therefore, as ex-
plained in Chapter 7.3.4, the total amount of data will remain the same.
Another mechanism the callee can employ to prevent the caller from
opportunistically generating, or choosing matching, off-line generated, re-
lationship keys after receiving the intersection is to require the caller’s
relationship keys to be escrowed before returning the intersection result.
The callee simply asks the caller to provide all of the possible relation-
ship keys, each encrypted with a different unrelated encryption key, in
advance. After identifying a match in the intersection result, the caller
will point out which of the keys was found, and provide the decryption
key (along with the signature) so the callee can verify the claim. The
complete process is illustrated in Figure 7.2.
7.3.4 Security analysis
As Bloom ﬁlters are probabilistic data structures, the security of any sys-
tem built on these will inherently display similar, probabilistic, charac-
teristics. As explained in Chapter 2.9, the probability of a fault (false
positive) depends on the structure of the Bloom ﬁlters, and the amount
of data contained. Our goal is therefore to clarify how these parameters
affect the overall security of the BloomBuddies scheme, in order to deﬁne
the minimum requirements for using it safely. We examine the security
of the BloomBuddies scheme according to the threat model presented in
Chapter 7.3.1.
As described in Chapter 7.3.2, the threats posed by intermediates and
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Figure 7.2. The BloomBuddies scheme illustrated. Alice needs to prove that there is a
social link between her and Bob through one or more intermediates (Carol).
outsiders are prevented by using speciﬁcally constructed relationship keys
instead of identity keys as the Bloom ﬁlter entries. Even though this pre-
vents the detection of speciﬁc users in a particular ﬁlter (within a certain
probability), it is still possible to gain an understanding of the overall
social network by reviewing and comparing ﬁlters. If relationship keys
are re-used between different contacts, it is possible to compare different
ﬁlters and approximate how many common contacts these contain. Fur-
thermore, the size and ﬁll ratio reveals the number of entries in a ﬁlter,
which corresponds to the number of contacts of a person. However, as the
false positive probability of a ﬁlter depends on the ratio between the ﬁl-
ter size and number of entries, by increasing the size of the ﬁlters we are
able to add false entries without compromising the security of the system.
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We can therefore prevent size analysis by deﬁning a standard number of
entries each user inserts into their ﬁlter, whether they are real entries or
not.
However, as the purpose of the BloomBuddies scheme to promote trust
in the caller, our main concern is that the caller would be able to gain
a better standing than deserved with the callee. If we assume that the
system is otherwise secure (i.e., the relationship ﬁlters and -keys are not
leaked), the most straightforward approach is for the caller to ﬁnd a public
key pair that is falsely identiﬁed as present in the callee’s relationship
ﬁlters.
By dividing the relationship ﬁlters into two parts, both the public key
and the signature of the caller’s identity, would need to ﬁt into two sepa-
rate ﬁlters. As discussed in Chapter 7.3.2, within our context, these can
be thought of as two linked random values. The probability of ﬁnding
such a key pair is therefore the product of the probability of matching
two random values into these ﬁlters. With mpub, kpub, npub representing
the size, number of hash functions and entries of the public part of the re-
lationship ﬁlter, and mpriv, kpriv, npriv respectively the parameters for the
private ﬁlter, the total probability of ﬁnding such a key becomes:
p = (1− (1−
1
mpub
)kpubnpub)kpub ∗ (1− (1−
1
mpriv
)kprivnpriv)kpriv (7.1)
As each relationship will insert one entry into both parts, we can assume
that the number of entries, and the ﬁlter parameters (size, hash functions)
are the same for both ﬁlters. The probability becomes then:
p = (1− (1−
1
m
)kn)2k (7.2)
This means that the probability of being falsely identiﬁed as a member
of a relationship ﬁlter (both the false key and its signature matching) is
the square of the ﬁlter’s two components (public and private parts). For
instance, with an upper limit of 1% false positive probability on the com-
ponents, the total probability is 0.01%. In other words, the caller would
need to, on average, perform 10000 connection establishment attempts,
with different keys, in order to succeed. We can compare this probability
with having both entries (a total of 2 ∗ n entries) in the same ﬁlter of size
m2. The false positive probability (for one entry) will then be:
p2 = (1− (1−
1
m2
)k2n)k (7.3)
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As we require that two interlinked values are falsely identiﬁed as present,
the error probability will then be p22. In order for this to be equal to the
error probability of using two separate ﬁlters, we need to solve the size of
the ﬁlter (m2) from the following equation:
(1− (1−
1
m
)kn)2k = (1− (1−
1
m2
)k2n)2k (7.4)
Solving m2, we have:
m2 =
1
1−
√
1− 1
m
(7.5)
Which converges towards 2 ∗ m, meaning that m2 will need to be two
times m for the same error probability. Therefore, having two different
ﬁlters requires only as much total data as maintaining two values in the
same ﬁlter. The beneﬁt of using two-part ﬁlters is to limit how much the
caller is able to learn from the intersection result that can be used in
subsequent attempts.
The callee will naturally strive to reveal as little as possible, preferably
only the entries that legitimately correspond to relationship keys owned
by the caller. The goal is therefore to minimize the number of bits set in
the intersection result, in other words, the false positive probability. For
an entry to be present in the intersection, it has to be present in both
of the ﬁlters of the intersection. The false positive probability of the re-
sulting ﬁlter is therefore the product of the probability of the two source
ﬁlters. We can therefore limit the false positive probability of the result
by adjusting either one of the sources. As the caller-provided key ﬁlter is
composed during the connection establishment, it is the natural target for
this adjustment.
Even though the callee is in this way able to control the false positive
probability of the intersection result, it does not prevent an attack. Even
though the intersection result would have an extremely low false positive
error probability, with enough computing resources it is still possible to
engineer a key matching the result. Furthermore, with each subsequent
connection attempt the caller is able to further familiarize himself with
the public part of the callee’s trusted ﬁlters. It is the private parts of the
ﬁlters that ultimately provide veriﬁcation of the relationship.
The purpose of the public part of the ﬁlter is, as explained in Chap-
ter 7.3.3, to allow the caller to choose which key (or keys) to reveal, as well
as to discover rogue callees through the use of false entries. As described,
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the false positive probability of the intersection result is the product of
the probabilities of the source ﬁlters; key ﬁlter and the public part of a
trusted ﬁlter.
p∩ = pkeyfilter ∗ ppublic (7.6)
Assuming healthy ﬁlters (for instance, 1% false positive probability per
ﬁlter), for a relationship key to erroneously to be indicated as present in
the intersection result is low (0.01% in our example). Having more than
one of the relationship keys present in the intersection result is certainly
possible, but having any of the false ones is always due to the false positive
probability as these keys are not used for any valid relationship.
Considering a rogue callee, the only way in which he will succeed in lur-
ing the caller into revealing a relationship key is for the key to be present
in the intersection result. As the callee does not know which bits of the
ﬁlter belong to valid relationship keys, the intersection ﬁlter will have to
be produced at random. This means that the relation between the proba-
bility of a valid relationship key to remain in the ﬁlter versus a false will
follow the relationship between the amount of valid keys in the key ﬁlter
and false ones. Therefore, by adding a large amount of decoys, for instance
ten times the number of valid relationship keys, the probability of ﬁnding
decoys in these rogue intersection ﬁlter will be much higher than encoun-
tering a valid relationship key, independent on how populated the ﬁlter
is. In our example, for each valid relationship key found will, on average,
entail that ten false ones are found as well. With the intersection false
positive probability of 0.01%, the probability for a rogue callee to succeed
(i.e., produce a ﬁlter with a valid relationship key present, but no false
entries) is p10
∩
= 0.000110 = 10−40, in practice none. However, we should
acknowledge that the presence of a false entry does not automatically rule
the callee as dishonest, as the probability of ﬁnding these will directly fol-
low the false positive probability of the intersection result. Instead, the
process should be re-iterated with a new set of false entries.
The process does not prevent a malicious callee from performing a man
in the middle (MIM) attack between two users who are known to have a
relationship. As the malicious callee will use legitimate intersection ﬁl-
ters provided by the real callee, the caller will become convinced of the
relationship and reveal the relationship key. In order for the malicious
callee to fabricate a relationship with the legitimate callee, he would then
have to either choose to rely on the false positive probability of the pri-
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vate ﬁlters, or engineer a key that both ﬁt the intersection result (the
public part of a relationship ﬁlter) and whose signature is guaranteed to
be present in the private part of the relationship ﬁlter.
As the malicious callee can not access the private part of the relation-
ship ﬁlters, this signature would need to have the exact same Bloom ﬁlter
pattern as the caller’s relationship key signature. Even though it is pos-
sible to generate such a key, the amount of work needed is magnitudes
more than ﬁtting a key into even the most strict key- or relationship ﬁl-
ter. Essentially the false positive probability of a ﬁlter with only one entry.
Furthermore, in order to protect the caller, we can still employ mutual au-
thentication where the callee is forced to prove its relationship with the
caller.
7.3.5 Scalability
In order for Bloom ﬁlters to be efﬁcient, we need to have a fairly good
estimate of how much information they will carry. However, in the decen-
tralized environments we target, the assumptions regarding the amount
of social links we need to convey using the BloomBuddies scheme may
vary from person to person. This makes it hard to deﬁne a standard size
for the BloomBuddy ﬁlters. As Bloom ﬁlters do not allow us to merge,
intersect and compare different sized ﬁlters in the way required, we need
a scheme that allows us to scale the ﬁlters without loosing these basic
properties, in order to allow participants to choose the size of their ﬁlters
themselves.
As discussed in Section 2.9, several schemes have been proposed that
increase the ﬁlter size dynamically. However, these are based on the as-
sumption that we only need to know whether individual elements are
present and does not allow us to compare complete ﬁlters, as required
in our scheme.
We base our method for scaling on the use of modulo for mapping the
bit positions, and the observation that the growth of the false positive
probability for each addition depends on the ﬁlter size. Adding the same
elements to a larger ﬁlter increases the ﬁll ratio less than adding them to
a smaller one. Therefore, by adjusting the ﬁlter size, even though the ﬁll
ratio and false positive probability remain the same, we can preemptively
slow down the growth of the false positive probability. This will provides
us with larger ﬁlters, which in the end will allow us to insert more ele-
ments while keeping the error rate at an acceptable level.
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To be able to increase the ﬁlter size without access to the source ele-
ments, we use a budding approach; we create clones of the ﬁlter and ap-
pend these until the required size is reached. The Bloom ﬁlters we use are
essentially bit ﬁelds where each set position corresponds to the modulo of
the hash values of the elements. As these depend on the size of the ﬁlter,
we need to ensure that the values get repositioned where they would have
been inserted in a ﬁlter of the new, expanded, size. But as we do not have
the source elements (only the modulo of the hash), we cannot determine
the correct bit locations for an arbitrary ﬁlter size. However, as the values
are the remainder of the hash values divided by the ﬁlter size, by multi-
plying the ﬁlter size with a positive integer, we can calculate the potential
positions where they could reside.
As we double the size of the divisor (the ﬁlter size), the remainder stays
unchanged if the dividend is less than the original divisor. In case the
dividend is between the original and the new divisor, the remainder will
increase by as much as the value of the original divisor. Continuing fur-
ther, if the dividend is between two and three times the size of the original
divisor, the remainder will stay unchanged. We can see that the remain-
der will always either stay unchanged, or increase with as much as the
size of the original divisor. Similarly when multiplying the divisor by
three, the remainder will be either at the same position, increase by the
size of the original divisor or increase two times the size of the original
divisor. Therefore, by duplicating the bit ﬁeld into the new space, we are
sure to include the modulo of all of the elements with respect to the new
ﬁlter size, as depicted in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3. Increasing the size of an 8-bit ﬁlter containing the values 6, 9, 15 and 20.
Each expansion appends a copy of the original ﬁlter.
In addition to providing a way of dynamically adjusting the ﬁlter size as
the number of entries increase, more importantly, the scheme allows us
to create unions and intersections of ﬁlters of different sizes. As we set
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each of the potential bit positions for the elements, the intersection will
contain all elements that are present in both ﬁlters. And as the false pos-
itive probability of the resulting ﬁlter depends only on the false positive
probability of the source ﬁlters (which remains unchanged throughout the
budding process), it is not affected.
As intermediate nodes are now able to scale the ﬁlters they process,
users can choose to use different sized ﬁlters according to their own as-
sumptions and estimates of the maximum number of entries. This allows
for ﬂexibility in the network, as we do not need to deﬁne a global, cau-
tiously chosen, standard for the size of the ﬁlters. This would likely be too
large for most users, diminishing the efﬁciency sought from using Bloom
ﬁlters in the ﬁrst place. Furthermore, we are now able to deﬁne false pos-
itive probability limits on the ﬁlters created by a remote peers (the key
ﬁlters and one-hop relationship ﬁlters) independent of how many entries
they will contain. As the size of these ﬁlters no longer matters, the re-
mote peer can choose a suitable size that will ﬁt all the elements while
maintaining the required error probability.
7.4 Implementation
The relationship-based ﬁltering was implemented in the prototype as an
access control ﬁlter (as mentioned in Chapter 3.3.1) for the SIP module.
This module performed ﬁltering of incoming sessions (voice and video call,
instant messaging) based on the social distance between the caller and
recipient. The module used the trustman module’s services to acquire this
relationship. Support for both the Pathﬁnder and BloomBuddies were
implemented.
The BloomBuddies scheme was implemented using power of two- sized
Bloom ﬁlters with an initial size of 32 KB (262’144 bits), and ﬁve inde-
pendent hash functions. The default false positive probability limit of
the implementation was set to 5% (i.e., the limit for considering ﬁlters
healthy). The optimal value for the ﬁlters’ parameters (the size of the
ﬁlter and number of hash functions to use) depends on the expected num-
ber of entries, as explained in [169]. We based our values on the social
networking study presented in [173], which found that a user with an av-
erage of 100 friends has, on average, 40’300 non-unique friends-of-friends.
Our conﬁguration represent the optimal parameters for ﬁlters containing
this amount, while maintaining an estimated false positive probability of
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4.4%.
The implementation followed the BloomBuddy scheme described previ-
ously. A relationship was formed by creating a new public key pair, of
which the public part and, signature of our own identity key, was shared
and stored in two-part ﬁlters. Four levels (social hops) of ﬁlters were used,
meaning that three levels were exchanged during each update, resulting
in 192 KB of data (two ﬁlters per level), when adhering to the initial ﬁlter
size. However, at each update the ﬁlter size is re-examined by estimating
the ﬁnal ﬁll rate per level using the average of the ﬁlters acquired. This
affects the size peers instruct their neighbors to use for the ﬁlters they
provide, in order to maintain a maximum of 5% false positive probability.
During connection establishment, the callee requests a key ﬁlter with
a false positive probability of at most 1% from the caller. The caller con-
structs this ﬁlter calculating the optimal size for a ﬁlter containing 100
times more keys than he has shared, and subsequently adds 100 fake en-
tries for each valid one to it. After the intersection, the result is checked
for these fake entries, and a re-iteration (with a new set of entries) is per-
formed if one is found. The connection is dropped, as a precaution, if fake
entries is found after the second intersection. Otherwise the ﬁrst relation-
ship key found (if any) is provided, together with a signature of the caller’s
identity key. The callee compares these with the private and public parts
of the relationship ﬁlters, and in case a match is found, provides the hop
level of it to the access control module.
Reviewing the security analysis of Chapter 7.3.4 using the default con-
ﬁguration of our implementation, we can conclude that the scheme pro-
vides a reasonably trustworthy method for discovering social connections.
Using the terminology of Chapter 7.3.1, outsiders are unable to gain in-
sight into the social network, as explained previously. However, inter-
mediate nodes are able to estimate the size of the social circles they are
connected to, but as we are using unique keys for each relationship, can-
not compare the ﬁlters in order to ﬁnd common acquaintances.
As for malicious callers, the probability of ﬁnding a public key match-
ing the relationship ﬁlter at a speciﬁc level is, at most (when the ﬁlters
are ﬁlled to the 5% limit), p = p2relationshipfilter = 0.05
2 = 0.0025, or 0.25%.
However, after the ﬁrst attempt an intersection of the received ﬁlters can
be made, and keys matching it produced. The probability of succeeding
will eventually be limited only by the false positive probability of the pri-
vate part of the relationship ﬁlter. As it is at most 5%, it would require
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an average of 20 attempts. We should note that these ﬁgures are only for
the most crowded of the relationship ﬁlters, usually the most distant (4
hops). The ﬁlters containing more closely related contacts will, in most
cases, have signiﬁcantly lower false positive probabilities as they contain
several orders of magnitude less entries.
Although an attacker performing a MITM- attack will be able to expose
a relationship key used by the caller, the damage will be contained to
only one speciﬁc relationship key. As for gaining trust with a legitimate
callee, an attacker must rely on the same false positive probabilities as a
malicious caller, or engineer a key matching the same Bloom ﬁlter pattern
as the caller’s. As we are using 32 KB ﬁlters and ﬁve hash functions, the
probability of ﬁnding one is p = (1− (1− 1
262′144
)5)5 = 2.5∗10−24, or 2.5 per
septillion attempts.
The relationship-based ﬁltering was applied to VoIP and instant mes-
sage sessions. The user could conﬁgure the maximum social path length
which he was willing to accept sessions from. In practice however, the
graphical user interface (GUI) was designed so that one of four settings
could be used; Everyone, Friends only, Friends of friends and In your net-
work. Everyone indicates that all connections are allowed while Friends
only and Friends of friends allow only the ones made by people close to
you. In your network is designed to allow anyone that has some sort of
social link to you. We review the usability of our solution in Chapter 8.
7.5 Summary
We have presented a Bloom- ﬁlter based method for discovering social con-
nections between users. By using viral distribution and a novel protocol
for exchanging ﬁlters, we can safely discover links of up to a predeﬁned
distance. Compared to existing solutions, our model is fully distributed,
protects the privacy of both parties and reduces the possibility of cheating
efﬁciently. Although we have presented it as a mechanism for discover-
ing common acquaintances, it can be used to discover links between any
type of information, as long as the two parts of the exchange are able to
implement the interactive discovery protocol.
However, the BloomBuddies scheme is not perfect. It is based on prob-
abilistic data structures, which means that there is a possibility for false
identiﬁcation given sufﬁcient time and computing resources. It should
therefore be used carefully, together with measures to prevent automated
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attacks. To our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst scheme that solves the introduc-
tory problem in fully distributed environments, addressing the privacy
and security concerns of all parties involved.
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8. Usability
The underlying theme of this dissertation is to examine how network-
ing services and applications can be constructed to operate in a secure
manner, while not being reliant on a centralized trusted provider. The
model we have outlined implements privacy protecting methods and uti-
lizes technologies such as the Host Identity Protocol to secure the commu-
nication and, if used properly, to minimize the risks involved.
However, due to the fundamental differences in how the services are pro-
vided, the threats may not be immediately understood by the end users.
In order to provide real security and privacy, users should have a basic
understanding of the threats and be able to properly use the security tech-
nology. In practice, poor usability has often been more detrimental to sys-
tem security than the weaknesses in the underlying security mechanisms
[149]. Users are unable to detect security indicators, and demonstrate
click fatigue when running into security warnings [150]. Even when a
user sometimes does take the time to look at the security indicators and
consider the warning, he may still fail to interpret and utilize this infor-
mation correctly [38]. This leads to users falling prey to relatively simple
social engineering attacks [15].
Despite the risks associated with Internet- based services (e.g., VoIP),
some users prefer these over traditional alternatives for their easy avail-
ability. In P2P- based variants, the security issues become even more
tangible. As previously reviewed, P2P systems harness the shared re-
sources of (possibly malicious) end-users to provide the service, creating
even more opportunities for exploitation The additional security mecha-
nisms we have presented are designed to mitigate these risks, but need
also to be presented to the user in a way that is both understandable and
usable. This is even more challenging with the demands and constraints
of the mobile environments we are targeting.
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User studies are needed to understand how, when and what to commu-
nicate to the users about these security mechanisms and the threats in-
volved, in order to understand how these should best be managed. In this
chapter we provide a comprehensive look into the usability challenges of
our system through the use of a P2P VoIP application on a mobile device
implementing the additional security features. We have gathered user
feedback via interviews, an online questionnaire and a UI paper mock-up.
We present and analyze the data gathered on users’ views and attitudes
towards the emerging application and on Internet telephony in general.
8.1 Related work
It is commonly believed that the challenges in making security usable
markedly differ from the demands of so-called traditional usability [176]
[149]. A key difference is that few, if any, errors can be allowed not to
jeopardize the overall security. This means that the common trial-and-
error way to learn the use of a new application will not work learning how
to manage security.
Security and usability are often seen as competing goals – a classic ex-
ample is usability of passwords: a password that is easy to remember is
weak, and strong passwords are hard to remember [15] [38]. Security and
usability also compete in another way: in [7] the authors found that users
often give up security for easy access. In other words, if security becomes
an obstacle in conducting everyday tasks, it gets turned off [124]. Apart
from the competition between the two, also bad usability hinders secu-
rity management: users may even be aware of the risks based on their
experience, familiarity with the domain or sender, and of the presence of
security features, but are unable to make appropriate security decisions
due to bad usability [38].
When it comes to usable security for VoIP and more speciﬁcally P2P
VoIP, not much is known about the current usability issues or how P2P
VoIP users behave and why, especially in a mobile environment. In [56]
is provided some insight into the user behavior and motivations of Skype
users, when they investigated how P2P VoIP trafﬁc in Skype differs from
trafﬁc in P2P ﬁle-sharing networks or from trafﬁc in traditional voice-
communication networks. According to [56], there were some remarkable
differences in the usage patterns of Skype users as compared with the
usage of traditional P2P ﬁle-sharing systems such as KaZaA, which also
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have their problems with usability.
8.2 Research questions and methodology
Our research concentrated ﬁrst on ﬁnding out about relevant user habits
that are likely to affect the usage of P2P VoIP application on a mobile
device, and what the current level of understanding related to the security
of such an application is. Our aim was also to ﬁnd out any relevant user
habits related to security in the context of using a mobile device, as these
may affect what components a mobile user interface for presenting the
security options should concentrate on. Our research questions (RQ) for
this part were formulated as follows.
RQ1. Which current usage patterns (computer, mobile phone, informa-
tion security) are relevant for the usage of our application and, on a more
general level, for managing secure P2P VoIP on a mobile device?
RQ2. What is the current level of understanding of security related to
P2P VoIP on a mobile device? What do users use as reference point for
understanding the security of the emerging application?
RQ3. What are the privacy needs in using P2P VoIP on a mobile device?
Furthermore, we wanted to collect feedback and impressions for propos-
als for the interface design for controlling the security features (presented
in Chapter 5 and 7), which we then implemented as a P2P VoIP applica-
tion using our prototype implementation of the P2P system. We were most
interested in how users, who were not experts in security or in informa-
tion and communication technologies, would be able to grasp the concept
and successfully use the application. However, we still wanted our users
to be ﬂuent computer and mobile phone users – possible early adopters.
The security mechanisms of the application are such that they require a
decent understanding of the underlying networking concepts to be fully
grasped. The target demographic of the study was therefore chosen so
that the full details of the mechanisms (and thus of any unexpected be-
havior) would not be well understood, but the areas to which they relate,
and the risks involved, would be familiar. This would allow us to study the
layman’s impressions of the issues of our study, without having to dwell
into the precursory concepts.
We used a mixed-method approach to get several types of information
on the user requirements and on the usability of the system: 1) semi-
structured interviews, 2) an online questionnaire and 3) user testing of
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user interface mock-ups and 4) on a functional UI.
8.3 The study
We started our study with user interviews, in order to understand the
current user attitudes and behavior relevant to our study. We chose to
perform interviews, as it allows to probe more deeply into the topics, ﬁnd-
ing subtleties that are hard to discover with more ﬁxed-form methods. At
this point, we only had our research questions and a rough outline of the
area, so we wanted to encourage the subjects to bring up any issue that
he or she might associate with the topic. The aim was to gain a compre-
hensive understanding of people’s attitudes towards mobile security, not
only their views on the topics in our initial outline.
On basis of the outcomes, we created an online questionnaire of the most
important issues, to gather more responses than is possible through in-
terviewing alone to form a understanding of the general attitude towards
these issues. We chose an on-line questionnaire, as it has been proven to
be a cost-efﬁcient technique for gathering data from a larger population.
The goal was to quantify the concerns discovered during the interviews.
The combined ﬁndings were then used to inform the design of the ﬁrst
paper mock-up user interface.
The mock-up was subjected to user reviews and feedback under moder-
ated semi-formal usability testing sessions. The feedback gained on these
sessions served as input for the VoIP application UI on a Nokia N810 In-
ternet tablet, which was also subjected to user reviewing and feedback
under moderated semi-formal usability testing sessions, where users con-
ducted several test tasks with the mock-up, at the same time discussing
their experiences and thoughts about the mock-up with the moderator.
We will now present each phase of the conducted study in more detail.
8.3.1 The Initial Interviews
The initial interviews were conducted with 9 users, aged 18-25, 6 male
and 3 female. Most had a bachelor degree, three in computer science. By
the time of the interview all the participants had approximately 2-3 years
of VoIP experience. However, none of the participants had ever used VoIP
application on any mobile device. Interviews took 45 minutes each and
focused on ﬁnding out about users’ experiences and preferences that were
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likely to be related to usage of VoIP. We also inquired about users’ general
knowledge of both computer security and security in VoIP applications.
We found out that all had received unexpected contact attempts via a
VoIP application, however most had rejected the contact attempt. The in-
terviewees usually only interacted with their contacts via VoIP, but were
unable to reliably estimate how many buddies they had on their contact
lists and how frequently they used VoIP. Mobile telephony was the most
frequent way to contact friends, but Internet telephony was quite popu-
lar too, to avoid long-distance call charges. Four interviewees mentioned
dropped calls as an undesirable aspect of calling through Internet.
The interviewees exhibited typical security attitudes, considering them-
selves relatively knowledgeable about security yet unable to explain basic
security related terms such as phishing. But the more the participant
seemed to know about security, the less he considered himself to under-
stand it, and vice versa: the more ignorant felt the safest. This ﬁnding on
mismatch between estimated skill level and awareness on security could
in our view be of crucial importance: falsely based carelessness can create
an easy attack point. However, the interviewees realized on some level
that there were more risks related to Internet calling, yet one user be-
lieved VoIP to be the safest calling method available.
Reasons for the general mistrust of VoIP were manifold: one user ex-
pressed he did not trust VoIP because “they [the service provider] can sell
my proﬁle info.” Although this opinion affects the overall trust in VoIP,
it shows lack of trust towards the provider rather than being afraid of an
actual attack and is not as such related to the actual security of VoIP. In
users’ mind this worry was, however, part of the security concerns. This
is an important ﬁnding as it is crucial for the UI design that it encom-
passes what users ﬁnd as relating to security, even when from a technical
viewpoint it might not be related to security. To trust or distrust may
depend on such false assumptions and conceptualizations, and if ignored,
may stop the user from using the system.
The interviews revealed that there are some reservations towards the
security of VoIP, but concrete reasons were hard to pin down, as the un-
derstanding of the concepts varied. Therefore, in order to be able to de-
scribe any security mechanism efﬁciently, we sought to quantify how fa-
miliar different security-related terms are through the questionnaire, and
if there are some that are misunderstood. Furthermore, as the trust in the
service providers was an issue, we needed to assess how important privacy
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in VoIP is, which affects how security settings related to it would be re-
ceived, and whether these settings could make VoIP be more attractive.
Finally, in order to gain insight into the usefulness of the social ﬁltering
mechanism, and therefore how obtrusive dialogs related to it would be,
we wanted to know how common unsolicited VoIP calls or messaging is,
and how familiar people are with the associated dangers.
8.3.2 The Online Questionnaire
The link to the questionnaire was sent to several mailing lists and news-
groups to draw users. We also tried to gain respondents through Facebook
by advertising the study on one researcher’s personal Facebook account.
The questionnaire can be viewed at https://survey.hiit.ﬁ/index.php?sid=-
57695&lang=en. With 44 questions, the questionnaire began with basic
demographic questions (age, gender, education, nationality, native lan-
guage), and then continued with questions on telephony usage in general:
preference on the type of telephony used (mobile, land-line or Internet
telephony), and on previous experiences on Internet telephony (if any)
and on their current level of understanding of security: password prac-
tices, information sources for security, worries related to security and pri-
vacy and which applications they currently trusted. We then asked if they
recognized some security related terms such as phishing and pharming.
Finally, the last questions dealt with the respondent’s reactions to previ-
ous connection attempts, if any, from unknown callers or chatters over a
VoIP application. This part is relevant for the P2P VoIP calling, where
such connection attempts present a realistic use case.
Many questions were conditional, with the aim of having respondents
only go through questions that were relevant to their experiences: if a re-
spondent had used Internet telephony, the questionnaire would consist of
questions on the usage habits: how often, with whom, for what purposes,
and which applications the respondent was using for Internet telephony.
If a respondent had never used Internet telephony, she was presented
with questions on why not.
The questionnaire ended with a request for contact details for a possible
invitation to test “a new user interface for a mobile VoIP application” –
we recruited our mock-up testers among the questionnaire respondents.
If the respondent did not enter their contact details at this point, they
remained anonymous.
We received a total of 103 complete responses, 51/51 male/female (one
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respondent did not state gender). The majority of the respondents (43%)
were 25-29 years old. The respondents came from 28 countries; their ed-
ucational background was diverse. The data was analyzed against the
research questions:
VoIP was the preferred calling method only by 12% of the respondents.
Unlike the interviewees, 14% of the respondents had used VoIP on some
type of mobile device (other than laptop): a typical usage was calling and
chatting. 65% were interested in having VoIP services on their mobile
devices, although often for infrequent exploratory use only. The most an-
noying feature of VoIP applications were delays, unexpected connection
breakdowns, noise in the channel, and bad quality of voice.
The respondents seemed to associate security with passwords, viruses,
privacy, conﬁdentiality, and integrity of personal information. They see-
med to be aware of computer security in general; 93% said they discuss
issues related to security with other people. The majority was aware of at
least one major system attack and had had personal experience of being
infected by a virus as well. 32% believed they are very well informed
about security. Only 6% believed to be badly informed about security.
On security related behavior, 42% stated that it was easy to remem-
ber their passwords; 81% did not write down their passwords while 71%
were using same password for multiple services. The main security con-
cern was loss of personal data, none was using a good password policy.
Passwords were categorized into “simple” and “complicated”, in terms
of their memorability and structure. The simple passwords were used
for “non-sensitive” services such as University accounts – or e-mail ac-
counts, which were somewhat surprisingly considered non-sensitive by
many users. The more complex ones were for systems used for ﬁnancial
transactions.
The majority was unaware of encryption in VoIP applications. Only one
participant wished for encryption in VoIP, and three felt encryption should
depend on the nature of the call. Though the need for security seemed
small, the respondents showed relatively strong concerns towards online
privacy. When asked whether they believe their online activities can be
monitored, 50% had wondered if their Internet calls could be listened to,
and 60% had wondered if unauthorized parties could read their chat ses-
sions. The percentage of users that never thought about being violated
was 24% for calls and 21% for chats. Users seemed to believe that no one
would even try to eavesdrop on their conversations: “Who cares to know
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what I’m talking about!”.
The ﬁnding is in line with earlier work: most users tend to fall in the cat-
egory “privacy pragmatists”, who are aware, but relatively careless about
privacy, ready to trade it off for a bargain [6].
In order to understand how users deal with privacy violations, we asked
whether they had received via VoIP a call, or chat request, from someone
not on their contact list. Almost one third had had at least one such a call
and almost half at least one such chat request. 17% rejected the call and
14% also subsequently blocked the caller. For chats, 15% replied but 22%
blocked the stranger.
We also attempted to analyze the amount of trust users have for online
applications and services, and how they decide what to trust. 46% were
neutral regarding trust in VoIP; only 3% were absolutely trusting and
only 3% did not trust VoIP at all.
8.3.3 Creating and Testing a Paper Mock-up UI
Next, we crafted a set of paper mock-ups for the P2P VoIP application for
gathering user feedback. The goal was to study how interface proposals
for the security mechanisms presented in this dissertation would be per-
ceived on a mobile device. Although the mechanisms apply to all services
provided through the P2P system, the mock-ups (and later user interface)
was focused on VoIP, as it provides a familiar use-case.
As the questionnaire had conﬁrmed that privacy was an important is-
sue for people, the paper mock-up UI covered use cases mostly related to
dealing with unknown peers. These were:
Use case 1: User is calling
Use case 2: User receives a call
Use case 3: Introducing a buddy.
Use case 4: Managing your security/privacy settings
Figure 8.1 shows the main UI on the paper mock-up. Online and ofﬂine
contacts were visualized with green (online) and gray (ofﬂine). The main
UI also included personal information of the user (1), proﬁle preview (2),
dial pad (3), status (4) and the social distance mode (5). The personal
information included the user’s name, proﬁle picture and a personal, ed-
itable, message. The “Proﬁle preview” showed how other users see the
proﬁle. The dial pad was used for calls to people not on the contact list.
The status could be set to On, Away, Invisible or Off, and the social dis-
tance mode was used to ﬁlter incoming connections based on how well the
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Figure 8.1. Application main UI paper mock-up.
user is connected to the caller.
Use case 1 and 2: User is calling and receives a call.
When receiving a call, a button with a question mark appeared next to
the caller that, when pressed, displayed the social link we have to the
caller. As examples of these information displays, we presented mock-ups
such as Figure 8.2(a)-8.2(b), showing how the user is related to the caller.
(a) 2-hop connection with the caller. (b) 3-hop connection with the caller.
Figure 8.2. The interface presenting the user’s relationship to the caller.
One central concept was hops, the social distance between two users in
a network of buddies. We were interested in what number of hops would
still increase the trustworthiness of the caller.
Use case 3: Introducing a buddy.
In our design, “introduction” was possible only from a direct buddy to an-
other buddy. The introductions could be done with or without recommen-
dation. A recommendation was given as free-form text (Figures 8.3(a)-
8.3(b)).
Use case 4: Managing your security/privacy settings.
The default settings consisted of ﬁve parts: communication, modes, sta-
tus, buddy list and recent. The modes allowed the user to change the
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(a) Starting the introduction for a person in
contact list.
(b) Choosing to introduce a contact with or
without a recommendation.
Figure 8.3. Introducing contacts with and without recommendations.
privacy mode (Figure 8.4).
Figure 8.4. Choosing privacy mode.
8.3.4 Mock-up user test and analysis
We subjected the mock-up design to a semi-formal usability test where
users were asked to observe and comment on the paper prototype against
the four use cases. Users ﬁrst ﬁlled in their demographic data and were
then introduced to the use cases. Their reactions to the paper prototype
were ﬁrst observed and then discussed with the test moderator. Six uni-
versity students between 18-24 years old, two female and four male par-
ticipated in the study.
The main UI seemed relatively understandable: Users were able to
match the functions with the right buttons. It was easy for users to in-
terpret the various colors for buddies in the contact list. All users could
identify correctly the buttons for calling, chatting and sending mail.
Use case 1 and 2: User is calling and receives a call.
The ﬁrst two use cases were easily understood. In use case 2 (receiv-
ing a call), a question mark button was presented, which was designed to
reveal more information about the caller. Almost all participants under-
stood this. However, everyone did not understand how this information
was obtained and found our UI solutions awkward. One user proposed
that the icon be changed into a magnifying glass, in order to show that it
would lead you to more detailed information; another proposed alterna-
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tively clicking on the proﬁle picture of the caller to get more information.
The concept of displaying a common buddy was well understood, and
liked. However, some users claimed they would answer the call indepen-
dent of what is shown of the caller. Unconcerned with privacy, they stated
that accepting a call from a previously unknown person would depend on
their mood and current activities.
However, judging by the reactions to the mock-ups, it seemed that most
users would not answer a call coming from a user further than one hop
away: Four users stated they would only answer calls from at most a
buddy of a buddy. One user would answer only to buddies’ calls, and one
user would answer a call even within four hops. An interesting sugges-
tion for how to indicate your relationship to a person was to add a button
with a number inside. The number would indicate the number of common
friends. Pressing the button would reveal a list of these common buddies.
Users could also prevent themselves from appearing on such lists by an
option in the personal settings. User could also choose to be visible only
as an anonymous “common buddy”, without revealing their name.
Use case 3: Introducing a buddy.
The concept of introduction seemed easy to grasp. However, some users
misinterpreted the icon. One user mistook “introduction” as a way to ob-
tain additional information about the user; another user mistook it for an
invitation to a chat session. One user also misunderstood the direction
of the introduction. Finally, one user assumed introductions were possi-
ble only among buddies concurrently online, even though this was not the
case.
Use case 4: Managing your security/privacy settings.
Although a new concept, most users seemed to understand that modes
were somehow related to security and privacy. One participant however
related the term “mode” to emotional states and mood, believing that this
would affect the layout and look of the proﬁle.
8.3.5 VoIP UI
Based on the feedback from the mock-up user tests, we created a status
bar control menu, as well as a VoIP prototype application for the Nokia
N810 Internet Tablet. The status bar control was implemented for the
Internet tablets, which mimicked the native presence status control. In
addition to the presence control (online status), we added two new items;
the privacy settings and call ﬁltering. These were implemented as sub
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menus to the control menu, allowing the user to set the privacy mode
(Open, Relaxed and Paranoid) and the call ﬁltering (Friends only, Friend
of friend, In your network and Everyone), as illustrated in Figure 8.5.
Figure 8.5. Snapshots of the Maemo status bar control interface. Both the privacy mode
and the call ﬁltering could be conﬁgured, although the status of only one of
these were shown in the status bar icon.
The VoIP application provided standard instant messaging and voice
calls between users, as well as the ability to send and receive recommen-
dations and introductions. The application’s main interface (Figure 8.6(a))
consisted of a contacts manager where detailed information about con-
tacts could be viewed. This included images of the contact, simulated
location- and social networking updates, and any recommendations given
or received. The user could call, start a chat session or introduce (and
recommend) the contact to other users. Based on the feedback from the
mock-up tests, we clariﬁed the direction of introductions through arrows,
and emphasize that the functionality was available even though the con-
tact was ofﬂine.
(a) The main UI of the prototype application
on Nokia N810.
(b) The extended call-notiﬁcation view.
Figure 8.6. User interface for the P2P- aware VoIP application.
Upon receiving VoIP calls, an information panel was presented as part
of the phone call alert (Figure 8.6(b)). It contained images, recommen-
dations, the user’s social connection to the caller, as well as simulated
publicly available information (twitter tweets, search engine results) re-
garding the caller. This was designed to provide a richer experience than
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what the ’awkward’ mock-ups had offered, providing a context to the so-
cial link (i.e., through what sort of communities the caller might be linked
to the callee).
8.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have described how we have gathered user feedback
through different phases of creating the application and its UI in order
to make the emerging application and its unfamiliar security functional-
ity as understandable and usable to its intended users as possible. The
information gathered relates to current usage of mobile and Internet tele-
phony, and their perceived security. At each new phase of the design, we
used the previously gathered user feedback as input to guide the design
to better reﬂect user needs for the emerging application.
Privacy, both in terms of protecting your communication, as well as
knowing how to deal with unsolicited requests, is becoming more impor-
tant each day, affecting the type of communication technology we choose.
Our approach of utilizing social links has been well received, but the man-
ner in which they are presented has an impact of its perceived trustwor-
thiness. The interfaces we have created were considered a step in the
right direction, and can easily be adopted to similar systems.
However, only usage over an extended period of time would reveal if
the application enables security and privacy management that is both
acceptable and also desirable for the end users, and what will the effects
of habituation be on the actual usage.
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9. Trials and future work
As part of the project, we conducted a trial of the prototype system within
the networking research group at Helsinki Institute for Information Tech-
nology HIIT.We distributed approximately 20 Nokia N810 Internet tablets
to our colleagues, with the encouragement that they would use the pro-
totype system for P2P voice and video calls. The goal of the trial was to
evaluate the system through hands-on experience. We hoped to gain feed-
back on both the concept itself, as well as the usability of our solutions
and actual implementation. As these were distributed in an early phase
of the development, we also expected the trials to help the implementation
process, as a larger user base could reveal programming faults faster.
The ﬁrst challenge was to execute a smooth deployment of the test envi-
ronment. Instead of pre-installing all of the software and settings neces-
sary, we wanted to evaluate methods could also be used by real users, out-
side of our trials, to set up their own network. This would provide insight
into the deployment issues of the framework. Therefore, the only mod-
iﬁcation we decided to perform to the tablets was to upgrade the Linux
kernel version to support IPv6 and other extensions required by the HIP
daemon. This is an unusual and technical operation not commonly per-
formed by end-users.
During our evaluation with HTTP-based applications, we often had to
create different types of wrappers around the applications to make them
work with the interface provided by the framework (described in Chap-
ter 3.3.2). As examples of HTTP-based applications, we created a P2P ﬁle-
sharing application and a personal photocaster. The client applications
were often easy to conﬁgure. Most desktop web browsers can easily be set
to use the HTTP proxy interface of the prototype, resulting in intuitive
andmemorable URLs for the user (e.g., http://alice.at.p2pship.org/media).
The podcast client we used lacked support for HTTP proxies, but could use
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the URL-based interface. With the server software, we were required to
bundle additional bootstrapping applications or -scripts, as these needed
to be registered with the P2P proxy in order to serve requests.
SIP-based multimedia applications were much easier to use with the
system. The design of the SIP ecosystem ﬁts the framework much better,
as registration of the clients is built into the protocol and these rely on the
SIP servers to relay trafﬁc for them. All SIP applications we encountered
could be used unaltered with the prototype, just by conﬁguring them to
use the P2P proxy as a SIP proxy.
To ease the installation of the software, we set up an application reposi-
tory containing the pre-compiled software packages. These are databases
containing software that the graphical application manager of the tablet
uses. Furthermore, the Maemo OS supports a mechanism of adding new
software repositories to the application manager by opening specially for-
matted repository conﬁgurations ﬁles. We created one for our repository
and distributed it through a web site as well as by email. This enabled
the prototype system to be installed with a few clicks using the built-in
application manager.
The next challenge was to conﬁgure the prototype system. As discussed
in Chapter 8.3.5, the security settings of the framework were accessed
through a status bar plug-in. The identities, however, still required man-
ual initialization and importing to be accessible by the prototype. Further-
more, these would also need to be signed by a trusted identity authority
in order to prevent impersonation.
The identity acquirement was solved by creating a web-based identity
authority service site. The site featured a simple interface for requesting
an identity and used email veriﬁcation, limited to the hiit.f i domain, to
tie the identity to a real user. The identities were signed by an identity
authority created especially for the trials, and downloaded (after being
reviewed) in XML-formatted data ﬁles with the sufﬁx .identity.
The prototype software package contained in addition to the software
a mime-type deﬁnition and a desktop integration description. The mime-
type deﬁnition added a new ﬁle type to the Maemo OS, the P2PSHIP iden-
tity package. This was designed to identify the identity packages down-
loaded from the identity service (ﬁles with the sufﬁx .identity), and were
given the mime type application/x-p2pship-identity. The desktop inte-
gration description contains information about software, such as the type
of software, the services it provides and how it should be categorized (e.g.,
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a game, utility or graphics application). It also deﬁned the content types
which the application manages. By adding the newly created mime type
as content type for the prototype, the identities would be automatically
installed from the web site after being downloaded.
Although the trial environment is still active, we can at this point high-
light some observations. It has helped us in improving the prototype,
identifying faults and unexpected complications. The installation proce-
dure can be considered successful, as each one of the participants was
able to install the software and acquire an identity with low effort. It
seemed that conﬁguring the actual device was even harder: at the start of
the trial, many experienced problems connecting to each other. It seemed
that the users had formed two groups which could connect internally, but
not with each other. The problem was found to be the time zone setting
of the tablets. While initiating the device, it requires the user to conﬁg-
ure the current time and date. What went unnoticed by many was that
it also required you to specify the time zone. This resulted in some of the
users using the default (GMT), while others had conﬁgured the correct
(EEST). As these are two hours apart, the registration packets with a va-
lidity of one hour were either expired or not yet valid between two users
of different time zones.
Another observation has been the importance of presence. As discussed
in Chapter 3.3.1, we did not implement full presence support in the SIP
module. This was a clear underestimation of its importance, as it may
cause users to restrain from using the system (and seek an alternative
communication channel), as they are not sure whether the user will re-
spond. Finally, the power-saving techniques used by the tablets often
caused problems. As it is a mobile, resource-limited device with a lim-
ited power supply, it has advanced methods of powering down components
when not active. One of these is the WLAN interface and the networking
stack. In centralized communication systems, the communication appli-
cation periodically polls the service provider for updates, keeping a line
open for incoming requests. In the P2P system, this is not always the
case, which caused users to be unavailable unless they had engaged in
some sort of network activity recently. This, however, can be addressed by
maintaining artiﬁcial connections or actively participating in an overlay
network.
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9.1 Application experiments
The trial environment has inspired the development of a number of addi-
tional extensions and framework-aware applications that illustrate how
the environment can used. In the following we provide a brief description
of some of these.
ShipSharing. ShipSharing is a web-based social content-sharing ap-
plication that utilizes the P2P HTTP interface of the prototype. The goal
was to create a web-based content-sharing site that allows users to better
control how and to whom the content is exposed. We created a small social
networking site, similar to Facebook1, that lets users establish friendships
and interact with each other. The site featured a personal wall (writable
note board accessible for the user and his friends) and a content-sharing
page for each user. The site allowed content such as images, videos and
documents to be shared with users that had been accepted as friends.
However, the site used the P2P framework for actually delivering the con-
tent.
A content management application, implemented in the Python script-
ing environment of the prototype, was installed on the user’s device. This
provided content-sharing services through the P2P HTTP interface by
featuring a generic interface that accepted requests for sharing content
(opening a dialog allowing the user to choose the content to be shared)
and accessing the content that had been shared. When adding content to
the social networking site, it was not uploaded to the site itself. Instead,
the site used the framework to issue a P2P request to the user’s content
management application requesting for new content to be shared. After
the user had chosen the content to share (or rejected the request), the
content itself was not transmitted, only an identiﬁer used as index by the
content management application.
The social networking site used this index when rendering the user’s
shared content page. As the site did not have possession of the actual
content, it only linked it to the site by providing a reference to the content
sharing application of that user. This meant that the actual content was
fetched using P2P HTTP from the user when viewing the page, with the
content management application allowing the owner to restrict to whom
the content was shared. The user could set rules for how content was
shared, which could result in some being shown while other content was
1http://www.facebook.com
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inaccessible.
The experience we got from using the site was encouraging. Although
the content sharing suffered from availability issues (users being ofﬂine
or on slow Internet connections), the concept itself seemed to work. And
as we only experimented with one application, we have not explored the
full potential of such a system. The content-sharing application attached
to the P2P framework provided, as stated, a very generic interface. The
requests for sharing of content provided a parameter specifying the type
of content to be shared. This enables the same application to be used for
other sites (and content types) as well, which would in turn allow the user
to manage the content shared throughout all these sites from one location.
We later ported the content sharing web application to the popular so-
cial networking site Facebook as well. This was possible through the
Facebook application interface, which allows third-party applications to
be used within it. Although the social networking is managed by Face-
book, the content is transferred P2P, allowing users to better control with
whom content is shared. The application is hosted at
http://apps.facebook.com/shipsharing.
CoffeeSipper. The CoffeeSipper prototype consists of a custom SIP-
based Internet video call application designed for the Internet tablets.
When receiving a call, it automatically answers it and begins to stream
the video feed from the built-in camera. It was originally intended as a
playful P2P version of the Trojan room coffee camera2, but can be used for
any type of surveillance. Furthermore, support for SIP instant messaging
has been added, allowing users to send messages which are shown on the
display. The application is maintained at the SPEAR project repository3.
DoorPlates. The DoorPlates application consists of a UI and a custom
SIP client that is intended to replace the static room door plates (dis-
playing the names of the inhabitants) seen in ofﬁces. By replacing these
plates with an Internet tablet, we are able to provide additional, and more
dynamic, information. For instance, the SIP presence of the inhabitants
could be indicated on the UI. Status information can be sent directly from
the inhabitant’s P2P SIP application using an instant message to the door
plate. When away, visitors could use the door plate to make a video call or
leave a message, which is delivered as an instant message. The system is
also maintained at the SPEAR project repository.
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trojan_Room_coffee_pot
3http://code.google.com/p/p2pship
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SIP Gateway
The SIP integration enabled the framework to be used with a range of
real-time communication software, but only to communicate with other
users of the P2P network. This was experienced as restrictive and incon-
venient, as other applications were needed to contact friends that were
not part of the trial. Furthermore, there may be communication systems
that can not be converted to the P2P model, as they need centralized con-
trol for special security policies or billing. This led us to examine how the
P2P SIP communication could interact and co-exist with traditional, cen-
tralized, SIP architectures. In more general terms, we set out to ﬁnd how
P2P real-time communication systems can co-exist with centralized ones.
This would provide a more realistic user experience, as we are able to use
the same application for all our communication, whether P2P or not.
Interaction with an external SIP system was designed using a gateway
architecture. The SIP signaling is routed to a gateway adaptor plug-in
of the prototype, which forwards it to an external SIP server. Although
each user can act as a gateway itself, the gateway may also reside on
a remote peer. This might be useful for corporate environments, where
the management of the external accounts is centralized to a stable, well-
connected and -protected, peer server.
The gateway functionality was implemented in the prototype using redi-
rection rules. When receiving SIP signaling, the target of the message is
compared against a set of regular expressions to see whether the mes-
sage should be sent to the recipient directly, or redirected to another
peer. For instance, a rule stating that targets matching the expression
.∗@example.com should be redirected to gateway@p2p.example.com, would
result in all signaling to users of the example.com domain to be routed to
the peer gateway@p2p.example.com.
A remote gateway peer consists of two functionally separate entities: the
gateway peer (a P2P peer), and the attached gateway adaptor. The gate-
way peer receives the redirected signaling and compares it against its own
set of rules. These rules includes who is allowed to use the gateway (the
source peer of the SIP signaling), for whom it relays (the recipient of the
messages) and where the gateway adaptor is located (network address).
If the signaling conforms to these rules, the SIP message is sent to the
gateway adaptor for processing. The gateway adaptor is also responsible
for translating the identities of the SIP signaling into those used by the
external system through an account-mapping database.
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The gateway adaptor is in this way responsible for maintaining the user
accounts of the external systems and mapping these to the P2P identities.
For instance, a gateway to Skype mightmap the identity alice@p2psip.info
to alice_on_skype. A one-to-one mapping is not strictly necessary (all iden-
tities can be conﬁgured to a single one), but this would lead to all calls
from within the P2P system seeming to be coming from the same user.
Furthermore, receiving calls from the external system would not be possi-
ble, as the external identity maps to several P2P identities. The gateway
adaptor performs this substitution and forwards the message to the proxy
of the external system. Figure 9.1 illustrates this ﬂow. The gateway adap-
tor is naturally also responsible for keeping the registrations to the exter-
nal systems alive. This might cause confusion when placing calls from
the external system, as the user may seem available (as the registration
is maintained by the gateway adaptor), but the actual recipient is not.
Figure 9.1. Sample signaling ﬂow when placing a call to a user of an external system.
The gateway adaptor can be part of the local proxy, but is designed as
a separate entity and may be moved to another location, as discussed. In
general, as it will contain the usernames and passwords to the external
system for all the users it serves, it will be a trusted authority and pro-
tected accordingly. This does create a lucrative target for attacks, which
is a weakness of the design. However, as noted, some systems may re-
quire such a set-up, as the interface to the external system might not be
accessible to normal users, such as company-internal telephone systems.
Systems with weak security can also beneﬁt from being accessible only
through a gateway peer, as they can leverage the strong security offered
by the P2P framework. But for accessing normal public systems, a dedi-
cated remote peer is not needed.
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9.2 Future work
The framework presented in this dissertation has been designed as a plat-
form for exploring different issues applications operating in future net-
works may face. We have concentrated our efforts on building a generic
model deployable in current networks, compatible with existing applica-
tions. The model is simple, providing applications with basic connectiv-
ity and identity management, designed to be portable to different types
of network environments. This has provided a good start, allowing us
to rapidly develop our system and concentrate on addressing security is-
sues. To proceed however, we will need to look beyond integrating existing
applications and consider how future applications, aware of the network
environment, are designed.
We will continue the work by designing a run-time environment for na-
tive applications of the framework. This environment will provide appli-
cations greater access to the overlay network, not only for connection es-
tablishment, but also for features such as shared storage. We believe that
this will allow us to examine how future applications will use network
services, which correlates to how the networks need to be structured. Our
aim is to develop an interface which provides applications with a sufﬁ-
cient amount of ﬂexibility to accomplish complex tasks while remaining
simple and adaptable to different environments.
This will take us towards more data-oriented networking architectures
and publish-subscribe paradigms, which we have so far only brushed upon,
to be able to achieve the level of efﬁciency needed. Although many such
models have been proposed, the details of how exactly different types of
applications would be implemented in these environments has not been
explored. We would examine the most popular networking applications
and services used today and see how, if at all, they can be adapted to
distributed environments. In these environments, we imagine each peer
having the applications themselves, but often an incomplete or not cur-
rent view of the data set. This raises questions about who is allowed to
modify the shared database, or whose input we accept, which can result
in highly subjective views of the available data. This is what we intent to
explore with the native applications.
Another development track we will continue on is the identity man-
agement. As the legacy applications are currently unaware of the cross-
application identities, we are unable to fully leverage the potential syn-
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ergy. By allowing applications access to the identity management and
trust database could enable more precise and secure application behavior.
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10. Conclusions
As the Internet grows closer to the limits of what the current architec-
ture can handle, we look for new solutions in network management and
application design which would allow for more robust, scalable and efﬁ-
cient networking. Currently network services are dominated by central-
ized models. Large data sets are stored on (logically) single nodes, and
users are forced to route trafﬁc great distances through remote servers,
even when both parties are physically near, sharing the same local access
point.
Distributed models and use of P2P technologies in application design
has been a natural step towards a more scalable networking environ-
ment. On the network level, we see data-oriented and publish-subscribe
architectures proposed as solutions, providing better network efﬁciency
for many applications.
The concept of P2P and distributed applications is well known and there
exists a myriad of different implementations today. However, these are
exclusively highly focused applications, completing only a single task or
providing a speciﬁc service. For each one, new infrastructure has to be
deployed, security issues resolved and an identity scheme established. As
we look for new solutions, we must also realize that it is not only the
size of the network, the amount of content and users, that has grown,
but the way the network is used has changed as well. Today we access
the Internet from a variety of different devices in different places, using a
multitude of access technologies.
In this dissertation, we have explored the implications of a generic,
cross-application, P2P framework. With this framework, we have tried
to simulate a future networking environment that applications may face,
and studied security and other issues associated with it. We have shown
through a prototype implementation that such a framework can be de-
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ployed in existing networks by using existing infrastructure and advanced
networking protocols, and can be used even by current, existing, applica-
tions.
Much of our research has revolved around identity management and
trust. We have identiﬁed, and addressed, privacy issues and experimented
with leveraging cross-application identities to create a safer networking
environment. Finally, we have highlighted the importance of identity mo-
bility and how these may form the cornerstone of networking security in
the future.
We feel that our work has been fruitful, and provided a way of exper-
imenting with different models for how applications could work in the
networking environments we are headed for. Much of the research on fu-
ture networking has been concentrated on either efﬁcient network archi-
tectures or enhancing the application use in the current architecture. In
this dissertation, we have combined these and examined how applications
could be enhanced and adopted to a future networking environment.
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Appendix A P2P HTTP cache
advertisement algorithm
Following is a meta-code listing for the P2P HTTP caching algorithm dis-
cussed in Chapter 6.2.1.
1 class Advertisement :
2 """An advertisement for objects originating from a single host."""
3
4 def __init__(self, cache):
5 self.requests = []
6 self.cache = cache
7
8 # The oldest unpublished object
9 self.oldest = 0
10 # The furthest point in time we have valid objects
11 self.valid_until = 0
12
13 def publish(self, time):
14 """Publishes an advertisement """
15
16 # Record the accessibility delay
17 for request , request_time in self.requests:
18
19 # Include only objects that are still valid
20 if request_time + request.expire > time:
21 self.cache.published.items += 1
22 self.cache.published.delay += time - request_time
23
24 self.last_publish = time
25 self.oldest = 0
26
27 def add_event(self, request , time):
28 """Adds an object to the advertisement """
29
30 # Record the pause since the last request
31 pause = time - self.last_update
32 self.last_update = time
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33
34 # Check whether this was a ’miss’
35 if pause > self.cache.PUBLISH_DELAY and
36 pause < self.cache.AVERAGE_DELAY :
37 self.cache.ad_miss = True
38
39 # Update the time of the longest valid object
40 if request.expire + time > self.valid_until:
41 self.valid_until = request.expire + time
42
43 self.requests.add(request , time)
44
45 class Cache:
46 """The cache - keeps track of all advertisements """
47
48 def __init__(self, avg = 300, max = 15*60):
49 self.ad_miss = False
50 self.published_count = 0
51 self.published.delay = 0
52 self.published.items = 0
53 self.advertisements = {}
54
55 # The average delay we strive to
56 self.AVERAGE_DELAY = avg
57 # The maximum delay limit
58 self.MAX_DELAY = max
59
60 # Initially, the publish delay is set to the strived -to average
61 self.PUBLISH_DELAY = self.AVERAGE_DELAY
62
63 # By how much we should increase / decrease the timeouts
64 self.PUBLISH_INCREASE = 0.1
65
66 def check(self, time):
67 """Checks whether we should publish or adjust the timouts"""
68
69 # For each host, check whether we should publish an advertisement
70 for ad in self.advertisements :
71
72 # if there has been activity , we have valid objects
73 # and a timeout has passed , publish
74 if ad.last_update > ad.last_publish and ad.valid_until > time:
75 if (ad.last_update + self.PUBLISH_DELAY ) < time
76 or (ad.oldest + self.MAX_DELAY) < time:
77 ad.publish(time)
78 self.published_count += 1
79
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80 # Adjust the timeouts based on the average accessibility delay
81 if self.published_count > 10:
82 acc_delay = self.published.delay / self.published.items
83 adjustment = 0
84
85 # Decrease timeout if we are over the average
86 if acc_delay > self.AVERAGE_DELAY :
87
88 # The decrease is proportional
89 diff = acc_delay - self.AVERAGE_DELAY
90 adjustment = (diff * self.PUBLISH_DELAY )) / acc_delay
91 else:
92
93 # Otherwise, decrease the timeout , unless..
94 adjustment = self.PUBLISH_INCREASE * self.PUBLISH_DELAY
95
96 # ..we had a miss: increase the timeout
97 if self.ad_miss:
98 adjustment = -adjustment
99
100 self.PUBLISH_DELAY -= adjustment
101
102 # Re-set the counters
103 self.ad_miss = False
104 self.published_count = 0
105 self.published.delay = 0
106 self.published.items = 0
107
108 def process_event (self, request , time):
109
110 # Add each event to the host-specific advertisements
111 ad = self.advertisements [request.host]
112 if ad is None:
113 ad = Ad(self)
114 self.advertisements [request.host] = ad
115
116 ad.add_event(request , time)
117
118
119 # The cache
120 cache = Cache()
121
122 # Point of entry for the cache simulator. The all_events array
123 # contains all requests , ordered by time.
124 all_events = load("browsing.log")
125 for time in range(1, all_events.max_time):
126 for request in all_events.requests_at[time]:
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127 cache.process_event (request , time)
128
129 # Each second , check whether we should publish or adjust the timeout
130 check.cache(time)
196
9HSTFMG*agagdh+ 
ISBN 978-952-60-6063-7 (printed) 
ISBN 978-952-60-6064-4 (pdf) 
ISSN-L 1799-4934 
ISSN 1799-4934 (printed) 
ISSN 1799-4942 (pdf) 
 
Aalto University 
School of Science 
Department of Computer Science 
www.aalto.fi 
BUSINESS + 
ECONOMY 
 
ART + 
DESIGN + 
ARCHITECTURE 
 
SCIENCE + 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
CROSSOVER 
 
DOCTORAL 
DISSERTATIONS 
A
a
lto
-D
D
 14
/2
0
1
5
 
 
J
o
ak
im
 K
o
sk
ela 
A
 S
ecu
re P
eer-to
-P
eer A
p
p
licatio
n
 F
ram
ew
o
rk
 
A
a
lto
 U
n
ive
rs
ity 
Department of Computer Science 
A Secure Peer-to-Peer 
Application Framework 
Joakim Koskela 
DOCTORAL 
DISSERTATIONS 
